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

A WORD IN SEASON;

OR

REVIEW OF THE POLITICAL LIFE AND OPINIONS

OF

MARTIN VAN BUREN.

ADDRESSED

TO THE ENTIRE DEMOCRACY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

"We contend for a well regulated democracy."—*John Marshall.*

DEDICATED TO THE TIPPECANOE CLUBS OF THE UNION,

BY A HARRISON DEMOCRAT.

Robert Mayo. M. D.

WASHINGTON:
PUBLISHED BY W. M. MORRISON.
1840.

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PREFACE.

In a review of the political life and opinions of one who has attained to the summit of official honors in the gift of his countrymen, it is deemed both proper in itself, and a duty we owe to the dignity of the office, at least, to give some general description of the authorities from which we have derived the facts stated. Of these authorities, that which is entitled, by courtesy, to the first notice, is

"The Life and Political Opinions of MARTIN VAN BUREN, by *William M. Holland*," published at Hartford, Ct., 1835, by Belknap & Hamersley. This book was written with the avowed object, in part, "to contribute to the political elevation of Mr. Van Buren." In the preface, (page ix,) the writer expresses his "great obligations to the Hon. Benjamin F. Butler for the ability and zeal with which he has on several occasions defended the character of his distinguished friend;" and tenders his "particular thanks to the Hon. James Vanderpoel, who has facilitated the collection of materials for his work," which he professes to submit to the public also as "a contribution to support democratic principles." The Life of Mr. Van Buren, thus boastfully ushered before the public, and greatly bepraised by the Globe and other party presses at the time of its appearance, must have entitled it to be considered authentic and satisfactory to the friends of Mr. Van Buren and to himself at the time of its publication. But many of the facts stated in this book with the expectation of advancing his ambition then, having at length commenced to act against him, have given occasion to some of his friends recently to declare it to be "a forgery." This attempt, however, to discredit their own production, at this late day, has entirely fallen to the ground, as a considerable reward offered by the editors of the Madisonian for a "forged copy," has failed to produce one, or any evidence of such "forgery."

"The Political Mirror," &c., published by J. P. Peaslee, No. 49, Cedar street, New York, 1835, has also afforded an ample source of information, such, too, as is not contained in Holland's memoir. This is a work of great merit, and bears an internal evidence that traces its authorship to one of the most profound statesmen of the present day. It is a magazine of astounding facts and astute deductions, so extensive in details and admirable in method as to have drawn from an eminent Senator the complimentary expression that "it will form the basis of the future history of these disjointed times."

Also, "A Memoir of Martin Van Buren, comprising an account of the intrigues by which he sought and acquired the nomination and election to the office of Chief Magistrate, together with developments of his political character, by A CITIZEN OF NEW YORK, printed by R. W. Roberts, New York, 1828," has afforded us much additional light.

A large portion of the facts stated are also derived from public documents in the Secretary's and Clerk's offices of the two Houses of Congress, as well as from various other authentic sources, which are referred to, respectively, when the facts are stated.

We have arranged the whole review in *three periods* of time.

The FIRST PERIOD commences with Master Van Buren's apprenticeship to the study of law at 14 years of age, and runs to the time of his attaining a seat in the United States Senate in 1821, giving a summary of his political tergiversations, his perfidy, and his intrigues for political advancement during that period.

The SECOND PERIOD runs from the time of his taking his seat in the Senate till he attained to the Presidential chair, as the nominee and successor of General Jackson, giving the commencement of his efforts, and the history of his success, in transferring the spoils system to the General Government; his clandestine devices and influences to facilitate *executive encroachments* on the other departments of the Government; and the *concentration of all power* in the Presidency before his election to that office, which he confidently anticipated and steadily pursued while he was Senator of the United States, Secretary of State, minister to England, and Vice President.

The THIRD PERIOD exhibits the *uses* and *abuses* he has made of those CONCENTRATED POWERS, in the short time which has elapsed since his election to the Presidency was consummated, by certain clandestine artifices that prostrated the elective franchise of twelve millions of freemen at the feet of a military despot in the civic garb, for the benefit of a favorite POLITICAL ADVENTURER.

Each of these periods of time are divided into several SECTIONS, according to the diversity of the subjects they embrace, and they reciprocally run into each other as the elucidation of their connecting subjects require; so that the THIRD PERIOD is for the most part anticipated by the recitals and allusions incident to the details of the FIRST and SECOND.

The whole is premised with an exposition of the principles of true democracy in contradistinction from those of an ambitious faction who attempt to cheat and decoy the people to their support by assuming that honored and popular name.

WASHINGTON, *September* 15, 1840.

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PRELIMINARY.

"We contend for a well-regulated Democracy."
[*John Marshall's speech in the Virginia Convention on the adoption of the Constitution.*

The true Democracy—of Statesmen, Patriots, and lovers of the Constitution—contrasted with the false Democracy of restless, ambitious innovators, and enemies of the Constitution.

One who professes to labor in the *cause of Democracy* might well be expected, certainly permitted, to explain what he conceives to be the true meaning of DEMOCRACY, and in what consists THE DEMOCRATIC CAUSE, particularly as he wholly dissents to the gross perversion of those terms in latter times. I will, therefore, previously to entering upon the proper subject of this review, devote this PRELIMINARY SECTION to a statement of my sentiments of these terms, showing that they are the same with those of the wisest and purest patriots of the better days of the republic, contrasted with those disorganising, revolutionary sentiments of the ambitious, upstart, radical, and false pretending "democratic leaders" of the present degenerate times.

A Democracy, in the true American sense, is a well-regulated Government of the People, through their representatives and agents—from *demos*, the people, and *krateo*, to govern.

The DEMOCRATIC CAUSE is the cause of *Justice* in any community, whether between man and man individually, or by classes, callings, sections, or associations, legally, geographically, or otherwise formed.

True Democracy is necessarily based upon JUSTICE, because it is an intrinsic principle of human rights, which should be held in strict observance as the indispensable RULE of the different departments of Government in prosecuting the public good, which could not be attained without it; and, especially, it should be unabated in its supremacy over the *enactment* of LAWS under the Constitution, as well as in the *adjudication* and the *administration* of them. Against the cause of Democracy and Justice, which are thus shown to be identical, it is clear that all violent or sudden *innovations* on the business operations of society are as disparaging and derogatory, by the indirect operations of such policy in impoverishing some and enriching others, as if the property of the one were violently seized and transferred to the other.

The cause of JUSTICE, then, strictly so considered, is *the true Democratic cause*, because it sustains the *equitable interests and rights of* ALL. And whatever INDIVIDUAL, or CLASS, or COMBINATION, of society may seek politically to advance his or their interests by wilfully infringing or disparaging the general interests of the community, is a presumptuous *monocrat* in principle, in the individual capacity, and, in the case of the combination, is a *faction*, a *conspiracy*, or a *despotism of the many over the few*, according to the extent of its numbers, and the success of the *schemes of injustice*.

Having entertained these sentiments for years, upon now reducing them to paper a reminiscence comes upon my mind, that I have high authority for them, as old as our revolutionary history, when *all our patriotic ancestors*, THE REVOLUTIONARY WHIGS, were considered and treated as *Democrats*, and the *Tories* alone were excluded or exempted from the honor or the odium of the appellation, as it was held on this or the other side of the Atlantic. It does appear, however, that, at a later period, when our present federal Constitution was under discussion in the several States for adoption, there were some symptoms of restricting the term Democracy to narrower limits: that is, to the friends of the Constitution, for a time at least, until it became the fundamental law of the land; after which, its veriest enemies may charitably be considered as *acquiescing Democrats*. But during the discussion of the Constitution, the advocates of its adoption, *the friends of the Union*, called themselves "Democrats," declaring that "they contended for a well-regulated Democracy;" while the opponents of its adoption, *the enemies of the Union*, and advocates of separate State sovereignties, called themselves "State Rights Republicans." How unjustly the former have been since stigmatized as federal consolidationists by the latter, who have at the same time filched from them their good old name of Democrats, and appropriated it to themselves, I must for the present leave it to the reader to judge.

I shall give one or two authorities only, to show how universally the friends of the Constitution, previous to its adoption, were considered as the true lovers of Democracy, and how all its former friends and foes have, since its adoption, been considered to be RE-UNITED as one great *Democratic Party*.

The immortal John Marshall, that learned jurist and profound statesman, the late Chief Justice of the United States, when advocating the merits of the Constitution, in debate on its adoption in the Virginia Convention, said:

"Mr Chairman, I conceive that the object of the discussion now before us is, whether democracy or despotism be most eligible. I am sure that those who framed the system submitted to our investigation, and those who now support it, intend the establishment and security of the former. The supporters of the constitution claim the title of being firm friends of the liberty and the rights of mankind. They say that they consider it as the best means of protecting liberty. We, sir, idolize democracy. Those who oppose it [the constitution] have bestowed eulogiums on monarchy. We prefer this system to any monarchy, because we are convinced that it has a great tendency to secure our liberty and promote our happiness. We admire it, because we think it a well-regulated democracy. It is recommended to the good people of this country—they are, through us, to declare whether it be such a plan of Government as will establish and secure their freedom.

"The honorable gentleman (Mr. Henry) has expatiated on the necessity of a due attention to certain maxims—to certain fundamental principles from which a free people ought never to depart. I concur with him in the propriety of the observance of such maxims They are necessary in any Government, but more essential to a democracy than to any other. What are the favorite maxims of democracy? A STRICT OBSERVANCE OF JUSTICE and PUBLIC FAITH, and a STEADY ADHERENCE TO VIRTUE."—*Elliot's Edition Va. Debates, page* 222.

"There are in this State, and in every State in the Union, many who are decided enemies of the Union. Reflect on the probable conduct of such men. What will they do? They will bring amendments which are local in their nature, and which they know will not be accepted. They will never propose such amendments as they think would be obtained. Disunion will be their object. We contend for a well-regulated democracy!"—*Ibid., p.* 224.

Long after the adoption of the Constitution, and even when party spirit was wrought up to the highest state of ferment on merely controversial points, but when all professed to be equal friends of the Constitution, Mr. Jefferson, in his inaugural address, illustrated our democratic political identity in the following appropriate manner. He said:

"During the contests of opinion through which we have passed, the animation of discussions and of exertions has sometimes worn an aspect which might impose on strangers unused to think freely, and to speak and to write what they think; but this being now decided by the voice of the nation, announced according to the rules of the constitution, all will of course arrange themselves under the will of the law, and unite in common efforts for the common good. All, too, will bear in mind this sacred principle, that, though the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will, to be rightful, must be reasonable; that the minority possess their equal rights, which equal laws must protect, and to violate would be oppression. Let us, then, fellow-citizens, unite with one hand and one mind; let us restore to social intercourse that harmony and affection without which liberty, and even life itself, are but dreary things. And let us reflect that, having banished from our land that religious intolerance under which mankind so long bled and suffered, we have yet gained little, if we countenance a political intolerance as despotic, as wicked, and capable of as bitter and bloody persecutions. During the throes and convulsions of the ancient world, during the agonizing spasms of infuriated man, seeking through blood and slaughter his long lost liberty, it was not wonderful that the agitation of the billows should reach even this distant and peaceful shore—that this should be more felt and feared by some and less by others—and should divide opinions as to measures of safety; but every difference of opinion is not a difference of principle. We have called by different names brethren of the same principle. WE ARE ALL REPUBLICANS; WE ARE ALL FEDERALISTS. If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this Union, or to change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated, where reason is left free to combat it."

Now is it not obvious, from the solemn asseveration of these eminent men, conspicuous as they were for their opposing controversial opinions, that it never entered the heads of our revolutionary patriots to *exclude* any portion of the friends of our independence and of the constitution from the great political fold of democracy, and denounce them as *aristocrats*, as *enemies of democracy*, as an *anti-democratic party*, and that, merely because they may have attained superior *intelligence*, *education*, *wealth*, *integrity*, and *consideration* in society? Nay, who ever dreamed of such injustice until this age of political humbuggery, emanating from a fraudulent and wicked "spoils dynasty?" Will those political quacks and imposters have the impudence to pretend that Stephen Girard, in passing from the obscure state of a poor boy to the enviable condition of a "millionaire," by his own industry and economy, was at the same time necessarily transformed into an *aristocrat* or "an enemy to the cause of democracy?" His whole life and his last act in death—*his will*—fully attest the contrary. *He was born and died a democrat!* The poor logic by which these men would argue the exclusion of the wealth and intelligence of society from the democratic cause, would operate to the exclusion of Mr. Van Buren himself and most of his adherents, who have contrived this humbug to deceive and flatter those who may not possess these advantages; but, being considered as constituting the most numerous portion of our citizens, would be likely to subserve their political purposes by the success of the trick. They also calculate that, by denouncing all the opponents of Mr. Van Buren as *enemies of the democratic cause*, they may decoy many into his ranks on account of their partiality for true democratic principles, and may frighten many others from abandoning him, lest they be read out of the democratic school. But fortunately for the salvation of the country, the good sense of vast numbers is daily undeceiving them by aid of the flood of light that is continually revealing the wickedness of his own *anti-democratic course*, and teaching them that to abandon him is the best evidence of *their adhesion to the cause of democracy*. But let the partisans of Mr. Van Buren speak for him and themselves. William M. Holland, his favored biographer, explicitly says that all the *opponents* of Mr. Van Buren's administration are *enemies to democracy*. At page 357, he makes the following precious admissions by way of boasting, viz:

1. "It may be safely stated that *two-thirds* of the PUBLIC PRESSES in this country *are opposed to the principles of the present administration.*
2. "The PERIODICAL REVIEWS and LITERARY JOURNALS *lean against the democratic cause*, without a single exception.
3. "PUBLIC SEMINARIES of instruction are under *the same bias.*
4. "The LEARNED PROFESSIONS are under *the same bias.*
5. "And a vast preponderance of the *literary* and *oratorial* TALENT of the country are under *the same bias.*
6. "WEALTH, FASHION, &c., are, to a great extent, arrayed against the democratic cause.

"How, then," he vauntingly and significantly asks, "does it happen that the people [minus the above] are guided by opposite sentiments?"

Presuming that the reader has a curiosity to know what these sentiments are, I place before him the following brief extract from the same book, (page 9 of the preface,) where those sentiments, which have been generally attributed to the supporters of Mr. Van Buren, and those of his opponents in relation to them, are clearly contrasted in a few words. He says:

"In submitting to the public this contribution to the support of democratic principles, the author is well aware that he shall not escape the censure of those who anticipate the destruction of all political and religious truth, by the leveling spirit of democracy."

He then adds, with levity, that he makes no question of "the sincerity of their melancholy forebodings," and displays a frivolous attempt to escape from the just censure to which he alludes, by alleging that "if, by democracy, you understand" what Mr. Roger Collard says of it, he is "well pleased with such democracy." Now the democracy which Roger Collard speaks of, is precisely the democracy which the whole American people aimed at when they adopted the constitution, as described in the foregoing extracts from Marshall and Jefferson, and quite the reverse of the destructive schemes of that misnomer and humbug called "Van Buren democracy," of whose doctrines, in common with his party, the following is a summary, as alleged to have been "always cherished by him," on the united authority, direct and indirect, of the New York Evening Post, the Boston Quarterly Review, the Democratic Review, and the Globe, viz:

1. That "anarchy is but a state of transition."
2. That "human regulations [law and justice] produce an artificial and unjust distribution of property."
3. That "the only real enemies to workingmen are their own employers."
4. That "wages are worse than slave labor;" that "the Northern system of labor is more oppressive than that of the South."
5. That "universal education is a mockery, and promises no relief for poverty."
6. That "poverty is only to be remedied by war and bloodshed, of the poor against the rich."
7. That "the sub-Treasury is paving the way for that catastrophe to come up."
8. That "the cause of the inequality of conditions is attributable to religion and the clergy."
9. That "the complete and final destruction of the clergy is necessary to elevate the laboring classes."
10. That "the evils of society are not to be cured by converting men to the christianity of the church."
11. That "uncompromising hostility to the whole banking system, and all incorporations, is the 'first step' of their reform."
12. That "every friend to 'corporations' is an enemy to the laborer."
13. That "hereditary property is a great evil;" that "at a man's death, his property must go to the State."
14. Finally, that "the rites of marriage should be abolished;" and give place to the licentiousness of the natural state, of course.

Of the destructive tendency of the "leveling spirit" of Van Burenism, *not* democracy, according to the sentiments just quoted, we have thousands of evidence; the very atmosphere we breathe is pregnant with them; the *resolutions of Van Buren meetings* held in the hearts of our cities, previously prepared by designing leaders, testify to it; and the speeches by which such proceedings are urged in various quarters, show the direction whence they come. Take the single resolution from many others like it, passed at a Van Buren meeting in Philadelphia not a year ago, viz: "That the doctrine of *vested rights* is at variance with the democratic principle; that chartered privileges (or corporations) are incompatible with freedom and equality!" Take the declaration of Mr. Senator Wright, of New York, in a speech delivered in his own State during the last summer, and republished in the Richmond Enquirer, viz: that "we have *now* reached the *period* when it is believed to be a common ERROR *to suppose that the revolution was complete;*" that "it is TIME, therefore, that we should inquire *for what was that revolution undertaken?*" that "it *was* to dismiss *monarchy*, ARISTOCRACY, and DESPOTISM!" Now the drift of all this, and a thousand other similar announcements and proclamations, is too obvious to be blinked—we cannot close our eyes upon them; if we do, they are thundered in our ears; and if we stuff them up to exclude the odious sound, this *revenant* of Jacobinism haunts our most inward thoughts. We all know that *monarchy* has been driven from these shores—what, then, remains of the enumerated objects above, to complete the revolution, "to be dismissed," (or rather "to be despatched" in the technicality of the guillotine,") but the "aristocracy," as Mr. Wright terms it, of wealth, intelligence, and civilization itself, exemplified, or rather personified, in the thrifty, industrious, moral, and religious portions of the community; they still "remain," and are characterized by Mr. Wright as a "despotism yet to be dismissed;" and "vested rights," by which every man of property holds his lands, his houses, and other effects, are, in set terms, made war upon by the Van Buren partisans of Philadelphia and New York; in which latter city different classes of them have, in advance, adopted the appropriate name of HUGE-PAWS, BUTT-ENDERS, POINT-ENDERS, &c.

All of these and other demonstrations made on the public mind at a distance, are but emanations from the central executive machinery at Washington, where public sentiment is manufactured by a conclave under the superintendence of *Amos Kendall*, and the clandestine influence of Mr. VAN BUREN. Some of the out-givings of that *junta* were made by Amos Kendall and Mr. Benton, in short speeches at the Hickory Club festival given on the 5th December, 1832. Among other things in the same strain, Kendall said:

"The United States have their young nobility system. Its head is the Bank of the United States; its right arm, a protecting tariff and manufacturing monopolies; its left, growing State debts and State incorporations."

Thus, in a breath, and with that imperial brevity so out of place as to cast an air of the burlesque upon it, does Amos Kendall and his associates and prompter put under the bans of the

Federal Government, our whole system of import duties, manufactures, State negotiations for internal improvements, and State incorporations of every description, of which *corporate institutions* the flourishing and provident State of Pennsylvania alone has upwards of *two hundred*.

The New York Review for the month of July, in an article on the Constitutional History of Greece, as I learn from the National Intelligencer of the 15th August, speaks volumes on this subject, of which I subjoin an extract, which is a brief but pointed illustration of our own case, viz:

"THUCYDIDES has sketched the whole philosophy of a 'reign of terror,' the mystery of *constructive majorities*, by which a few bold and crafty spirits dictate their own opinions to the multitudes they affect to obey, and measures opposed by almost every individual of a great mass are seemingly adopted with perfect unanimity, in a few words, as exactly descriptive of certain recent events as if they had been expressly intended as a history of them. It is curious to see what is called, by the political wire-drawers of the day, 'party discipline,' or, in plain English, the *art of thinking for the people*, as familiar to the demagogues of antiquity as to those even of this privileged age."

And yet, what most unequivocally points out the origin and concert of action I have just adverted to, (which can be fully proved by a committee vested with power to send for persons and papers,) is the fact, that Mr. Van Buren has, in the last paragraph but one of his late message at the commencement of the present Congress, virtually endorsed this very denunciation of Kendall's against *all State incorporations;* to accomplish the overthrow of which he invokes the spirit of revolution, *per fas aut nefas*, peaceably, if it can be so accomplished, but forcibly, and by torrents of blood, if necessary. His words are:

"To remove the influences which had thus gradually grown up among us—to deprive them of their deceptive advantages—to test them by the light of wisdom and truth—to oppose the force which they concentrate in their support—all this was necessarily the work of time, even among a people so enlightened and pure as that of the United States. In most other countries, perhaps, it could only be accomplished through that series of revolutionary movements, which are too often found necessary to effect any great and radical reform; but it is the crowning merit of our institutions, that they create and nourish, in the vast majority of our people, a disposition and a power peaceably to remedy abuses which have elsewhere caused the effusion of rivers of blood, and the sacrifice of thousands of the human race. The result *thus far* is most honorable to the *self-denial*, the intelligence, and the patriotism of our citizens; it justifies the confident hope that they will carry through the reform which has been so well begun, and that they will go *still farther* than they have yet gone in illustrating the important truth, that a people as free and enlightened as ours, will, *whenever it becomes necessary*, show themselves to be indeed capable of self-government, by voluntarily adopting *appropriate remedies* for every abuse, and submitting to *temporary sacrifices*, HOWEVER GREAT, to insure their permanent welfare."

I grant that this endorsement is made in Mr. Van Buren's accustomed indirect, parenthetical, and equivocal manner, not so easily comprehended by the generality of readers, except by the aid and comparison of correlative facts; but upon viewing the whole connexion, it is easy to perceive the ardent purpose so concealed, and for which, if any thing, he should be held the more responsible. The confirmations, also, of this purpose of revolution, were they wanted, are abundantly supplied by the subsequent acts of his despotic majority in the two Houses of Congress, in destroying the *business corporations* of this District as a commencement, in attempting to disgrace the *States' internal improvement stock* by refusing to assume their debts unasked, and in attempting to establish *a standing army of* 200,000 *men*, under the pretence of regulating the militia, but to *revive the sedition law* by the application of the army regulations to the voters throughout the country, to the extent of the two-hundred thousand militia so intended to be brought under the army regulations.

If these few facts, selected from thousands that might be recited, are not sufficient to prove the settled purpose of revolution, till an authentic investigation by a committee of Congress may have an opportunity to do so, I will here add only one other *ex-officio* manouvre to throw further light upon it.

Amos Kendall, late Postmaster General, who has been authorized to withdraw from the cabinet expressly to launch upon an editorial crusade against the elective franchise of the people, in order to accomplish the re-election of Mr. Van Buren, has, in the 3d number of the extra Globe, issued a bulletin, of a column in length, addressed to all those of our fellow-citizens whom he pleases to denominate "democrats"—whom, on a previous occasion, in his circular petitioning for subscriptions to his paper, he defined to be "farmers, mechanics, and workingmen," excluding all other citizens from that honor. In his bulletin, he says:

"FOURTH OF JULY.—It becomes democrats this year to go into the celebration of our great anniversary, not with hilarity and mirth, but with solemnity and fervor. They should go into it with something of the feeling which our forefathers did in 1778 and 1779, when the British hirelings were attempting to quench the flame of liberty in the best blood of America," &c. &c.

"Let democrats reflect on these things as they go to celebrate the Fourth of July. Let the reflection make them serious and thoughtful. Let them remember the pledges of their forefathers to each other, on this sacred day in 1777-'78-'79-'80-'81," &c. "Let this remembrance inspire them with the resolution of their fathers, and induce them to swear their fathers' oath, to live free or die." "It is not now they are called on to defend their liberty in fields of blood. Through your own right of suffrage, democrats of America, the enemy attacks you, and in that is your present defence. Your weapons are as yet those of peace, and by a resolute use of them, the occasion for resort to other means of defence may be forever averted. But should you, by listleness and indifference, suffer the enemy to get possession of your Government, of its Treasury, and its army, you may not be able hereafter to place in Congress, in the Executive chair, or even in your State Legislatures, the representatives of your choice," &c. &c.

"Swear on the Fourth of July to avert that catastrophe." "Band together, and prepare to March to the polls, not with arms, or knives, or clubs, to beat and butcher your fellow-citizens, but with hearts firmly resolved, by an honest and independent exercise of the right of suffrage, to avert the possible necessity of marching hereafter in battle array to put down usurpation!!"

The possible election of General Harrison is, then, by this miscreant, Kendall, made the occasion to excite the partisans of Mr. Van Buren, to prepare, *in that event*, to march "in battle

array" to put down "*usurpation!*" as he presumes to stigmatize the success of him or any one else at the polls, over Mr. Van Buren! Is not this an avowal that the present party of office-holders already claim the Government AS THEIR OWN; and that they propose, and are preparing, to defend its *possession*, WITH BLOOD AND CIVIL WAR! if they can put a sufficient number of the people in the mood, in addition to the means of the "Treasury and the army" already in their hands—nay, that Mr. Van Buren himself has authorized, and is responsible for this threat? If any one doubts this, let him bear in mind that this bulletin was issued a few days before the passage of the sub-Treasury bill legalizing their posession of the Treasury, in all probability to stimulate the *party slaves* in the House where the bill had slept, and to encourage them with the belief that such an appeal would have a good effect on their drooping cause at the polls. Let him also bear in mind, that though the bill was passed two or three days *before* the Fourth of July, that hallowed day, at 12 o'clock, was desecrated and disgraced by Mr. Van Buren, to *sign the bill*, as "another declaration of independence!" and that the arrangement was so announced in advance by the Globe, for stage effect, at the celebrations of the anniversary, as far as the announcement could reach, in time—and that it was so glorified in Philadelphia by the PARTY. Also let him remember that Mr. Van Buren is the very man who returned his cordial thanks to a committee of Philadelphia Van Buren men, a year or two ago, "for the offer of 10,000 minute men armed and equipped as his *first legion*, to execute his orders issued or to be issued!!" and if all these things do not satisfy him of what is intended, if they dare, I should say, *his dulness of apprehension when his liberty is in danger*, BUT THE BETTER FITS HIM FOR A PALACE SLAVE!! Here is a copy of the resolution and the letter of thanks alluded to:

"1. *Resolved*, That the more effectually to uphold the constitutional Government of our choice and of our love; to secure the rigid enforcing of the laws of Congress, and the orders of the Executive, either now issued, or which may hereafter be issued; for the preservation and protection of the public lands from the grasp of speculators, and securing the nation its constitutional specie currency; to protect United States officers in the discharge of their public duties, and at the same time the public peace from outrage: We, the sovereign people, do hold ourselves ready to organize in this city and county of Philadelphia, a first volunteer legion of ten thousand men, to be as shortly as possible fully armed and equipped, the same to be called The Philadelphia United States Minute Men."

[For this pledge of support, President Van Buren returned his 'sincere acknowledgments' in the following letter:]

"WASHINGTON, *May* 29, 1837.

"GENTLEMEN:—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter communicating to me the proceedings of a large meeting of the citizens of the city and county of Philadelphia, without distinction of party, held in Independence Square, on the 22d instant.

"It is gratifying to me to learn from those proceedings, that the course pursued by myself and those associated with me in the Executive branch of the Government, upon the important subjects of the currency, foreign trade, and the public lands, receives the cordial approbation of so meritorious and respectable a portion of my fellow-citizens.

"For this expression of their confidence and good will, and for the accompanying pledge of support and co-operation in upholding the authority of the constitution and laws, I beg you to make to those you represent my sincere acknowledgments.

"Thanking you, gentlemen, for the flattering and friendly manner in which you have performed the duty assigned to you, I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, M. VAN BUREN.

"To Messrs. F. STOEVER, ISRAEL YOUNG, and JOSEPH DEAN."

Though the foregoing classification of Mr. Van Buren's supporters, as embracing the farmers, mechanics, and workingmen, be in a very material degree false—yet it shows what desperate assumptions the party can resort to, in claiming for their supporters the most numerous classes of society, in order, if possible, to flatter and win them to their desperate cause, under the captivating banner of democracy, as if these classes constituted the whole democracy or exclusive democrats, and could dispense with all other classes and callings in society as drones, intruders, and nuisances. Whereas, on the contrary, does not the good sense of the farmers, mechanics, and working men, teach them that a well-organized community must have the aid of the learned professions, lawyers, doctors, divines, the merchants, tradesmen, factors, and transporters, embracing the whole of our shipping community, &c. &c., whose services, at moderate fees, or commissions, enable the former to prosecute their farming and other labors, and thereby economize time and profits in their several pursuits, upon the simple principle and first elements of political economy so admirably illustrated by Adam Smith, in his dissertation on "the division of labor?"

But the truth is, that this classification of their party supporters is a wholesale calumny. The real substratum of their party is composed of the TENETS of Tom Paine, Fanny Wright, Robert Dale Owen, Orestes A. Brownson, and Wm. M. Holland, cemented by the promise of sub-Treasury spoils. Independent, however, of this cement, I grant that the captivating licentiousness of those doctrines has seized upon the ardent passions of many inconsiderate persons, and that a vast many others are deceived by the catchwords of "*democracy*" and "the largest liberty," not heeding whither the siren notes of their seducers would lead them; while the *true democracy of the country*, that is, "the advocates of a well-regulated democracy," are utterly opposed to their destructive schemes, and are prepared to cast their votes for HARRISON AND DEMOCRACY against VAN BUREN AND MONARCHY.

In connexion with the above exposure of the gratuitous classification of *Van Buren radical Democracy*, and their revolutionary doctrines, propagated under specious deceptions, it is proper

now, in order to bring us up to the point of departure, or commencement of this REVIEW, to re call the attention of the reader to the fact that Mr. Van Buren's biographer, William M. Hol land, Esq., also virtually assumes the same classification of his supporters, as composing the *real people*, the DEMOCRACY of the country, to the exclusion of many other important classes and callings of society, as we have seen; and that he declares that there is "a wonderful harmony subsisting between the members of said party." He then goes on to explain how and wherefore this harmony is produced—which is so pregnant with meaning, more than meets the eye at a superficial view, that I shall here transcribe it for reflection. At page 359 he says:

"But the true cause of the surprising harmony that exists between the President [Jackson] and the people is either not understood by the anti-democratic party, or is misrepresented. The TRUTH IS, (says he,) that the President has been sustained in his measures, because they have *all* been based upon a *careful observation* and thorough knowledge of the popular will. He has *collected* and *embodied* the wishes of the people; he has felt himself constantly to be their agent and minister; and, if he has seemed to lead public opinion, it has been because he is endued with the penetration which has enabled him to *foresee* its current, and, by throwing himself at its head, to bring its full force to sustain him."

With an eye to the machinery for the manufacture of public sentiment, established by an official *junta* at Washington, to which I have already alluded, (but which can never be fully exposed, except by a committee of investigation, disembarrassed of the impediments of the present Executive, who is interested in its concealment, after the example of his predecessor in defeating the investigations of other committees,) it is plain that, in so "*collecting and embodying*" the wishes of the people, as here alleged, a portion of Executive LEAVEN might easily have been thrown in to ferment and modify their intrinsic character, and thereby derive their true origin from the *Executive wishes*, in bringing their full force to sustain *himself*. But, especially of Mr. Van Buren, our author, page 362, says:

"No instance of *bad faith*, no example of *double dealing*, no act of *duplicity* or *disingenuousness* has ever been *fastened* upon HIS *political* character. His friends *challenge* the strictest scrutiny on *this point*, and invite the most unscrupulous exposure." "The public will not be satisfied with vague general charges—proof must be given of specific acts." "Without such proof, the common sense of mankind will be slow to believe that his regular and steady progress towards the highest honors of the Government, through a long course of public service, is *ascribable to the low artifices of duplicity and cunning*." "His success as a political leader will rather continue to be ascribed to the superiority of his genius, the extent of his attainments, the intrinsic excellence of his character, *and to his admirable knowledge of men*. His clear perception of truth, his predominating good sense, the honesty of his own motives, and HIS SAGACITY IN DETECTING THE MOTIVES OF OTHERS, have indeed endowed him with a rare talent of HARMONIZING, CONCENTRATING, and DIRECTING the varied FEELINGS and EXERTIONS of THE MEMBERS OF A GREAT PARTY."

A party! so constructed! as we have seen! Yes, he does *harmonize, concentrate*, and *direct* that MISERABLE PARTY; so that, out of a great deal of fustian, we have come to some truth, at least. And, taking the following from the same concluding chapter 26th, page 355, we find the like mixture of truth, with an attempt to impose a gratuitous assertion upon the credulity of his readers who are not better informed, and ending, indeed, with a precious avowal. He says:

"The firm belief of the writer in the most ultra democratic doctrines, and his partiality towards the subject of this narrative, as the champion of those doctrines, he has not any where affected to conceal." (He says) "No doubt this strong bias of his mind has led him to take views of certain public events widely different from those which are entertained by persons of an opposite political faith. He has, however, strenuously endeavored not to distort, conceal, or misrepresent facts. The incidents (says he) of Mr. Van Buren's life have been fairly stated, and his opinions fully displayed." "The friends of Mr. Van Buren (he continues, page 356) ascribe his remarkable elevation to superior ability and virtue; his enemies charge it to intrigue and accident. It appears, however, to be universally admitted that he is endowed with extraordinary abilities of some kind." (But, says he) "During many of the earliest years of his public life, he was denied not only honesty but ability. In regard to the latter endowment, the mouth of calumny has been effectually stopped." "With regard to his integrity and patriotism, and the accordance of his political principles with the true interests of his country, a similar unanimity of opinion cannot, in the present generation, be expected."

The reader doubtless perceives, from these evidences respecting the classification of partisan *supporters;* their *doctrines;* the measures taken to *collect* and *embody* their wishes; the skill of their present leader in *harmonizing*, *concentrating*, and *directing* such a party; the admissions impugning his *honesty* and *ability* in early life, and avowing the present want of unanimity of opinion in regard to his *integrity*, his *patriotism*, and the *accordance of his political principles* with the true interests of his country—that much light is gained towards a clear comprehension of the bill of indictment and specifications which I now propose to give in outline. In the course of its rehearsal, the reader will also be prepared to discern how admirably Mr. Van Vuren's *defective education*, his *native cunning*, and the *tortuous course of his political life*, adapted him for that *consummate imposture* by which he has frequently *supplanted* his political rivals, or, when failing to do so, has given in his adhesion to them for *ulterior views*, and has finally *captured the Presidency*, as if filched by *legerdemain*, from the BEWILDERED SENSES OF A DECEIVED PEOPLE! His biographer, page 15, says that—

"After acquiring the rudiments of an English education, he became a student in the academy in his native village," where "he made considerable progress in the various branches of English literature, and gained some knowledge of Latin. It may be inferred, however, [continues he, and such an admission in such a place renders it certain,] that all these acquisitions were not great in amount, as he left the Academy when but fourteen years of age to begin the study of his profession." [Note.—"The period of study preparatory to admission to the bar was seven years for candidates who, like the subject of this memoir, had not the benefit of a collegiate education." (Page 26.) So that, to make up the defects of education, his cue was, to take time by the forelock, with a fraud upon the legal regulation in the case, by affecting to commence his legal studies at fourteen, (which is ridiculous,) in order to evade the legal disability to be admitted to the bar at the age of 21, in which he nevertheless succeeded.] "Such (says our author, page 16) was the preparation with which Martin Van Buren, at the age of fourteen years, com-

menced the study of law." [Upon which he exclaims] "What an encouraging example does his subsequent success present to the young men of our country! Few," says he, "are denied advantages of education equal to those which he possessed."

He then says:

"It is an interesting matter of speculation to conjecture what would have been the effect of a regular education, so called, upon the mind of the subject of this memoir? He has shown himself to be a profound reasoner, at least, in his profession; yet he probably knew little in early life of the rules of logic, or of the metaphysical disquisitions which have professed to teach the art of thinking, from the days of Thales to those of Thomas Brown. He evinces freedom, accuracy, and copiousness in the use of (the English) language; yet he had, as we have seen, but a slight acquaintance with any of the languages of antiquity. He has acquired habits of patient and accurate research, but not from the diagrams of Euclid, or the mystic steps of analytic mathematics.

"Such examples of distinguished success" (continues our infatuated author) "ought, perhaps, to excite some more thorough inquiry into the usefulness [or uselessness!] in all cases, of our ordinary routine of studies."

"Some persons possess, beyond a doubt," (says he) "strong natural aptitudes to excel in certain departments, and great natural inability to reach even moderate excellence in others. Ought not a true system of education [the Van Buren system] to turn the peculiar powers of the pupil to the best account, and to waste no time in attempting to render him a proficient in those branches of science, literature, or art, for which he has neither capacity nor inclination? If so, is not that system of questionable utility which forces every student, at a uniform pace, through the same round of mathematical and classical discipline, without reference to the peculiar tendencies of his native talents?

"Again:" (says he, page 18,) "in most of our higher seminaries, the same course of instruction, the same text-books, the same principles in literature, science, and the arts, are presented, year after year, to successive generations." "It is not unreasonable to suppose, that young minds, thus moulded upon a uniform system, will generally fall into common and uniform habits of thought, and will be led to reason, believe, and act precisely as their fathers and teachers have reasoned and believed before them. The strong tendency of the system is to repress inquiry and original investigation, to eradicate every idiosyncracy of intellect, and merely to infuse into a passive mind the views which have been passively received by those who teach them! To this kind of discipline Martin Van Buren was never subjected! Whether to his advantage or loss can only be a matter of conjecture!!"

Whether to his advantage or loss can only be matter of conjecture! Grant you, Messrs. Holland, Butler, and Vanderpoel, at least in 1835, when your glorification of Van Buren was published, and when the lights of parallel cases of the wild weeds of innovation and disorder that are wont to spring up in the uncultivated soil of ardent and restless minds, only pointed out the probable grounds of conjecture; but now, in 1840, facts and their consequences have been developed in sufficient abundance "to satisfy the world" that, if such want of "discipline in the principles and doctrines of our 'forefathers,'" which a regular education would have taught him, did not redound to his own individual loss, by eradicating the "idiosyncracies of his intellect" and "repressing their native propensity" to inflict *innovation* and *disorder* upon our long-approved system of Government, the calamities which these undisciplined propensities of his idiosyncracy of intellect have brought on the country, through a course of wild experiments, conceived by the whim of an untutored mind, like that of PHETON, aspiring to ride in and conduct the chariot of the sun, do most fully declare at whose cost the experiments of MARTIN VAN BUREN have since been made, and add one more to the thousands of lessons by which poor human nature has been taught never to entrust itself to the vagaries of a wild, visionary mind, undisciplined in ethics, morality, and religion, unbalanced by contemplating the beautiful symmetry and unchangeable consistency of the physical sciences, *so well calculated to curb the political adventurer*, and to KEEP HIM WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF PRUDENCE, AND THE APPROVED EXPERIENCE OF WISER HEADS AND BETTER PATRIOTS.

FIRST PERIOD.

"Even at that early age, too, [FOURTEEN, WHEN HE COMMENCED THE STUDY OF LAW,] Mr. Van Buren is represented, by those who knew him, to have had a spirit of observation, with regard to *public events*, and the *personal dispositions* and *characters* of *those around him*, which gave an EARNEST of his future *proficiency* in the SCIENCE OF POLITICS and of the HUMAN HEART."

[*Holland's Life and Political Opinions of Martin Van Buren, page* 16.

I. *Mr. Van Buren's bad faith, double dealing, and disingenuousness, exemplified in the case of his conduct to De Witt Clinton:—united with the Hudson and Hartford Convention Federalists in opposition to Mr. Madison and the late war against England:—Rufus King, James A. Hamilton, &c., his political coadjutors.*

Mr. Van Buren's biographer, William M. Holland, Esq., whether hired or volunteered in the cause of his glorification, says: "No instance of bad faith, no example of double dealing, no act of duplicity or disingenuousness, has ever been *fastened* upon his political character;" and then challenges his opponents to "the strictest scrutiny." Mr. Holland falls far short of sustaining this exemption, as his own book affords many evidences sufficiently subversive of his assertion, even without further scrutiny and reference to other authorities abundantly at hand.

It is charged on Mr. Van Buren by a respectable citizen of his own State, and confirmed by another, both of whom know his history intimately well, and are personally known to the writer of this review, that "his whole political life is stamped with inconsistency, treachery, and dissimulation;" and that "his most liberal proffers of friendship have been swiftly followed by per-

secution and neglect." Of the truth of this, many illustrations have been given in the political writings of both. Let a few instances in the case of his game of "fast and loose" with De Witt Clinton suffice, viz: In 1812, Mr. Van Buren was in habits of confidential and friendly intercourse with Mr. Clinton, and supported his nomination for the Presidency against Mr. Madison; (*a fact of general notoriety, and admitted by Holland, page* 90.) In 1813, after the defeat of Mr. Clinton, when his popularity proved an insufficient ladder for Mr. Van Buren to rise by, the latter "changed front," and became the advocate of Mr. Madison and the war. (*Same authority, with much boasting, pages* 90, 91.) During several years Mr. Van Buren had opposed Clinton's scheme of connecting the waters of Erie and the Hudson by a canal bearing their name, and finally, on the 13th April, 1816, accomplished the defeat of a bill appropriating $250,000 a year during eight years, for that object.—(*Memoir of Martin Van Buren by a citizen of New York, page* 20, *and his opposition to it acknowledged by Holland page* 93.) In 1817, Mr. Van Buren having failed through seven years' exertions to destroy the popularity of Mr. Clinton, adopted the temporizing course of wearing a double front, one for Clinton's friends and one for his own, at a legislative caucus held in Albany for the nomination of Governor. He had, through his organ, the Albany Argus, recommended "toleration and liberality" among those who "may receive and reciprocate favors." He had procured it to be preconcerted among his friends, that, should Mr. Clinton be nominated, they (his friends) should rise and retire from the body. But at that conjuncture, when the ballots had been counted, showing a majority in Clinton's favor, Mr. Van Buren rose, and, to the utter confusion and astonishment of his co-partisans, moved that the nomination be *unanimous*. But the minority retired according to agreement, and left Van Buren with his new political associates.—(*Memoir of Martin Van Buren by a citizen of New York, page* 25.) In 1818, he again forsook Mr. Clinton, after discovering that the "toleration and liberality" recommended by his press, the Albany Argus, had not produced its intended effect; for, "so far from Mr. Clinton's 'reciprocating the favors he had received,' he would hardly extend to him a cold civility." But the humiliating reflection to Mr. Van Buren that he had nothing to expect from the confidence of Mr. Clinton, in one who had thus suddenly abandoned his own party, did not prevent him from undertaking the forlorn enterprise of "worming himself again into their confidence," which he accomplished by becoming the advocate of the Hudson and Erie canal.—(*See same Memoir, &c., pages* 28, 29.) Finally, on the occasion of the sudden death of Mr. Clinton, when Mr. Van Buren had attained to a seat in the Senate of the United States, he seized upon this favorable position to become the eulogist of that great statesman before the congregated intelligence of the nation. "Notwithstanding all the circumstances of his ungrateful and base treatment of him, and the strong sympathies which his untimely end must have inspired in every breast, Martin Van Buren ventured to improve the opportunity to recover the standing he had lost, by an effort to turn the sympathies of the people to his own account." "In rising to announce the death of a favorite son and idolized statesman, before the assembled talents of a great people, he dissembled a spirit of deep humility; he professed to have consigned to the same grave with his illustrious fellow-citizen, all his feelings of animosity; and painted his character in the most pathetic and engaging colors, for which he had artfully prepared himself." "The single fact," said he, "that the greatest public improvement of the age in which we live was commenced under the guidance of his councils and splendidly accomplished under his immediate auspices, is of itself sufficient *to fill the ambition of any man*, and to *give glory to any name.*" "This seemingly amazing magnanimity and disinterestedness of their Senator, who was known to have been the deadly foe of their deceased son, had the wonderful effect that was anticipated. The same tide upon which Clinton had been elevated, in opposition to every effort of Van Buren, secret or open, was immediately mounted by him, and on which he was drifted to the highest honors of the State;" [being shortly after elected Governor to succeed Clinton.]—(*See the same Memoir, pages* 32, 33.)

On the 22d May, 1812, Mr. Madison was nominated for re-election to the Presidency by a Congressional caucus at Washington; and, on the 29th of the same month, a federal caucus of the New York Legislature, held at Albany, nominated De Witt Clinton to oppose him and the war measure,* of course, then in contemplation. This nomination, we have seen, Mr. Van

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* Benjamin F. Butler, Esq. (then Attorney General of the United States, and now United States Attorney for the city of New York) did, in an electioneering letter dated in March, 1835, addressed to Hugh A. Garland, then a member of the Virginia Legislature, and since elected Clerk of the House of Representatives by the locofocoes as the further fit instrument of their party, undertakes "to deny that there is any thing in the mere fact of Mr. Van Buren's support of Mr. Clinton (right or wrong) 'under the circumstances stated,' to sustain the imputation of opposition to the war." (See Holland, p. 91.) Now, though this is a gratuitous presumption in face of the fact proved upon Mr. Van Buren by indisputable testimony already cited, yet I cannot but note its affinity to Mr. Ritchie's pliant doctrine, that there is nothing in his mere opposition to Mr. Van Buren's principal measures of the sub Treasury, the army of 200,000 men, &c., to justify the inference that consistency should array him against the man. I know of no one who believes with Mr. Ritchie, unless Mr. Butler does—and of the sincerity of Mr. Butler's opinion in such a matter, "under the circumstances," the reader may form some judgment, when he is informed that Mr. Butler, while Attorney General, frequently retracted his official opinions at the command of General Jackson, and elaborated opposite ones to suit the President's taste or passion. The case of the Baltimore and Washington rail-road is one in point. The company desired that the road should connect with the canal. It was referred to the Attorney General, who gave his opinion in favor of the company's right to do so. General

Buren not merely "concurred in the propriety of supporting," as avowed by his biographer, but took a very active part, in secret concert, with his then federal coadjutors, James A. Hamilton and others, to consummate it by rendering Mr. Madison unpopular, under their violent denunciations of his war measure, declared the June following. The author of the "Memoir of Mr. Van Buren," above referred to, says, (page 12,) "Immediately after the declaration of war, the federal party in Van Buren's county, by his special recommendation and personal contrivance, held a meeting which was managed altogether by his 'direction;' and, on the 8th day of July following, the federalists published their address and resolutions, signed by James A. Hamilton and others of Mr. Van Buren's creed of politics at the time, of which this is as ample:

"*Resolved*, That the war is impolitic, unnecessary, and disastrous; and that to employ the militia in offensive war [that is, to enter Canada] is unconstitutional."

In further illustration of certain changes of positions on the political chess board, it may be well here to remark that, while Mr. Van Buren and his federal colleagues of that day were thus opposing Mr. Madison and the war with vituperative virulence, Mr. Ritchie, editor of the Richmond Enquirer, was, with equal zeal, supporting that illustrious father of the constitution and the war. In proof of this, I cite the following fact, viz: that, in reporting the proceedings of a republican caucus of the Virginia Legislature, held at Richmond on the 12th February, 1812, to nominate electors for President, at which Andrew Stevenson, Esq., now minister to England, was chairman, and Thomas Ritchie, Esq., editor of the Enquirer, was secretary, Mr. Ritchie *said* of the CAUCUS:

"*But one sentiment reigned through the meeting;* which was, "TO GIVE AN UNDIVIDED SUPPORT TO MR. MADISON."—(*See report of proceedings of that day.*)

Though Mr. Van Buren did, after the defeat of Mr. Clinton by the re-election of Mr. Madison, give his support to his administration and the war generally, yet, as an additional evidence of his vacillating course in this as well as the rest of his career, the Senate's Journal of New York, for September, 1814, shows that he opposed the raising of troops, under the recommendation of Governor Tompkins, to aid in the war.

In 1819, Mr. Van Buren successfully advocated the election of Rufus King to the United States Senate, and, in a letter to a friend during the canvass, "pledged his head on the propriety of supporting Mr. King." "Yet," *says the author of the Memoir of Martin Van Buren, page* 39, "at that session of the Legislature, in 1819, he (Mr. Van Buren) professed great hostility to Mr. King and his federal friends; and accused De Witt Clinton and his friends of the political degeneracy of favoring the election of Rufus King, and thereby endangering the power, and assailing the principles, of the democratic party." I also find a virtual confirmation of the strongest feature of this statement in Holland's Life of Van Buren, pp. 143-'44, where he speaks of "an extract from what purports to have been a private letter of Mr. V. B. to a political friend." Holland says: "Whether this extract is *authentic* or *false* is UNKNOWN to the present writer." So important a matter was it (in a work gotten up for the avowed purpose of glorifying Mr. Van Buren) to set this affair right, that no one can believe the parties interested, in affording the materials of information to the biographer, would have failed to contradict it if they could: therefore, we may understand the *policy* of permitting the *authenticity* or *falsehood* of it to remain UNKNOWN to him. He then, by sheer bravado, gives the extract as the only document, of any kind, which the enemies of Mr. Van Buren have been able to adduce against him, which he "leaves, without comment, to the judgment of the reader," viz:

"I should sorely regret to find any flagging on the subject of Mr. King. We [the Albany regency] are committed to his support. It is both wise and honest: and we must have no fluttering in our course. Mr King's views to wards us are honorable and correct. The Missouri question conceals, so far as he is concerned, no plot, and we shall give it a true direction. You know what the feelings and views of our friends were, when I saw you; and you know what we then concluded to do. My "Considerations," &c, and the aspect of the Albany Argus, will show you that we have entered on the work in earnest. We cannot, therefore, look back. Let us not, then, have any halting. I will put my head on its propriety."

We shall presently see that Mr. Holland, in the same chapter, p. 146, admits that Mr. Van Buren, after Mr. King's election, united in the instructions of the New York Legislature to their Senators against the admission of Missouri, except under a *negation* of her right to hold slaves. And in regard to the authenticity of the above extract, the author of the "Memoir,"

Jackson returned the opinion to Mr. Butler for reconsideration, and Mr. Butler then gave an elaborate opinion to the contrary—which stopped the railroad about 100 yards short of the canal. By the way, in reference to Mr. Garland's agency in making fair weather for Mr. Van Buren in Virginia, and his subsequent call to Washington as Clerk to the House, it appears to me that it would be a good rule, whenever we see a conspicuous locofoco brought before the public, as the organ of an electioneering movement at Washington, to look for him so selected, to make a figure in some high office shortly afterwards. Mr. Hugh A. Garland was selected by the junta here as a fit person, from his radicalism and activity in the Virginia Legislature, to do a special party service in his State; and he performed his task no doubt, so much to their satisfaction, that a special messenger was afterwards despatched to him, to invite him to come to Washington and be a candidate for the clerkship of the House—an important office for a party who is disposed to abuse it. Every body knows the efficient part the Clerk took in setting aside the returned members from New Jersey, at the commencement of the last session. Without his act, (which was a daring and flagitious usurpation, that had not a shadow of legal right, even in the House, much less in the Clerk, before the contested cases went before the Committee of Election,) New Jersey could not have been disfranchised, nor the sub-Treasury bill have been passed, by the mockery of an unconstitutional Congress!

already quoted, says: "The original [letter,] of which this is an extract, is in the handwriting of, and signed by, Martin Van Buren."—(*See Memoir, page* 45.)

It may be interesting to some youthful readers, less informed in political biography than others, to say an additional word of James A. Hamilton and Rufus King. Mr. Hamilton was the son of Alexander Hamilton, who has ever been habitually reviled by Mr. Ritchie as a "*blue light, black cockade, federalist.*" He was one of Mr. Van Buren's earliest political associates, and continued to be his fast friend for years, probably without abatement; for we find him figuring conspicuously, in 1828, as the agent or representative of Mr. Van Buren, while acting in the double capacity of a delegate of Tammany Hall to escort General Jackson to a festival at New Orleans, and to make a political demonstration against Mr. Calhoun on his return to New York through the South. Also, during the first month or two after General Jackson's inauguration in 1829, Mr. Hamilton was selected as Mr. Van Buren's *locum tenens*, as Secretary of State, till he could make preliminary preparations at Albany to resign the governorship he had held about three months, and repair to Washington to assume his new station, at the right hand of Jackson, in person. But Mr. King was better known as a leading federalist, and a strenuous opposer of the admission of Missouri with her rights to slave property, independent of the legislative instructions participated in by Mr. Van Buren. It also delighteth Mr. Ritchie, and all the nomenclature of his classical correspondents, *Romans by name*, to vilify every Democratic Whig who has ever held social or political converse with Mr. King. Nevertheless, we see it was such men of the Federal party (upon whom Mr. Ritchie has lavished more billingsgate than ever fishwoman did on her rivals in the market) that Mr. Van Buren acted with, in opposition to the republican administration of Mr. Madison, until the defeat of Mr. Clinton and the re-election of Mr. Madison induced him to "change front" on the Vicar of Bray principle of keeping in favor with the "*strongest side*"—a principle so dexterously practised by Mr. Ritchie before him, under the temptation of the "loaves and the fishes," till at length he has cornered himself by his inconsiderate vow to "sink or swim" with the "Magician," being too sanguine of his magical powers to dupe the democracy of numbers for despotic ends. But for this vow, based probably on some private pledges he cannot violate *to save his country*, I must do Mr. Ritchie the justice to believe that his disgusting vociferations in praise of the "Northern man with Southern feelings" would long since have been silenced, and substituted by "wrathy invective" and "criminating reproaches."

II. *Mr. Van Buren an abolitionist in heart—advocated the extension of the right of suffrage, and citizenship, to free negroes in New York, whereby they are also eligible to office;—he also approves the admission of slaves to testify, in court, against white citizens.*

In the New York convention of 1821, to amend her constitution, "a proposition to restrict the right of voting to *white* citizens, was rejected by a vote of 63 to 59—Mr. Van Buren voting in the majority."—(*See Holland's Life of Van Buren, page* 187.) The result of this vote, and other passages of the amended constitution, in which Mr. Van Buren concurred, is, not only that persons of *color* are put on a footing with white citizens of his State, in voting at elections, and entitling them to participate in instructing their Representatives in Congress, and petitioning that body for the abolition of slavery; but they are rendered eligible to seats in the State Legislature and in Congress, and to appointment to office in that State—there being no disqualification of her voters in either respect, her voters being continually spoken of in the constitution as *citizens*, from among whom, without any express distinction or disqualification of *color*, such officers are eligible.

On the agitation of the Missouri question in 1819'-20, Mr. Van Buren resorted to disingenuous artifices to defeat the rights of that State to her slave property, without committing himself, till his plans might arrive at maturity—which the following facts, derived from Holland's book, pages 144-45-46, plainly show, viz: A few weeks before the re-election of Rufus King to the United States Senate, (in Feburary, 1820,) effected mainly by the exertions of Mr. Van Buren, as already noticed, Mr. Van Buren authorized the use of his name "in the call of a public meeting of the citizens of Albany, to express their opinions on the extension of slavery beyond the Mississippi," [designed to be hostile to it of course.] A series of preparatory steps being passed through, a memorial to Congress was finally adopted, and Mr. Van Buren's name, as understood to be authorized, was affixed to it by Henry T. Jones, Esq., which Mr. Van Buren afterwards disclaimed, in a letter to Mr. Jones, as transcending his authority; which, (*with a little hair splitting,*) he said, was a "permission to use my name as a committee to call a meeting of our citizens to express their opinion on the Missouri question;" and adds, "you surely cannot suppose that the use of my name for that purpose, imposed on me an obligation to sign whatever memorial might be agreed upon by the meeting." The equivocation here, is fully apparent to all who know the accordance of the *results*, with the *objects*, of called meetings! Yet, shortly after this, Mr. King being now elected, the Legislature immediately passed a *resolution* "instructing their Senators and requesting their Representatives of the State in Congress *to oppose* the admission as a State in the Union, of any territory not comprised within the original bound-

ary of the United States, without making the *prohibition* of slavery therein, an indispensable condition of admission"—"Mr. VAN BUREN VOTING FOR THE RESOLUTION!"

Mr. Van Buren has also voted in the Senate of the United States to prohibit the introduction of slaves into Florida. And his more recent "refusal to enter into diplomatic discussion of the proposition to admit Texas into the Union," (though a favorite object of his predecessor,) "was doubtless to embarrass the growing influence of the South, and ultimately to weaken the tenure of their constitutional rights."

In his letter to the Hon. Sherrod Williams, Mr. Van Buren advances the opinion, that Congress *has* a right to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia; but in order to make this sentiment less offensive to the South, he fabricates a "doubt whether it will be politic to do so."

But other facts in abundance may be adduced to show the inclination of Mr. Van Buren, and his principal adherents, to the abolition faith, and expound the mental reservations of this great dissembler on that subject, among which I may cite the following, viz: When Mr. Van Buren was Secretary of State, his principal messenger of the State Department was a FREE NEGRO, at a salary of $700 a year; a *free negro* was, and now continues to be, a messenger and the internuncio to the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Paulding, the friend and connexion of Mr. Ritchie, and a thorough abolitionist: many *free negroes* are messengers in the Treasury Department, in the War Department, in the Post Office Department, and in several of the bureaus, at salaries that many respectable white citizens would be proud to accept for the like services. About the time of the Southampton insurrection in Virginia, a splendid NEGRO BALL was given at the President's Mansion, which General Jackson honored with a few moments of his presence, and was afterwards toasted by the company at their set supper. The excitement of the insurrection in Virginia was, in various other ways, felt in this District, as the records of the court will show, and one of its consequences was, an attempt to kill a Mrs. Thornton, by one of her slaves; who, from the atrocious character of the assault with an axe, at the dead of the night, while she was asleep, was condemned to be hung; but when the appointed time for his execution approached, it was found that he had been reprieved for a short time by the President; the reprieve was again repeated at short intervals, as if to exhaust public expectation, when at last, this midnight assassin was finally *pardoned*—and to evade public indignation, doubtless, was clandestinely smuggled out of the city, and sent to Florida. Upon a more recent occasion, when Congress began to be flooded with petitions from a distance, for the abolition of slavery in this District, a communication being presented to the editor of the Globe, by the writer of this review, discussing the *inviolable right of property* in slaves, as well as lands and chattels, except when "condemned to public use, for an equivalent in money," the said editor, F. P. Blair, peremptorily refused to give it an insertion in his paper, (it was afterwards published in the Richmond Enquirer,) he, the said Blair, declaring that he totally dissented from the writer, and solemnly averred, as his belief, "that Congress has a right *to cut the throats of every man woman and child in the District!*" Let the reader take in connexion with this, the fact, that the leading doctrine of the locofocoes, is to tolerate no essential difference of opinion, and that Mr. Blair is Mr. Van Buren's prime minister, or oracle of his "improved public press," and he will see that we have arrived at something like an expression of concurrent opinions on this subject, without citing, in confirmation of it, the appointments of thorough abolitionists to foreign missions and other high trusts. I shall not conclude this catalogue, however, without mentioning Mr. Van Buren's approval of the introduction of *negro* testimony against a white citizen, and that, too, under peculiarly aggravated circumstances, in the case of Lieutenant George Mason Hooe, a native of Virginia, in the United States naval service. In this case the testimony of two negroes, the slaves of the accuser of Lieutenant Hooe, was taken, and made of record against the accused, before a court-martial, which resulted in the dismissal of Hooe from the naval service, in defiance of his remonstances against a procedure so revolting to the institutions of the South and the laws of Florida, where the trial took place; Mr. Van Buren endorsing the same that he "saw nothing in those proceedings to disapprove." Yet, this is Mr. Ritchie's boasted "Northern man with Southern feelings!" according to that jesuitical overture, indeed, by which Mr. Van Buren falsely professed to *betray* the North, to *court* the South; which was at once a *double* insult both to the SOUTH and to the NORTH.

III. *Mr. Van Buren opposed the adoption of a bill of rights with the New York constitution—he opposed the extension of the elective franchise—and he opposed the amenability of the higher officers of State to the ordeal of popular elections: the inconsistency of his sentiments on the veto power—his advocacy of long terms and re-elections to the chief Executive—the inconsistency of his doctrines and practice respecting the "spoils of office;" a system of which he was the unenvied author.*

In the New York convention of 1821, to amend her constitution, Mr. Van Buren opposed the adoption of a Bill of Rights, in connexion with that instrument; nevertheless such a bill would have been in accordance with the practice of nearly every other State in the Union; as, indeed, did the Virginia convention strongly recommend the adoption of a Bill of Rights for the federal

constitution, and instructed her delegation in the first Congress to procure, if possible, the adoption of a Bill of Rights drawn up by the convention.—(*See the conclusion of Virginia debates, Elliot's edition.*) Mr. Van Buren said, on the occasion above referred to, that "he was opposed to a Bill of Rights, as implying some higher authority than the people."—(*See Holland page* 198.) This is a sophistry, in guarding the rights of the people, equivalent to taking away their body arms to assist them in the right of self-defence. Every horn-book politician knows that a Bill of Rights is a summary of fundamental principles, by which the people, through their representatives in convention, endeavor to guaranty a conformity with the limitations of the constitutional powers to their agents in the different departments of Government.—(*See the debates, for reasons why a Bill of Rights was not adopted with the federal constitution.*)

In the same (N. Y.) convention, Mr. Van Buren denounced the principle of *universal suffrage* as follows: "Upon the proposition to extend the right of suffrage, Mr. Van Buren expressed his *fears* that the extension contemplated by some of the amendments proposed would not be sanctioned by public approbation, and only occasion the rejection of the whole by the people; [the people are always thrust forward as the sponsors for his opinions;] that were the bare, naked question of *universal suffrage* put to the committee, he did not believe there were twenty members who would vote for it." "His chief fear seems to have been, that the great departure from the former *freehold* qualification would hazard the adoption of the whole amendment."—(*See Holland, pp.* 181, 185.) Right or wrong, this! it is palpably contradictory to some of those vaunted democratic principles he pretends, in his messages to Congress, to profess, one of which is that "the only legitimate object of Government is to secure the greatest benefit to the greatest number"—a dogma, nevertheless, more plausible than correct, as it is liable to involve injustice, oppression, and danger to the rights of property, the validity of contracts, and other vested rights of the minority, if the "greatest number" should possess but little property, and be taught by the same party artifices to believe and to will it to be for their good *to establish an agrarian law.* But to flatter all persons of small property, and newly imported foreigners, with this delusion, seems now to be the principal dependence of this great leader of party, as is further evinced by the efforts of his partisans of the Senate in repeated instances, and more particularly in their late attempt to establish *universal suffrage* in the corporation of Washington, for the gratification of temporary laborers on the public buildings to control the permanent citizens in the management of their corporate concerns.—(*See Mr. Senator Norvell's report of a bill for altering the charter of the city.*)

Mr. Van Buren also opposed the amenability of the higher officers of State to the ordeal of popular elections. Holland, page 190, quoting from a speech of Mr. Van Buren, (as in most other cases of his opinions here cited from his biographer,) says: "He concurred in the opinion which had been expressed as to the *impropriety of* ELECTING *the higher officers of State,* BECAUSE THEIR DUTIES WERE IMPORTANT; and it was to be *feared* that it would have a *tendency* to render their judgment *subservient* to their *desires* for A CONTINUANCE IN OFFICE." The public have been sufficiently informed of similar sentiments expressed in former times by Mr. Buchanan, Mr. Grundy, and other advocates of Mr. Van Buren, and we all know what are his professions and theirs to wheedle the people now.

Mr. Van Buren was a strenuous advocate, in the New York Convention, for conferring the veto power on the Governor over the acts of the Legislature, by which he might annul *every act* that is not passed by two-thirds of their number. He urged in favor of it that "The superior force and influence of legislative power would secure it against abuse;" that "no man would have the *temerity*, on ordinary occasions, to resist its acts, or check its proceedings;" and he referred to the English Constitution, where "the Executive is *a branch* of the Legislature, and has an absolute negative." Yet, "surrounded as he is with prerogative," said Mr. Van Buren, "and placed beyond the reach of the people, since the year 1692 *no objection has been made by a King of Great Britain to any bill presented for his approbation!*" Rather than produce the excitement and irritation which even there would result from the rejection of a bill passed by the Parliament, he has resorted to means, which have degraded the Government and dishonored the nation, to *prevent* the passage of bills which he should feel it his duty to reject."—(*See Holland, page* 163.) Are we left to conjecture from this whether Mr. Van Buren's more recent declaration, in advance, that he would veto a certain bill, be an instance of *his* "degradation of the Government and dishonor of the nation," by resorting to such means to *prevent* the passage of said bill, to relieve himself of the exciting consequences of its veto? or, is his premonition to Congress an evidence of the unceremonious levity with which he now views the superior force and influence (the sanctity) of legislative power? And yet, such an advocate AS HE for the "Executive veto," to check the "legislative power," State and federal, did afterwards, in a speech in the Senate of the United States, manifest a holy horror at his own forced construction of a veto power of the Supreme Court over all the legislative acts of the several States, and of Congress, under the mere limited right to judge of their constitutionality! It will be perceived, by the following extracts, that Mr. Van Buren's insidious attempts to prejudice Congress and the several States against the Supreme Court was as artful in design as it was frivolous in its grounds of attack. On the 7th April, 1826, addressing the Senate, he said:

"It has been justly observed, that there exists not upon this earth, and there never did exist, a judicial tribunal clothed with powers so various and important as the Supreme Court.

"By it, treaties and laws, made pursuant to the constitution, are declared to be the supreme law of the land. So far, at least, as the acts of Congress depend upon the courts for their execution, the Supreme Court is the judge, whether or no such acts are pursuant to the constitution, and from its judgment there is no appeal. Its veto, therefore, may absolutely suspend nine-tenths of the acts of the national Legislature!" [Why did not Mr. Van Buren say the whole, for they could suspend the whole, as well as one, if they should all be unconstitutional. But the guarantee against such an exercise of their judicial function, resides in the good sense of Congress to avoid, except by casual defect of judgment, such disastrous legislation—saving always, the recent party legislation of the supporters of Mr. Van Buren himself, and under his prompting, who set themselves above the constitution.]

"But," says, he, "this is not all. It not only sits in final judgment upon our acts, as the highest legislative body known to the country—it not only claims to be the absolute arbiter between the Federal and State Governments—but it exercises the same great power between the respective States forming this great confederacy and their own citizens. By the constitution of the United States, the States are prohibited from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts." "This brief provision has given to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court a tremendous sweep!!" "But of this highly consequential provision, this provision which carries so great a portion of all that is valuable in State legislation to the feet of the federal judiciary, no complaints were heard, no explanation asked, no remonstrances made," [by those who opposed the ratification of the constitution.] "It is most mysterious, if the constitution was then understood as it now is, that this was so. An explanation of it has been given, how correct I know not." * * *

"But whatever the motive that led to its insertion, or the cause that induced so little observation on its tendency, the fact of its extensive operation is known and acknowledged. The prohibition is not confined to express contracts, but includes such as are implied by law, from the nature of the transaction." [What well balanced mind would say it should be otherwise?] "Any one (adds he) conversant with the usual range of State legislation, will at once see how small a portion of it is exempt, under this provision, from the supervision of the seven judges of the Supreme Court. The practice under it has been in accordance with what should have been anticipated!

"There are few States in the Union [for this was his drift from the first] upon whose acts (says he) the seal of condemnation has not, from time to time, been placed by the Supreme Court. The sovereign authorities of Vermont, New Hampshire, New York, New Jersey [!] Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Missouri, Kentucky, and Ohio, have, in turn, been rebuked and silenced, by the overruling authority of this court." However, says he, "The authority has been given to them, and this is not the place to question its exercise. But this I will say, that if the question of conferring it was now presented for the first time, I should unhesitatingly say, that the people of the States might, with safety, be left to their own Legislatures, and the protection of their own courts."

Is there no appeal from these malignant strictures of Mr. Van Buren? Is there no consolation in the opinions of infinitely wiser judges than he? If it be not fair to infer that the acquiescence of those great States, whose grievances he so officiously recounts, *is proof of their sanction of the correct judgment of the court*, I would recommend the reader to turn to the able speech of John Marshall on the federal judiciary, delivered in the Virginia Convention, by which similar vagaries to those of Mr. Van Buren were fully controverted, while the merits of our system of Government were under consideration. That able speech, indeed, was an earnest, at the time, of the masterly powers of mind with which the same individual was destined afterwards to preside over the Supreme Court.

Mr. Van Buren also advocated the longest term for the Governor, and his eligibility to re-election, as *essential*, BOTH, to test the *good* or *evil* of his measures, and the *approval* or *censure* of the PEOPLE. He said, (*see Holland, p.* 166.)

"He had not experienced the evils of triennial elections; but as we had vastly increased the power of the Governor [by vesting him with 'a veto upon all laws, so far as to make their re-enactment by two-thirds of both Houses necessary to their passage against his consent'] a strong desire is manifested to abridge his term;" in which sentiment he concurred. "But how abridge it?" (said he.) "We wish the people to have an opportunity of testing their Governor's conduct, not by the feelings of temporary excitement, but by that SOBER SECOND THOUHGT WHICH IS NEVER WRONG. Can that be effected if you abridge the term to one year? No, sir! it is necessary that his power exist long enough to survive that temporary excitement which a measure of public importance must occasion, and to enable the people to detect the fallacy with which the acts of Government [or their own judgment, he rather means] may be veiled as to their real motives. Can a fair judgment of motives or the effects of measures be made in a few months? No, sir! Even a term longer than three years must sometimes be necessary to enable us to judge of the effects of measures!!"

Truly, it took just three years, short by a fraction, for the seizure of the public Treasury, and the diversion of it from its customary use, under the regulations of law, to prostrate commerce and the general prosperity of the country; but it may take a much shorter term, under a continuance of Mr. Van Buren's Administration, with the Treasury and a standing army at his command, to drench the country in blood, and accomplish its entire subjugation to his despotic rule.

As long ago as 1813, when he had turned coat, and become an advocate of "strong war measures," speaking in a public address on the re-election of Governor Tompkins, he denounced the detestable practice of the British in impressing American seamen into their service, in very handsome terms. He said it is "a practice which can never be acquiesced in by Government, without rescinding the great article of our safety, *the reciprocity of* OBEDIENCE *and* PROTECTION *between the rulers and the ruled.*" But now, when the people complain that their business is ruined by the oppressive measures of the Government, and pray for relief, he answers "that the people expect too much from the Government;" "that the Government will take care of itself, and the people must take care of themselves;" but it begins to be obvious that the gold and silver currency for the office-holders, and depreciated shin-plasters for the people, in lieu of our once uniform currency, is one of the thousand evils of his measures, which the *sober* SECOND THOUGHTS *of the people* will teach him at the polls in November, THEY MEAN NO LONGER TO ENDURE!

In the same address, (*see Holland, p.* 101,) Mr. Van Buren, then *worming* his way to office, deprecated, like Gen. Jackson, what he called "the distressing truth that it was not in the pow-

er of *circumstances* to destroy the virulence of party spirit." Now, when he has attained the highest command, true to the example of his illustrious predecessor, (whose conversion to the spoils system was his handiwork,) he has, like him, in order to retain power, become one of the most active partisans (as the author and patron of that detestable monarchical system) in fanning the flames of "PARTY SPIRIT."

In the New York Convention, (*see Holland p.* 198,) Mr. Van Buren said "that while he avowed the principle that the *dominant party* should *always* POSSESS and EXERCISE *the official patronage*, yet he maintained due regard IN ITS DISTRIBUTION *should constantly be had for the rights of the minority.*" Now, if this be not an entirely incompatible sophistry, coined to please one party and conciliate the other, (for it is incomprehensible to me how he could give the exclusive official patronage to the dominant party, and yet, in its distribution, have constant regard to the rights of the minority, who were to have *nothing*, unless, in his view, justice to them consisted in not depriving them of their civil as well as political rights;) yet I should say, it affords a loop-hole through which to catch a glimpse of the "spoils doctrine" of the Albany Regency, when in its germ, however wonderfully it has been changed in its rugged aspect, under the revision and emendations of its author, by transplanting it to Washington, and engrafting thorny scions upon it, from the time he began in the Senate to modify and give direction to the patronage of the Federal Government. We all know something of the enormous growth and corrupt exercise of that patronage since, for the benefit of the "dominant party," and in vengeance *against the rights of the minority*, WHICH HAS NEARLY SHOOK THE MORAL, RELIGIOUS, AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRY TO THEIR FOUNDATIONS.

SECOND PERIOD.

"His long study of the *human heart*, [SPEAKING OF MR. V. B. WHEN HE ENTERED THE SENATE,] his great experience in *political matters*, and his pre-eminent *good sense*, had given him a power of *interpreting the popular will*, and UNITING, HARMONIZING, and DIRECTING the *feelings of those with whom he* ACTED, which FEW MEN EVER ATTAIN TO." [*Holland's Life and Political Opinions of Martin Van Buren, page* 208.

I. *Mr. Van Buren, uniformly, for a series of years, has been an advocate for a tariff or imposts for the protection of manufactures—His subsequent repudiation of his first love, as an overture to the South—His support and denunciation of internal improvement, still more diversified and inconsistent—His claim of initiative legislation, alone, brings the money power very much within his grasp.*

When our partisan biographer, Mr. Holland, comes, in his eleventh chapter, to treat of "Mr. Van Buren's course in the Senate," he takes occasion to distinguish him with very high-sounding and laudatory compliments, to the great disparagement of the rest of the Senate. Without quoting those fulsome passages in detail, I will concede all that is meant to be assumed for Mr. Van Buren by his kind historian, viz: that he *united*, *harmonized*, and DIRECTED his political asssociates with whom he *acted* in the Senate, as alleged in the passage quoted above as an appropriate heading for this period of his career, particularly as his biographer seems much enamored with it, desirous to make deep impression of its truth, from his frequent repetition of it in different parts of his book. It will, therefore, be perfectly fair to hold this boasted party manager responsible for that "*direction*" which he gave to those with whom he "acted" in the Senate, in certain important doings of theirs, as well as what he enacted on his own hook, during that important period, which his biographer found it convenient to say nothing about, touching his overtures to the South; though he professes that "nothing has been intentionally omitted, glossed over, or unfairly represented"—an expression which he also takes pains to reiterate in sundry other places in his book, protesting that he "has made strenuous endeavors not to conceal or misrepresent" any material fact or opinion. After adding a further eulogy in disparaging the rest of the Senate, saying that, "to furnish a complete view of Mr. V. B.'s services in the Senate of the United States, during the *seven years* he was a member, (from 1821 to 1829,) would be to transcribe a large portion of its proceedings," he goes on to give a meagre summary of his acts and doings on most of the prominent subjects of legislation of that period, with an omission, nevertheless, of the principal features of some of them, which I will supply from other authority. He also distorts some of those transactions, and glosses them over, as we have seen he did, in many instances, in the preceding period, before he came to the Senate. I shall take the liberty of correcting these, as I have done those.

The Federal Government and the State Governments, taken together, constitute the elements of a whole and *perfect* sovereignty. The States, individually, are *imperfect* sovereignties, so far as the powers delegated to the Federal Government abate or curtail their former complete sovereignty. The Federal Government is also an *imperfect* sovereignty, so far as the powers not

delegated to it, but reserved to the States respectively, are wanting to make that sovereignty complete. The sovereignty of the Federal Government is complete in all things that appertain to foreign relations, and to the internal commerce *between* the States. There are many minor subjects of legislation on internal police, not connected in any manner with foreign relations, or with the relations between States, between States and citizens of States, and between citizens of different States, which come within the sphere of *joint*, *interfering*, or *participating* sovereignties of the Federal and the State Governments. And I doubt whether there be any subject of legislation in which a State has exclusive sovereignty, in regard to the United States authority, inasmuch as the whole range of State legislation is subject to the supervision of the Federal Government, through the Supreme Court, so far as any infraction of any of the delegated powers of the federal constitution may be involved in such legislation. These general hints are thrown out here, to bring the contemplative mind to some focal points involved in the sequel. And, for the same purpose, it may be well to bear in mind that the federal constitution consists of three principal ARTICLES, besides several others that are miscellaneous. The *first* relates to the Legislature; the *second* relates to the Executive; and the *third* to the Judiciary—each comprising matters more or less enhancing or restricting the powers and duties of the others. In the eighth section of the *first* ARTICLE, the specific powers delegated to the legislature are enumerated in *eighteen* clauses, of which I copy the *three first* and the *eighteenth*, viz:

"The Congress shall have power—

"1. To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, [vulgarly called tariff] and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.

"2. To borrow money on the credit of the United States.

"3. To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes."

"18. To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof."

Under this *eighteenth* clause, the reader perceives that Congress has the power, as effectually granted, though not by name, to make whatever laws it shall deem necessary and proper to execute any other power, as that power itself was conferred; and that any measure, for that purpose, which one Congress may deem *necessary* and *proper* to-day, may at another time, under change of circumstances, be deemed unnecessary or inexpedient to the end desired.

From the earliest moments of legislation under the constitution to the present day, Congress has found it "necessary and proper," by the concurrent votes of all parties, in order to "regulate commerce" and "to provide for the common defence and general welfare," not only to lay imposts (or tariff) *for revenue*, but to *protect* the manufactures that might minister to the "common defence and general prosperity;" and not only to protect such manufactures, but to construct forts, arsenals, military ways, and whatever else they might deem necessary to the "common defence," &c.; also such harbors, canals, roads, &c., as Congress may deem necessary and proper for the general commerce, or commerce between the States, &c., paying due deference, as a matter of expediency and decorum, to the wishes of the States most immediately concerned; so that the difficulty consists not so much in the right to act as the discretion in acting. Whether politicians may, *to-day*, admit these plain truths, and *to-morrow* deny them, and still claim credit for consistency, is another matter. For a masterly exposition of this whole subject in all its bearings, I would refer the reader to the refutation of the "views" of the Richmond Enquirer, by the Editors of the National Intelligencer, in a series of essays through the months of June, July, and August.

On the subject of the TARIFF, as long ago as the 30th January, 1817, resolutions were adopted in the New York Legislature, mainly by the influence of Mr. Van Buren, and "the dominant party" to which he was attached, "instructing their Senators and requesting their Representatives in Congress, to use their influence to obtain *efficient protection* for the *infant manufactures* of the United States," &c. And by these resolutions Mr. Van Buren and his friends laid the foundation of that very tariff, of which his present Southern supporters have ever since complained.—(*See New York Senate Journal, pages* 52, 78, *as quoted by the New York Times; but entirely omitted by Holland.*)

He voted in the Senate of the United States for the tariff of 1824, without hesitation, scruple, or instructions. (*This is admitted, but glossed over by Holland, page* 275.)

On the 25th February, 1837, he voted in the Senate of the United States against reducing the tax on salt; which, in the opinion of the salt champion of Missouri, is the most objectionable item of a high tariff.—(*See Senate Journal* 1827; *but omitted by Holland.*)

At the same session, however, Mr. Van Buren began to quail on the general tariff, as we learn from Holland, (page 275,) who says: "At a public meeting held in Albany on the 10th July, 1827, Mr. Van Buren delivered a speech of considerable length and great *ingenuity*," in which he examined "the tariff bill, which passed the House of Representatives in 1827, but was laid on the table in the Senate—he concurring of course. In the course of his speech (says he) Mr. Van Buren intimates his serious *fears*, that the friends of protective duties were urging their measurs with too much eagerness. He also cautions MANUFACTURERS against uniting their fortunes with any *political adventurer*;" a home hit, this, that will tell at the rebound of the

sober SECOND THOUGHTS *of the people* in November next. This was his "sheep speech," so famous for favoring contradictory opinions.

In the Spring of the same year, 1827, when Mr. Van Buren, accompanied by Mr. Cambreleng, was making a tour through the South, on an affected pilgrimage to Mr. Crawford, but in fact with sundry political speculations in view, such as ascertaining, by authority, from Mr. Crawford, the enemy of Mr. Calhoun, something which might at a future time be used to supplant Mr. Calhoun in the affections of General Jackson, and at the same time to make such overtures to the South, as might serve his own turn, in case General Jackson should not be taken up by the South to supersede Mr. Adams, HE DID, in replies to invitations to public entertainments, resort to similar misgivings with those above referred to; and, particularly, in his answer to an invitation by the citizens of Raleigh, he denounced those acts of federal legislation, upon what he called constructive rights, meaning the *tariff* and *internal improvements*, which had been frequently and earnestly advocated by both himself and his travelling companion Mr. Cambreleng. Seizing the opportunity of railing at the administration for what he had so frequently aided in doing, as national measures, he said:

"All dispassionate observers will admit that the measures (of the administration) to which you allude, justify the alarm you express. The spirit of encroachment has assumed a new and far more seductive aspect, and can only be resisted by the exercise of uncommon virtue."

That this offering to the South, was propitious, is apparent from the Columbian Telescope, of South Carolina, proclaiming at the time, that "Mr. Van Buren is not unlikely to succeed General Jackson, if he keeps steadily to his *present plan!*" (*See the Political Mirror, pages* 41, 42; *and chapter* "*how to dispose of a rival*," *page* 124.) These important passages in Mr Van Buren's magical life, are not even alluded to by his biographer, *Holland*.

But Mr. Van Buren rallied again, in the next twelve months, and "VOTED FOR THE TARIFF OF 1828," which provoked the most serious commotion that ever threatened the peace and integrity of the Union, in the South, headed by Mr. Calhoun and his nullifying friends. This is admitted by *Holland* (page 298) to be true, notwithstanding the speech of 1827, above quoted.

Mr. Van Buren was also the coadjutor and adviser of the author of the proclamation and the force bill, the natural offsprings of the above tariff. He was Vice President, resident at Washington, at the time those exciting measures took place; Mr. Livingston, the author of them, and a native of New York, having been appointed Secretary of State by the recommendation of Mr. Van Buren, at the dissolution of the cabinet in 1831, those measures must have been submitted to his advisement, and received his entire approbation, upon every principle of reciprocal praises and obligations between him and General Jackson—though the objectionable parts of the proclamation were afterwards explained away by General Jackson, at the instance of his political high priest and confessor at Richmond, doubtless, also, with the approbation of Mr. Van Buren, in order to conciliate Mr. Ritchie and the South.

With regard to INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, (the handmaid of the protective tariff, so far as the one encourages the home production of the muniments of war, &c., and the other affords the facilities of making them efficient, transporting them from place to place, &c., not otherwise sufficiently provided,) we have already seen that Mr. Van Buren was for a long time opposed to Clinton's plan of State improvements; we shall now see how he vacillated on this subject in regard to the *policy* and *powers* of the Federal Government.

In the Senate of the United States, in may 1822, he voted for the preservation and repairs of the Cumberland road, and for establishing United States' *toll-gates* on that road, in the States through which it passes; with other such latitudinous provisions, that caused Mr. Monroe to veto the bill. (*This is indirectly acknowledged by Holland, page* 271.)

In 1823, Mr. Van Buren voted, in the Senate, for provisions similar to the above, in relation to the preservation, repairs, and continuance of the Cumberland road. This and the preceding facts are indirectly acknowledged, and more than half suppressed by Holland. The only notice he takes of these votes is, in an extract from a speech of Mr. Van Buren on Foote's resolution, several years thereafter, in which he adverts to his votes on the Cumberland road, and says, "it is by no means *certain* that, in this respect, he *himself* has been *altogether* without fault." Certain circumstances "had induced him, *without full examination*, to vote for a provision authorizing the *collection of toll* on this road. The affair (says he) of the Cumberland road, in respect to its reference to the constitutional powers of this Government, *is matter entirely* SUI GENERIS!" A case, *sui generis*, in regard to its constitutionality!! I will venture to opine, without any hazard of mistake, that there is not another man, B. F. Butler excepted, the compeer of Mr. Van Buren, into whose mind the conception ever could have entered to fabricate such an unique prevarication and *false pretence*, to excuse an *act* which, had it not been his own, he would have pronounced, according to his then existing political cue, to be unconstitutional. To start a doctrine *that any case whatever* can come up in the whole range of legislation, that can entirely evade the question of constitutional power over it, on account of any *peculiarity* that may be set up for it, is so absurd and unstatesmanly, that the presumption with which it is advanced can only be accounted for in this instance by the long practice and unparalleled success of Mr. Van Buren in the arts of deception and *counterfeiting* the

similitude of truth. My reason for making the above exception in behalf of Mr. Butler is, because that gentleman has demonstrated his tact in the same sort of literary anomaly while he was Attorney General—though I presume he had acquired "some (more) acquaintance with *Latin*" than Mr. Van Buren had. In the fall of 1836, when the Secretaryship of War was about to be vacated by Mr. Secretary Cass accepting the embassy to France, Mr. Butler desired the situation and salary without vacating that of Attorney General, notwithstanding the incompatibility of the relation he would then stand in, as legal adviser (in quality of Attorney General) to himself, (in quality of Secretary of War,)—for this would be an advantage to him in all his official perplexities as Secretary of War, as he would be sure, *upon consultation*, to have the opinion of the law officer on his side; and, if the question should be raised as to his right to hold two offices, or to draw two salaries, under the constitution and the law, his opinion, in the capacity of Attorney General, might be decisive with the Secretary of the Treasury—particularly if he could do away a palpable solecism by *legal logic*, or the *hocus pocus* of his legal reputation, and make it appear that his second office was *no office*, but a nondescript *sui generis* case of service, and that he was entitled to the exact equivalent of the salary, for *extra services*, (the standing *sui generis* for all impostures of the kind.) Accordingly, he did arrange the thing exactly in the exquisite Van Buren style of legal quibble, and succeeded in befooling General Jackson and the Secretary of the Treasury, *secundum artem*. He styled himself "Secretary of War, *ad interim*," and so signed his name to all official papers while he was acting in this double capacity, about a year, cheating the country, and giving a shock to the common sense of every man who cast his eyes on so novel a title, unknown to the laws or the constitution.

"On the 22d January, 1824, Mr. Van Buren called the attention of the Senate to the alarming assumption of power by the General Government, in regard to 'internal improvements.'"—(*See Holland, page* 267.) "On the 19th of December, 1825, he again brought forward the same subject, and offered two resolutions, one of which declared 'that Congress does not possess the power to make roads and canals within the respective States.'" (*See ditto.*) "On the 21st April (same year) he opposed the appropriation for the Louisville canal." (*Ditto, page* 269.) And, on the 15th May following, he opposed the proposition to subscribe, on the part of the United States, to the Dismal Swamp Canal, connecting the navigable waters of Virginia and North Carolina. On the last but one of these occasions, Mr. Van Buren said:

"The aid of this Government can only be afforded to these objects of improvement, in three ways: by making a road or canal and assuming jurisdiction; by making a road or canal without assuming jurisdiction, leaving it to the States; or by making an appropriation without doing either. In his opinion, the General Government had no right to do either."

The reader has now before him two remarkable instances of Mr. Van Buren's oscillations from the *extremest constitutional constructiveness*, without the possibility of his having entertained a sincere belief in the "necessity" or propriety of collecting tolls by the United States on the Cumberland road, to *the extremest respectiveness to the letter of the constitution*, equally improbable of belief to justify him, in denying the power of the General Government to aid a State improvement by appropriation or loan. Mr. Van Buren, who commenced the study of law at *fourteen*, after a lapse of about thirty years' devotion to nothing else but law and *politics*, was yet so ignorant of the constitution in 1822, as to believe that the United States had constitutional power to CONSTRUCT A ROAD, (*sui generis*, be it remembered) ASSUME JURISDICTION, and COLLECT TOLLS, within the States!! But as soon as he finds it *politic* to make overtures to the South, and take lectures from professor Ritchie on his *beau ideal* of a "Northern man with Southern feelings," he is ready to take his *diploma* upon such restrictive construction (being no construction at all) as would render nearly the whole code of our laws unconstitutional, because they are not in accordance with ITS LETTER!! an absurdity, which needs only to be stated, to be fully appreciated, thus, viz: that if every law must conform to the letter of the constitution, that is, have a *literal* provision for it in the instrument, it would require that the constitution should anticipate and embrace, in advance, the whole legal code; and that whatever law be not therein literally embraced, shall be considered unconstitutional, which is absurd. It results, then, from this *argumentum ad absurdum*, that the "necessarily" implied powers are infinitely more numerous than those powers expressly enumerated; as each of these must carry with it a train of correlative powers that may be deemed by Congress "necessary and proper" from time to time, to carry it into execution.

So that, while I must agree that, according to the example of most of our illustrious statesmen before he began to strut his brief hour on the stage, his advocacy of protective imposts and internal improvements would have constituted some claim for Mr. Van Buren's taking rank in that galaxy of brilliant names, I must be permitted, nevertheless, to say, that all his seeming merit therein, has proved to be nothing but the frothy declamation of a political speculator, from the time he trafficked away his consistency, by time serving overtures to Mr. Ritchie for "Southern influence, to promote his ambition." Mr. Ritchie well knows that Mr. Jefferson was not only an advocate of a tariff or imposts for the protection and encouragement of "our infant manufactures, suited to our circumstances," but of internal improvements, by the Federal Government applying any surplus of revenue from imposts, to the construction of roads, canals, &c., as expressed in many of his

messages to Congress, down to his very last annual. Such, also, does he know were the sentiments of Mr. Madison, Mr. Monroe, and even of General Jackson, [with the exception of some unintelligible distinctions and inconsistences in the latter part of his administration, which he must have derived from Mr. Van Buren, through the promptings of his preceptor at Richmond.] Yet Mr. Ritchie has pertinaciously striven, against public opinion and the established policy of the nation from its birth, to establish a TOM RITCHIE SCHOOL OF POLITICS *denouncing all implied powers*, for the adoption of Virginia and the whole South, which has had a greater tendency to undermine the Union, than Mr. Calhoun's mad career and all his nullifying friends put together, inasmuch as his is but an *infection* from the TOM RITCHIE MANIA. But it would be rational to suppose that Mr. Van Buren's former *zeal* for a "protective tariff" and "internal improvements" would have been sufficient to have excluded him from the *Tom Ritchie school*, if Mr. Ritchie were the man whose political consistency, propriety, directness and good faith, on other occasions, would entitle him to be counted upon. Not so, however; for it has been a favorite artifice of Mr. Ritchie to lay low, and await the signs of the popular current, and in the mean time, to coax eminent men to modify, explain away, and annul their former opinions, so as to enable him to claim them to be of his way of thinking on the favorite doctrine of his school, for which he barters his pretended influence over Virginia politics, which is sure to seem considerable when the ebb makes in his direction. The recent case in which Mr. Ritchie has seduced Mr. Poinsett and Mr. Van Buren seriously to implicate their own veracity before the American people on the subject of the standing army of 200,000 men attempted by them to be imposed upon the country under the disguise of a militia regulation, is yet perhaps the most remarkable instance of this sort of political prostitution in the Tom Ritchie calendar.

Let no one suppose that I have charged this billing and cooing, this trafficking between Mr. Ritchie and Mr. Van Buren, unadvisedly. Without going into the details of the political intercourse that commenced between them, on Mr. V. B.'s visit to the South in 1827, which has probably been unremitting ever since, embracing sundry other personal visits of Mr. V. B. to Mr. Ritchie during the Virginia convention in 1830, and since he has been President, with the long visit of Mr. Ritchie at Washington during his inauguration, I will content myself by putting together a few facts that have already been made public, independent of what I am confident could be proved, by a committee of investigation authorized to send for persons and papers, showing the corrupt and clandestine influences used to swerve the President from the settled policy of the country, and particularly that the declaration of Mr. V. B.'s biographer is as true in this, as in other cases, viz: that "he unites, harmonizes, and directs, all with whom he acts," &c.

Holland, speaking on the subject of internal improvements, *p.* 271, says: "The course of General Jackson's administration has done much to throw light upon this subject, especially his famous *veto message* upon the Maysville road bill. *Mr. Van Buren was then a member of his cabinet*, and, to use *his own* language, 'gave to the measure of which that document was an exposition, his ACTIVE, ZEALOUS, and ANXIOUS SUPPORT." He then quotes from an electioneering letter of Mr. Van Buren, addressed to a committee at Shocco Springs, N. C. in October 1832, while he was candidate for the Vice Presidency, and afterwards remarks upon them thus: "These extracts, it will be noticed, go *farther* than the *veto message* upon the Maysville road bill, and assume the ground AFTERWARDS *adopted by the President*, that EVEN FOR PURPOSES WHICH MIGHT BE DEEMED OF A NATIONAL CHARACTER, *no appropriations ought to be made without a previous amendment of the constitution!!*" I ask, is it not now palpable, from this gradual progress of Mr. Van Buren from the extreme doctrine of "collecting tolls on the Cumberland road," to the opposite extreme of demanding "an amendment of the constitution to authorize an appropriation for avowed national objects," (the identical doctrine of the Tom Ritchie school,) and the consequent, progressive, corresponding changes in General Jackson's views of that subject, and of his "reasonable tariff," that there existed a corrupt coalition for political effect against the known will of the country, by which the Tom Ritchie doctrine was to find favor and support in Mr. Van Buren, and then, through his "clandestine influence over General Jackson," was to become the court doctrine of his administration?

But lest these should be deemed insufficient to satisfy those whose affections, or rather delusions, are so strong that they do not wish to be undeceived, I will quote an extract from the Richmond Enquirer of 25th June, 1830, which if it does not show under whose influence the President vetoed the Maysville road bill, it affords further proof at least, of that pervasive influence by which Mr. Van Buren "unites, harmonizes, and directs, all with whom he acts"—as the letter was written by one of his most zealous political friends, and perhaps one of the most effective in procuring the success of his recent elevations to the highest offices of the country. The letter was (*from Washington,*) dated 18th June, 1830—

"The opposition, when the President put his veto upon the Maysville road bill, calculated with great certainty that Pennsylvania (in sportsman's phrase) would *bolt*. Indeed, some of our own friends gave evident symptoms of alarm, and thought all was lost. However, the thing has gone forth, in as hideous a dress, too, as the opposition press could characterize it, withal; and, to their astonishment, that State still stands firm, and has not yet shot madly from her sphere. She still holds the front rank, and is No. 1. We have been most agreeably disappointed. The democracy of that democratic State, have taken a correct view of the subject of internal improvements, and will firmly sustain the President in the course he has taken. I have lately received several letters from gentlemen living in that State which evince a degree of unanimity, not to have been expected by the most sanguine of our

friends," &c. &c. "I have no fears of Pennsylvania. I never can believe, whatever may be her opinions as respects the constitutionality of the question, that she will consent to be taxed to make roads and canals in other States, after having spent not less than twenty millions of dollars in making her own roads and canals. Situated as she is, it would be infinitely preferable, I should think, (if improvements are to be made at the expense of the Federal Government) to have the surplus revenue divided among the States, as proposed by the President according to their respective representations in Congress, &c. DE WIT CLINTON."

"The foregoing reflections are so just, in the abstract, that they are as applicable to New York as to Pennsylvania, and the fact that those two great States have gone so extensively into internal improvements at their own expense, is a presumptive evidence that they did not formerly consider it constitutional even to vote for appropriations from the General Government for those objects, &c. They are then doubly bound to act with Virginia and the South, both on the obligations of consistency and interest."

[By the way, I cannot give that corrupt coalition any of the credit they would assume to themselves, in the matter of giving a home direction to *State improvements*, as it is obvious that the rapidity of the demand for improvement would not permit the State authorities to wait the slow motion of federal aid, and that the hostility, of the party in power, to improvement, *on any terms*, is fully demonstrated by their attempt to disgrace the credit of the States abroad, in the very necessary matter of negotiating funds for those objects, by raising a hubbub in the Senate about assuming State debts, without a hint or request to do so.]

Were it necessary, I could easily show that these narrow-minded and unstatesmanly doctrines of Mr. Van Buren, derived from the Tom Ritchie school, are not in accordance with the settled policy and practice of the country. Independent of the splendid instances of internal improvement, and improvement in our infant manufactures, affording commercial facilities and profits to productive labor through our vast extent of country, effected by *appropriations* and fostering *protection* of Congress, the simple fact, that there are standing committees of Congress, "on Internal Improvements," and "on Roads and Canals," and "on Manufactures," is alone sufficient to show that these are among the powers or means deemed "necessary and proper" to carry specific powers into execution. But these implied powers are not only the results of the aggregate counsels of the nation: even Virginia herself, never was, in her collective sense, as a State, nor in the individual opinions of the great majority of her wisest statesmen, opposed to the exercise of these powers, as necessarily implied by the specific powers. The petitions that have been presented to Congress from time to time, from all quarters of the State, praying the aid of Congress in her internal improvements, might alone be considered conclusive on this subject. I will select a few of those petitions, by their titles, presented from the remotest parts of the State, during the earlier part of General Jackson's administration, before he adopted Mr. Van Buren's fostered doctrine of the Tom Ritchie school, but which Virginia has not yet adopted, and I believe never will.

"Petition of the President and Directors of the Northern Turnpike Company in the State of Virginia, for the construction of a road from Leesburg in Virginia to Cumberland in Maryland, praying for a subscription of their stock by the Government of the United States; which petition was referred to the Committee on Roads and Canals."—House Journal for the session 1828-'29.

"Petition of inhabitants of Harper's Ferry and its vicinity, in the State of Virginia, praying Congress to grant to a company incorporated for the purpose of erecting a bridge over the river Shenandoah, grounds sufficient for the abutments of said bridge; as also for a grant of money to aid in the erection of said bridge."—House Journal, session 1829-'30.

"Petition of inhabitants of the town of Wheeling, in the State of Virginia, praying that efficient measures may be promptly adopted for the improvement of the navigation of the river Ohio, from, its sources, to Louisville, in Kentucky; which petition was referred to the Committee on Internal Improvements."—Session 1830-'31.

"Petition of sundry citizens of Richmond, (in Virginia,) praying that an adequate appropriation may be made to remove the obstructions to navigation in James River, between the port of Richmond and Burwell's bay; which was referred to the Committee on Commerce"—House Journal, 1831-'32.

It is also a remarkable fact that the last of the above-named petitions came from the city of Mr. Ritchie's adoption, signed by many of Mr. Ritchie's warmest political and personal friends, was the result of several public meetings held on the subject, and was forwarded to Congress, without any protest from Mr. Ritchie *against* it. Away, then, with the senseless pretences, that a protective tariff and internal improvements are incompatible with the Virginia creed, and are not within the province of Congress, whenever that body deems them necessary and proper, as the means of executing powers specifically enumerated.

II. *Mr. Van Buren's inconsistency respecting the constitutionality of a Bank of the United States: His combined safety bank system in New York, for political purposes: Failure of his attempt to seduce or intimidate the United States Bank to the embraces of Executive dictation—as a substitute for which he introduces his New York system, by combining State banks, as depositories of the Treasury, under Executive control: Explosion of the system occasions a resort to a sub-Treasury bank, in order to accomplish the original design of usurping, concentrating, and monopolizing the money power.*

It is generally thought that, by constitutional right, Congress wields the MONEY POWER as a balance to the Executive power over the SWORD. But, when it is considered that Mr. Van Buren claims the "initiative" as well as the "final" legislation—the *initiative* by virtue of his authority to recommend measures of legislation, the *final* by virtue of his power to veto all bills—will not the reader perceive that the *purse* or money power is brought very much within his grasp; and that it is of vast importance to wrest these gigantic initiative and final powers from a man whose principles set so loosely upon him, that they flit about and change front with every

political breeze that blows! Under any circumstances, these are dangerous powers in the hands of a bad man; but, being in such hands, with a corrupt majority of the legislature composed of his own partisans, supplicating his patronage and executive favor, is at once equivalent to an absolute surrender not only of the money power, but the whole power of legislation.

This brings me prematurely to a remark upon the great "spoils system," of which Mr. Van Buren is the *author*, as it originated in his own State, and *perfecter*, as it is now practised in the Federal Government. But, from the definition I would give of that system, it will be perceived that this sort of corrupt Executive influence over legislation constitutes a part of that system, and therefore a brief definition of it will not be entirely out of place here, though more properly coming in connexion with an exposition of the abuses of Executive patronage (properly so called) introduced into the General Government by Mr. Van Buren's clandestine influence over Gen. Jackson.

The most lucid conception that can be formed of this "spoils system" may be that which divides it into three great branches, as follows:

The *first* I would denominate the *direct* "spoils of office," or of offices actually existing—this branch being assumed to be under the direct control of the Executive as his right of PATRONAGE.

The *second* I would term the *indirect* "spoils of office," or of offices not actually existing, but in prospective, to be brought ultimately into the sphere of the direct spoils office, by the President's *initiative* power of legislation operating upon a *venal legislature*.

The *third* I would designate as the *indirect* "spoils of business" in general, consisting of unequal benefits to portions of the community at the cost of other portions, to be brought about by the President's *initiative* power of legislation operating upon a *venal legislature*.

That legislation, so materially in the hands of the Executive, as I have shown the federal legislation may be, under the circumstances stated, SHOULD, in all instances that affect large *appropriations* and establishment of *new offices*, in which the President either indicates the section of country on which such appropriations may be expended, or has the appointment of officers that may be required, and the disposal of all other matters connected with the *initiation* and the *execution* of such laws, CONSTITUTE a part of the great "spoils system" must be manifest notwithstanding the novelty of the definition. Also, that other legislation, likewise materially in the hands of the President, as above supposed, which affects unequally the business operations of different portions of the community, some for better some for worse, according to their party aspect, SHOULD, in like manner, constitute a branch of the great "spoils system" is equally evident. These two branches of that system, however, cannot be reduced to such certain calculation of vicious and venal motives, as that of the *direct* "spoils of office," actually existing—to which, by a great mistake, the spoils system has generally been supposed to be confined. The "spoils system," then, embraces the whole money power, direct or indirect, *so far as the President may, by his own act, directly or indirectly bring the control of it* WITHIN HIS OWN GRASP.

After a protective tariff and internal improvements, the next most striking example of the IMPLIED POWERS of Congress, is, that of incorporating a Bank of the United States, for the purpose of carrying into execution one or more of the SPECIFIED POWERS, such as "to facilitate pecuniary loans" upon emergency, "to aid in the fiscal agency of the Government," and "in establishing or maintaining a uniform currency," among other, incidental, benefits that would necessarily accrue to agriculture, commerce, manufactures, and other matters of business, promotive of the common good, or "the general welfare" of a sovereign people.*

It is in this *field of implied powers* that nearly the whole of the legislative labors are necessarily exercised in all constitutional Governments, as I have already endeavored to show. And it is in this field that systems may be attempted by conflicting parties, party compromises and coalitions, or even by the concurrent patriotic zeal of all parties, which, if pushed to extremes, may threaten, and imminently jeopard the common good, in violation of that salutary restriction, requiring that the exercise of such powers shall be in accordance with "the common defence and THE GENERAL WELFARE"—[a phrase, by the way, which has been so vilified, for party effect, as to render it a prejudice against a measure, to say that it is called for or rendered "necessary and proper," by "*the general welfare*," in "executing a specified power."] Such abuses were apprehended to be the tendency of those branches of the great American system, just passed under review in the foregoing section—whether from just cause or from the excitement of strong party prejudices; and, therefore, a jealous people, yielding to the dictates of pru-

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* Since writing the above, from recollection, not having the act of incorporation before me, I am enabled to subjoin, by way of note, from an able editorial article in the National Intelligencer, of the 27th August current, the preamble to the act of incorporation of the Bank of the United States, to which Washington affixed his approval as President of the United States on the 25th February, 1791:

"Whereas it is conceived that the establishment of a Bank of the United States upon a foundation sufficiently extensive to answer the purposes intended thereby, and, at the same time, upon the principles which afford adequate security for an upright and prudent administration thereof, will be very conducive to the successful conducting of the national finances; will tend to give facility to the obtaining of loans for the use of the Government in sudden emergencies; and will be productive of considerable advantages to trade and industry in general: Therefore," &c.

dential motives, arrested or abated their progress, by counter indications to their Representatives; and the enterprise of the States has well substituted a part of it by their own exertions, in the exercise of their co-ordinate power, to meet their own calls for internal improvements within their respective limits.

The fixedness of internal improvements, to the local objects, rendered it practicable for the co-ordinate power of the State, and the Federal Government, in this particular, (as in all other cases of co-ordinate powers,) to be operative without interference or collision; and, therefore, the right of internal improvement was not exclusively granted, or prohibited, to the Federal Government, but was left to be exercised (co-ordinately) among the implied powers, "necessary and proper," in the estimation of Congress, to execute other powers specifically granted, "for the common defence and general welfare." But the mercurial character of commercial intercourse renders it impossible for any State to protect her own manufactures by countervailing commercial regulations, that would not be liable to affect, injuriously, the manufacturing and other interests of other States; and, therefore, the specific power "to regulate commerce," was given up by the States, and exclusively conferred on the Federal Government, with the *general power* over all measures that might be deemed by Congress to be necessarily and properly incident thereto.

To incorporate a bank of the United States, I have said, was one of the *implied powers* found to be necessary and proper to carry into execution one or more of the *specified powers*. Of the validity and soundness of that decision, made in the earliest days of the constitution, by men, too, who had taken the greatest part in its formation and adoption, we have the corroborating opinions of many of the most eminent statesmen of the *democratic republican party* of Virginia, as well as the rest of the Union, at the time it was first adopted; and the same decision, with the judicial confirmation of the Supreme Court, has ever since been steadily maintained, with an increased majority of the republican party,* up to the present time, embracing the very period of the late DESTRUCTION of the *second bank* that had been established and based on that decision. And this same bank would have been rechartered by a large majority of all parties in both Houses of Congress, in the high party times of Jackson's administration, but for his VETO, which required two-thirds of both Houses to pass the bill in defiance of his personal hostility. Yet, neither the VETO, nor the outrage of removing the public deposites from the bank to insure its DESTRUCTION, and thereby prevent a renewal of the efforts of Congress to recharter the same bank, were perpetrated on account of any constitutional objections to *a national bank* of a particular organization (a Treasury bank) to suit the *views* of the Executive. For, besides the evidences of an opinion favorable to the constitutionality of *a national bank* occurring in nearly every message of General Jackson during his first term, *there is*, in the very draft of his instructions to the agent authorized in 1833 to make arrangements for the removal of the deposites to State banks, preparatory to the destruction of the United States Bank by drawing off the vital principle infused into it by Congress at its creation, *a recognition of the constitutionality of a bank*. Of the various modes of expression by which General Jackson declared his opinion in favor of the constitutionality of a national bank, I take the following remarkable one from his message of December 7, 1830, with which he connects an acknowledgment, also, of the benefits of such an institution to the country:

"In the spirit of *improvement* and *compromise* which distinguishes our country and its institutions, it becomes us to inquire whether it be not possible to secure the advantages afforded by the present bank, through the agency of a bank of the United States, so modified in its principles and structure as to obviate constitutional and other objections."

The passage in Gen. Jackson's instructions to the agent, above adverted to, runs thus:

"It is the opinion of the President, that hereafter as heretofore, bank agency will be found convenient, in managing the fiscal operations of the Government, and as he cannot, consistently with his avowed sentiments, sanction any national institution organized upon the principles of the existing Bank of the United States, he deems it proper to ascertain whether all the services now rendered by it, may not be performed by the banks incorporated by the several States, on terms equally or more favorable to Government."

This was substituted, by order of the President, for a paragraph in the original draft of instructions made out by the Secretary of the Treasury, in which General Jackson was supposed to be adverse to the constitutionality of a *bank*, and the substitute was made solely to correct that misapprehension, as we are informed by the authentic narrative of Mr. Duane.—(*See page* 91 *of said* "*Narrative.*")

The reader is now prepared to appreciate the bearing of these facts, in connexion with others

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* It might be acceptable to many were I to mention here the names and arguments of the eminent men chronicled in our political and legislative history, as being original and acquiescing advocates of this power; but for want of space and time must forego those details. It would be seen that such a list would not only commence with the name and clear reasoning of Washington, and embrace every other Virginia President, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe, but that it would include every President we have had, excepting only the existing incumbent, Mr. Van Buren. Nay, it would be seen to comprise many others of the strongest and most gifted talents of the democratic republican party (now so much disgraced by the descoration of its name to impose jacobinical, locofoco doctrines on confiding democrats,) besides some of the present prominent locofocoes themselves: of the former, we would see the names of Wm. H. Crawford, Alexander J. Dallas, and General Smith, of Maryland; among the latter, the names of John C. Calhoun, Felix Grundy, and John Forsyth, who are now in close alliance with the most radical locofocoes against the institutions of our country.

yet to be mentioned, upon Mr. Van Buren's position of "uncompromising hostility to a bank of the United States," and upon his relation of "Magnus Apollo in General Jackson's counsels."

Can it be for a moment supposed that General Jackson would, without Mr. Van Buren's secret approval, have persisted in favoring the constitutionality of a national bank, (of a certain organization, indeed,) notwithstanding Mr. Van Buren's declared influence over him, as implied in those resistless magical powers imputed to him by his biographer, of "uniting, harmonizing, and directing all with whom he acted," and as actually exercised by him in effecting other important *changes* in Jackson's opinions, particularly those of his "reasonable protective tariff," and "internal improvement in avowed national objects," as set forth by Mr. Van Buren himself, in regard to the latter, in his Shocco Spring electioneering letter quoted by Holland, (page 272) in which, speaking of the President's Maysville veto message of 1830, he says, "I throughout [the discussion of the principles of that message] gave to the measure, of which that document was an exposition, my ACTIVE, ZEALOUS, and ANXIOUS SUPPORT?" What is the true and obvious import of this "active, zealous, and anxious support," of a *veto* to a measure of internal improvement, while discussing that measure of an administration, of which Mr. Van Buren "was the spirit and the creator," at a time, too, when "no formal meetings of the Cabinet Council were holden, (*See Mirror, page* 247,) which cabinet meetings General Jackson had dispensed with *during his first cabinet*, in order that he might, without jars and conflictions of opinion, give his whole ear to Mr. Van Buren and his confederates, Kendall & Co.? It surely means a secret, effective, countervailing influence over General Jackson's preconceived individual opinions on the subject; particularly, too, as there were no cabinet consultations held, and General Jackson did "afterwards adopt" the extreme extent of Mr. Van Buren's new born scruples against the constitutionality of "appropriations, even for purposes *avowedly* of a national character."—(*See Holland, page* 274.)

This important question, then, naturally arises—how came it, that Mr. Van Buren, as the spirit and creator of General Jackson's administration, as his chief privy counsellor and clandestine adviser, failed, nevertheless, to indoctrinate General Jackson against the constitutionality of a national bank? and that we hear nothing of such objection, in the history of the day, until it suited Mr. Van Buren, in his electioneering overtures to the South, to declare "uncompromising hostility to a bank of the United States?" A few facts, to my conception, will render this mystery as clear as day: it will be palpable that Mr. Van Buren was not at that time of a mind to declare his uncompromising hostility to *a bank*, but would gladly have co-operated with Gen. Jackson in procuring the establishment of one, with such organization as would have rendered it a fit tool for the abuses of Executive authority and influence, and thereby have brought the MONEY POWER materially under Executive control. Grant to Mr. Van Buren (with the exceptions I shall show to it) the truth of Holland's statement (page 303) that "he has been a firm opponent, throughout his whole public life, of the extension of the banking system in New York, and of the Bank of the United States;" grant that, with Mr. Wright, Amos Kendall, and the rest of his radical agrarian faction, "he considers wealth an order of nobility (*ditto, p.* 300) not guarded against by the bravery or wisdom of our patriotic forefathers," and that he considers it "the grand engine of self-exaltation and popular oppression," *used as he has used it*; grant that "of all inventions which have been put in operation in this country," he considers "the most exceptionable are incorporated companies, and that the worst of all incorporated companies are banks," *as he would use them!* and that he (Mr. Van Buren) is a real hard-money man, opposed to the paper system, in favor of a national currency of *gold*, and in favor of an adequate silver currency for common use (*ditto*, p. 308:) grant him, in common with his associates, the profession of all these opinions as part and parcel of the same system of denunciation they have been practising towards all the valuable corporations which have been such powerful and efficient agents in the internal improvement and prosperity of every State in the Union, yet, by the very exceptions he has made in his practice, to those professions, I should be able to show the insincerity of the one, or the wilful and deliberate baseness of the other—that these professions were to answer sinister purposes, and that they were abandoned or laid on the shelf whenever he could make a contrary or temporizing course minister to his ambition. Or why did he, as Governor of New York, patronize and recommend the combination of her banks, if not as a political engine, under the title of the safety fund system? Why did he, through his long and faithful political yokefellows, Levi Woodbury and Isaac Hill, endeavor to convert the United States Bank into a political instrument at the control of the federal Executive? Why did he, on failing to accomplish that object, conspire with other venal and irresponsible associates of General Jackson to obtain by oblique approaches and intimations to Congress, the charter of a Government bank organized upon different principles from the then *existing bank*; and, failing in that, resolve its destruction, and resort to the association of State banks as depositories of the public moneys, thereby bringing their combined influence under the control of the Executive—if all these manoeuvres were not for the wicked and selfish purpose of administering to his own ambition, by gaining the command of the money power, regardless of the yet untold mischiefs he has brought upon his country? Of the most important facts that serve to resolve these queries, I proceed to give a brief account from the best authorities, for the benefit of the public, who have necessarily been unable to see and

compare them in *juxtaposition*, so essential to enable them to appreciate this branch of the great "system of spoils" by which the country has been beggared, and the Government reduced to bankruptcy. I shall first quote from Holland, (pages 320, 321, 322) what he tells us Mr. Van Buren said of the New York banks, in his message to the Legislature the 1st January, 1829, "after alluding, in the *happiest* manner, to the distinguished abilities of his predecessor," De Witt Clinton:

"He (Gov. Van Buren) says the most important business of the session, was the question of renewing the charters of the several banks in the State: thirty-one charters would expire in the course of four years, with a capital of fifteen millions of dollars, and debts amounting to thirty millions. He alludes to the difference between their situation at that time, and the laying the foundation of the banking system anew; and says, in view of the extent of these institutions and their close connexion with the affairs of the community, that 'to dispense with banks, altogether, is an idea which seems to have no advocates.' 'He says, that experience is against banking owned wholly by the State, and that to make stockholders liable, in their private capacity, throws the responsibility into the hands of irresponsible persons.' 'He finally concludes that the present solvent banks cannot be so suddenly closed, without a violent disturbance of the interests of the public; and alludes to 'a sensible and apparently well considered plan' which had been submitted to him, and which proposed 'to make all the banks responsible for any loss the public may sustain, by the failure of any one or more of them.' He then presents a brief epitome of the "safety fund system,' and concludes this part of his message with the remark, that 'the interest which attaches itself to the representative character, can never be greater than when the fulfilment of the trust committed to the representative, may bring him in conflict with the claims of the great moneyed interests of the country."

'On the 26th January 1829, Mr. Van Buren, in a brief message, introduced [for the second time] to the favorable notice of the Legislature, the celebrated 'safety fund system.' This plan originated with the honorable Joshua Forman, and was by him laid before Mr. Van Buren. It was somewhat modified by the suggestion of the latter, and finally adopted by the Legislature."

This is nearly all that Holland says on this insidious scheme, except a few extracts from the magniloquent praises of it by Thomas Hart Benton, (always entitled to do more harm than good to any cause) addressed to General Davis of Mississippi, in pursuance of the *clandestine system of electioneering* organized by the cabal at Washington. The following is a more full and sagacious representation and commentary of the same *plot in embryo*, from the unknown author of the *Political Mirror, p.* 233:

"There is a power incident to banking institutions, which is susceptible of great abuse. They may control their debtors and their customers, and may be used for political effect. But in the ordinary isolated and independent state of these institutions, their number and adverse interests almost annihilate this power. Their stock and their business are distributed throughout the community; and as no one, singly, can affect public opinion, attempts for that purpose have been, consequently, never made. But a moment's consideration will show a case wholly different, where many of these institutions in a State, or in the Union, combine, and are directed by the will of an individual or of a party. The restraint upon the dangerous power of each bank is removed; the dependant upon bank favor cannot seek relief from oppression by shifting his account; he has but one mean of obtaining, perhaps, indispensable pecuniary aid: he must conciliate the bank directors, and their favor is to be purchased only by his vote and influence in political contests. The possible abuse of this power, by individual banks, has, by many sound political economists, been objected against their creation; but their great use overpowered the objection from possible abuse, until their very number became protection. But, when banks combine, the power to pervert their faculties is increased, and the restraint wholly taken away.

"Amid all the excitements of party, for forty years, no one had conceived the design of combining the banks, to control the popular voice. No bold and designing politician had ventured upon this expedient, until the subtle genius of Martin Van Buren seized it in the project of the safety bank system of New York.

"This system, we understand, is not the offspring of Mr. Van Buren's scheming and prolific brain. It was begotten, probably, in the purlieus of Wall street, in the commerce of money changers, who looked to it only, so far as it regarded themselves, as a pecuniary speculation, but who were fully aware that the political power it might give would be its best recommendation to Governor Van Buren. When first submitted to him, it was received coldly. His attention, as he lay upon his couch whilst the details were read, was divided between the reader and a newspaper: but when the suggestion was made, that the combined banks would furnish a power which might not only check the operations of the Bank of the United States, but might so control that institution as to render it a serviceable engine throughout the Union, instantly, all the energies of the careless listner were roused. No car of love sick girl ever drank with more intense delight the long-desired, but unexpected, love tale. What a prospect was here opened! The banks of the State of New York, weak and useless for party effect in their individual existence, were hooped together, and became like the fasces, the bundle of handed rods borne by the lictors before the Roman Consuls, the representative of irresistible power; whilst the bank of the United States [would] like a serpent, wrap all opposing interests in its folds and crush them beneath his feet!

"The project was instantly adopted, cherished, matured, and is now, in New York, in full tide of successful experiment. The State, overwhelmed by a moneyed aristocracy [so much reviled by Mr. Van Buren except when he can use them to his own purposes] is bound to the car of Mr. Van Buren's ambition. But the beatifick vision which enraptured his sight, could not be immediately and wholly realized. The Bank of the United States could not be seduced or coerced to minister to his unhallowed ends. The attempt to influence it was not omitted. (however,) and the war upon that institution which has ensued, so disastrous to the country, but so beneficent to the 'dominant party,' is to be ascribed to Mr. Van Buren!!"

* * * (Page 235.) "The safety fund act, passed in 1829, requires that all banks thereafter incorporated [the whole of the bank charters were then about to expire] should pay annually, for six years, one half per cent, equal to a contribution of three per cent upon their respective capitals—to remain the property of such banks respectively, but to be vested under the direction of the Comptroller of the State, in productive stocks, subject to the payment of the debts and losses accruing to the community from insolvent banks—thereby making the combined banks mutual assurers for each other, uniting them in such manner that the whole may be moved by the same impulse, and operate irresistibly upon all other banks in the State [and when all should come to be rechartered it would embrace the whole.] Three commissioners preside over this [many-headed] monster; one appointed by the State, the others by the banks. These are visiters of all the banks of the association; on the suggestion of one of whom, the Chancellor of the State is required, by injunction, to stop the proceedings of a bank, and, unless cause be shown to the contrary, to subject it to the pains of insolvency. This power, unconnected with politics, may have little danger, may be, perhaps, useful; but in the hands of politicians, and in the condition of most country banks, especially in New York, may, and does, make the banks connected with the system, the subjects of party influence.

* * * (Page 236.) "Soon after the election of General Jackson, a meeting was held in Washington of the principal chiefs of the party, to consider of the means to perpetuate their authority, of which possession of the bank was among the most prominent. The first manifestation of their purpose was in June, (of the same year,) 1829, by an attempt (supported by Mr. Woodbury, then Senator, and since Secretary of the Navy, and now Secretary of the Treasury, and by Mr. Isaac Hill, late editor of a violent Jackson journal of New Hampshire, then unconfirmed Second Comptroller of the Treasury, and now a Senator of the United States,) [since a pension agent, and now Re-

ceiver General of the Treasury at Boston,] to coerce the bank to remove the president of the branch bank at Portsmouth, upon party grounds. This attempt was countenanced, if not fully participated in, by Mr. Ingham, Secretary of the Treasury, who undertook to give the bank 'the views of the Administration' in relation to the appointment.

"Upon these extraordinary instances, the bank deemed it necessary to extinguish, if possible, at once, the hope of converting it into a party agent. The president of the institution, therefore, distinctly announced to the Secretary of the Treasury that 'the bank rightly apprehended his views; and that it became his duty to state, in a manner so clear as to leave no possibility of misconception, that the boards of directors of the bank and of its respective branches acknowledged not the slightest responsibility to the Secretary of the Treasury, touching the political conduct of their officers; that being a subject on which they never consult, and never wish to know the views of any Administration; that, for the bank, which has specific duties to perform, and which belongs to the country and not to party, there was but one course of honor and safety; that, whenever its duties came in conflict with the spirit of party, it would not compromise with it, but openly and fearlessly resist it; that in this its interests concurred with its duty, as it would be found, at last, that the best mode of satisfying all parties was to disregard all.'

"Notwithstanding this decisive rebuke, there lingered in the bosom of Mr. Van Buren a hope that the bank might yet be constrained to submission, or he dreaded to make upon it a resolute and unequivocal attack before the party had been thoroughly prepared to sustain it. Whilst, therefore, the Presidential message of 1832 struck a dreadful note of preparation for danger, it reserved a *locus pœnitentiæ*, a place for turning; and such continued the policy of the party for three years!

"In that message the President was made to observe: 'The charter of the Bank of the United States expires in 1836, and its stockholders will most probably apply for a renewal of their privileges. In order to avoid the evils resulting from precipitancy, in a measure involving such important principles and such deep pecuniary interests, I feel that I cannot, in justice to the parties interested, too soon present it to the deliberate consideration of the Legislature and the people. Both the constitutionality and the expediency of the law creating this bank, are well questioned by a large portion of our fellow-citizens,' &c. * * * In this there is no committal on the constitutional power, &c. The paragraph assumes the character of precaution for the interests of the parties, while it threatens the bank with possible danger.

"The message of 1830 is more explicit of the views of the Administration. 'Nothing has occurred,' says the President, 'to lessen in any degree the danger which many of our citizens apprehended from that institution, as at present organized. In the spirit of improvement and compromise which distinguishes our country and our institutions, it becomes us to inquire whether it be not possible to secure the advantages afforded by the present bank, through the agency of a bank of the United States, so modified in its principles and structure as to obviate constitutional and other objections.' Still not a doubt is expressed of the constitutional power of Congress. But the existing bank is distinctly apprized of the design of the Administration to prostrate it, and to establish another, modified on principles which would obviate the objections of the President to it. Though the non-committal hand of Martin Van Buren be visible here, there is a clear admission of the right of the Government of the United States to incorporate a bank, with an expression of a disposition to make one suitable to the views of those now directing the affairs of the nation.

"The subject (of the bank) is very briefly treated in the next annual message of December, 1831, [Mr. Van Buren being then absent on his short embassy to England, but left the President more than ever imbued with his wishes and returned the next spring, after the rejection of his nomination, to connect his future operations on the money-power with his canvass for the Vice Presidency.] The message says: 'Entertaining the opinions heretofore expressed in relation to the Bank of the United States, as at present organized, I felt it my duty, in my former messages, frankly to disclose them.' To disclose what? That the constitutionality and expediency of the law creating the bank was doubted (not by the Administration, but) by a large portion of our fellow-citizens; that many of our citizens apprehended danger from that institution as at present organized. There is evidently [in all this tenaciousness of the idea of a modified organization] a door kept open for retreat, [from constitutional scruples;] and, had the bank proven itself sufficiently docile and obedient, a very inconsiderable change in the provisions of its charter might have made it, the present bank, constitutional and expedient; and the 'many citizens,' who were conjured up to 'doubt' or 'apprehend,' would have been annihilated with the same magic wand that had called them into being.

"The Administration foresaw, and events soon made it evident to all, that the nation was not prepared for the extinction of the bank, when the design against it was first conceived. The first attack was repelled at every point. The committees of both Houses of Congress reported in favor of the existing bank. The Committee of Ways and Means distinctly put and ably maintained the following propositions: 1. That Congress had the constitutional power to incorporate a bank such as that of the United States 2. That it is expedient to establish such an institution. 3. That it is inexpedient to establish a National Bank, founded on the credit and revenues of the Government.

"Thus rebuked and instructed, a decent respect for the Legislature required that the President should have left the subject to them and the people, [whose immediate representatives they were,] until he should be called to act upon it officially. But this course did not quadrate with the views of the party—of Mr. Van Buren. The nation, if suffered to discuss it solely as a question of public policy, would, it was feared, recognise and pursue its true interests, and, in due season, recharter the bank, and mar forever the design of the Administration to engross and wield the money-power of the country. An appeal was, therefore, [presumptuously, and in contempt of the rights of the whole people through their direct legal representatives,] made from the councils of the nation to the Jackson party, [or rather Van Buren faction,] who were termed the people!"

Failing in this scheme of alternative parts, either to convert the existing bank into an Executive machine, or to reorganize its charter for the same end, Mr. Van Buren's third alternative was to transfer the "safety bank system of New York" to the General Government, so far as the association of State banks as *public depositories* of the Treasury would give their combined impulses into the hands of the Executive. In order to show that Mr. Van Buren's "associated banks" was the model on which the President's new plan was formed, and that Mr. Van Buren, who had returned from England, had located himself at Washington, and was the fellow-traveller, the mentor, of the President during his Eastern tour, and in close counsel with him when he wrote to the Secretary of the Treasury from Boston, June 26, 1833, I shall make a few quotations from that letter and from the President's instructions to the agent authorized to make arrangements with State banks as depositories and fiscal agents of the Government. The fallacies of reasoning and fact exhibited by those extracts, contrasted with the known results, will strike the mind of the reader with as great force as the singular correspondence between the Van Buren *State* and the Van Buren *federal* ASSOCIATION OF BANKS, as a lever to control the MONEY POWER.

"The State institutions are, in his opinion, [Jackson's letter,] competent to perform all the functions which the United States Bank now performs, or which may be required by the Government. At the same time that they cannot so effectually concentrate the money power, they cannot be so easily or effectually used for individual, political, or party purposes, as a Bank of the United States, under any form, or of any character. It is, therefore, the desire of the President that you should immediately turn your attention to the making of such arrangements as will

enable the Government to carry on all of its fiscal operations through the agency of the State banks—(Jackson's letter to Duane; see Narrative, p. 16.)

"But the insecurity of the public deposites is not the only reason which will justify their removal from the Bank of the United States. The President thinks that the use of the means and power which they give, to corrupt the press and public men, to control popular elections, to procure a recharter, contrary to the decision of the people, [a gratuitous assertion,] and to gain possession of the Government, which it was created to serve, are substantial reasons requiring their removal." "But the strongest and controlling reason, in the mind of the President, is that which has been before referred to, and which consists in the necessity of organizing a new scheme for the collection,* deposite, and distribution of the public revenue, based on the State banks, and making a fair *experiment* of its practicability before the expiration of the charter of the existing bank; that the country may have a fair opportunity to determine whether any bank of the United States be necessary or not."—(Ditto, p. 26.)

"Time has shown that the curtailment of the accommodations and the circulation of the bank produces no sensible effect on the business of the country:" [Indeed!] "The establishment of new State banks, and an extension of the old, fill up the space from which the United States Bank withdraws, and the community at large is scarcely sensible of the change." [Truly!] "Such will be the progress of events, until the bank has wound up its concerns and ceased to exist, when its absence will neither be felt nor regretted by the people." [I commend this to the special wonder and admiration of the reader.]—(Ditto, p. 27.)

"It is the President's opinion that the power over the State banks which the Bank of the United States now possesses, is derived almost wholly from its receipts of the public revenue. It is chiefly through the money thus received that it obtains, directly or indirectly, the paper of the State banks and raises balances against them. If its receipts of the public revenue shall cease, its means of raising those balances will cease. If the State banks become the receptacles of the public revenue they will instantly be enabled to raise like balances against the Bank of the United States and its branches. That bank will not only be deprived of power, but that power will be transferred [where?] into the hands of the State banks."

[So says the jesuitical prompter of this letter, while, in his mental reservations, he knew that the power would be transferred to the hands of the Executive, who was now about seducing them to come within his grasp, as may be seen by the following extracts from the proposed regulations of them by the President:]

"Instructions," (to the agent,) "(E.) 1. That one bank be selected in Baltimore, one in Philadelphia, two in New York, and one in Boston, with a right on the part of the Government to add one in Savannah, one in Charleston, S. C., one in the State of Alabama, one in New Orleans, and one in Norfolk, upon their acceding to the terms proposed; all which shall receive the deposites in those places respectively, and be each responsible to the Government for the whole public deposites, wherever made.

"(F.) 2. That those banks shall have the right, by a convention of their presidents or otherwise, to select all the banks at other points throughout the United States, in which the public money shall be deposited, with an absolute negative by the Secretary of the Treasury.

(G.) "3. That the Secretary of the Treasury shall have the power to discontinue the deposites in any bank or banks or break up the whole arrangement, whenever he may think proper; he giving, in such case, the longest notice of his intention to do so which the public interest may warrant.

(H.) "4. That the primary and secondary banks shall make returns of their entire condition to the Secretary of the Treasury monthly, or oftener if he shall require it; and report to the Treasurer weekly the state of his deposites with them respectively; and that they shall also subject themselves to a critical examination of their books and transactions, by the Secretary of the Treasury, or an authorized agent, whenever the Secretary may require it."—(Ditto, p. 85.)

Having perpetrated the deed, their extreme solicitude that the *substitutes* for the immolated fiscal agent of the Government should succeed, betrayed the quacks of the administration into such extreme stimulation of the State banks to do every thing that could be done by the United States Bank, that they presently overdid the work with such wild excess as to explode the whole system. The Secretary of the Treasury, immediately upon executing Gen. Jackson's order to make the deposites in State banks, addressed the banks selected to this effect:

"The deposites of the public money will enable you to afford increased facilities to commerce, and to extend your accommodations to individuals; and, as the duties which are payable to Government arise from the business and enterprise of merchants engaged in foreign trade, it is but reasonable that they should be preferred in the additional accommodations which the public deposites will enable your institution to give, whenever it can be done without injustice to the claims of other classes of the community."—(Extract from the Secretary's letter to the Girard Bank of Philadelphia, dated 26th September, 1833.)

In 1820, there were only 308 banks in the United States. In 1830, during a space of ten years, there had been only twenty-two banks added to the above number, making 330. In 1837, there were 788 banks, being an increase of 458 banks, in little more than two-thirds of the time in which there had only been an increase of twenty-two banks. But immediately after the removal of the deposites there were more than 200 new banks chartered in one year. Such were the fruits of the *statesmanship!* of a set of men whose immaculate "director" had professed to be theoretically opposed to banks altogether, but had recommended the recharter of the New York banks, (*as he said,*) merely because they were so connected with the business of the citizens generally, that they could not be suddenly dispensed with. Since then, we have seen him and his partisans co-operating in the multiplication of banks almost indefinitely, and as suddenly, upon the explosion of their wicked designs, turn about to demolish their own progeny, together with the whole banking system, which he had avowed could not be dispensed with altogether! Is such a man to be longer entrusted with the management and "direction" of national affairs, wherein the worst of tyrannies cannot be more disastrous, than the *instability* he has introduced *in our laws* and *our civil institutions?*

Here, then, we have seen that Mr. Van Buren recommended the recharter of all the banks of New York in 1829, because, "to dispense with banks altogether, is an idea which seems to have no advocate." *Per contra,* he is now for crushing them all at once throughout the Union; and his party slaves in Congress have commenced the work at the last session, by crushing those of the District of Columbia, preparatory to the general catastrophe, which his proposition of a bank-

* This is a deliberate purpose to violate the first of the explicit powers delegated to Congress by the constitution, viz: that "Congress shall have power to lay and COLLECT taxes," &c., by provision of law of course, over which the President has no control, but to execute its provisions.

rupt law was intended to effect in another way. Query, did not Mr. Van Buren's lenity towards the banks of New York arise from his scheme then proposed, of "banding them together" as a political engine?

We have also seen that Mr. Van Buren, shortly after putting the *combination*, "safety bank system," in operation, made overtures and threats to the Bank of the United States, through his party friends whom he "directs" to become an executive tool; and pending three years' anxious hope of effecting his object of grasping the money power in this way, suspended all expression of his constitutional objections to a bank of the United States; and on his failure to seduce or intimidate the bank, even yet, without denouncing the constitutionality of *a bank*, he takes measures to destroy that institution, and to transfer to the Federal Government the system of combined State banks, similar to the combined system he had introduced in New York; and actually so far succeeded in his unrighteous purpose, by usurpation and violence to the constitution, until the system itself demonstrated the wickedness of the design, and the fatuity of its execution, by an universal explosion—partly effected by the contagious mania, brought about by the inspirations of Executive madness, of multiplying State banks and speculations of all sorts, the natural fruitions of Mr. Van Buren's inordinate over-reaching ambition.

Not disheartened, however, at so signal a reproof for his want of patriotism and statesmanly foresight, he straightway resorts to a substitute, in a scheme of a sub-Treasury or Treasury bank, which his whole party had stigmatized with reproachful epithets, while they had better hopes of the other schemes. This, also, he has, after repeated efforts, succeeded in forcing to put on the *outward garb of law*, which its gross violations of the constitution will never sanction, and from which, its speedy explosion on account of its utter impracticability, will soon prove the country's happy deliverance.

This measure is UNCONSTITUTIONAL, not only because it is not embraced in the *specific powers* of Congress, and recognizes the power assumed by the President to 'collect' and keep the revenue, in violation of an express power given to Congress to COLLECT and keep by its own officer, the Secretary of the Treasury, whose fiscal reports are ordered to be made to Congress direct—but because it cannot be inferred as an *implied power*, it being neither necessary nor proper "to aid in conducting the national finances," which it will obstruct instead of aiding; nor to facilitate "the obtaining loans on emergency," as it will impede those facilities by the general embarrassments that will arise from it; nor will it conduce "to the advantage of trade and industry," but the contrary, by withholding from active circulation the whole amount of the revenue, for a great portion of the year, while it is locked up in the vaults of Receivers General.

It is IMPRACTICABLE, because it conveys conflicting and incompatible authority to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Postmaster General, and the Treasurer of the United States, over the deposites in the hands of Receivers General, empowering either to control the entire deposites by transferring them to any point, or detaining them in despite of one another, and therefore in utter derogation of a prompt, regular, and consistent action, according to the exigencies of the Government—leaving, indeed, the salutary or deleterious interposition of the President in such emergency, to be implied, by another effort of usurpation over law, rather than provide for the possible contingency.

The bill would also be UNCONSTITUTIONAL, even were it *practicable*, and could contribute in any degree as an implied power to accomplish the objects of specific powers, *because* it involves so *vast an expense*, and *increases Executive power* to so dangerous an extent, that it would be the last of all practicable resorts to accomplish those objects consistently with "the common defence and the general welfare of the country," essential to the constitutionality of every law, but which this puts in imminent jeopardy. On the other hand, without casting about for any other more practicable and economical device, the very institution which has been destroyed in order to erect this upon its ruins, was more efficient in every respect, and entirely economical, as it cost the Government nothing, but paid it a bonus, and, while sustaining itself above "executive dictation," *restrained* instead of *enlarging* "*Executive power*."

But especially is this law unconstitutional, *because* IT ORIGINATED IN THE SENATE. The constitution says: "All bills for *raising revenue* shall originate in the House of Representatives." Most of the State constitutions express this inhibition of the Senate thus: "All *money bills* shall originate in the House of Representatives." Without insisting that this clause of the State constitutions is the true exponent of the above clause of the federal constitution, (and it has been the practice of Congress so to construe* it,) but confining myself to the straitest sense of the phrase "all bills for raising revenue," it will be manifest, from the title of the sub-Treasury bill, that it is a bill for *raising revenue*. Its title is, "An act for the *collection, safe-keeping*, transfer, and disbursement of the public revenue." Now, to place the proposition beyond dispute, that a bill for the collection and safekeeping of the revenue must constitute an essential and indispensable part of the system of "raising revenue," I will suppose a simple case.

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* The bill for appropriating $3,000,000 for fortifications, to provide for a French war, into which General Jackson was hurrying us a few years ago, was abandoned on account of the objection that it originated in the Senate.

Suppose the constitution were just going into operation, and a bill for "raising revenue" were about to be enacted for the first time: will it be pretended that a bill apportioning the *taxes*, duties, imposts, or *excises*, would be perfect without a provision for their *collection* and *safekeeping*, whether in the same or in a separate bill? Such a provision would assuredly form a part of the system of "raising revenue;" otherwise no revenue would be raised. Well, such a system has long ago been established: will it, therefore, be pretended that now an attempt to change the whole system of collection and safekeeping, or even any part of it, is not an essential interference with, abrogation of, or remodeling, the system of "raising revenue?" And, if it be, it is undoubtedly necessary that such a bill should originate in the House of Representatives. Gentlemen of the locofoco stamp may persist in their obstinacy, and continue to place themselves, as they are wont to do, above law and the constitution, but there is no getting rid of the force of demonstration, or the *opprobrium* of disregarding it.

Yet, notwithstanding the outrages proposed to be perpetrated by this bill in a thousand ways, Mr. Van Buren has dared to insult the good sense of the American people by calling it "a second declaration of independence," and has actually burlesqued the ceremony of signing the sacred instrument of "American Independence" by expressly setting apart the holy day of the FOURTH OF JULY, at 12 o'clock, to sign this bill of abominations, which, in fact, threatens the subversion of the liberties our forefathers won with their blood and treasure. And straightway Mr. Ritchie, too, chimes in, and echoes "a second declaration of independence"—*he* who had condemned this same bill, when it was first proposed, as "enhancing the Executive patronage which ought to be diminished, and as dangerous to American liberty."

But this is not all. Mr. Van Buren, under the pressure of embarrassments and panic in which his unaccountable blunders have involved him, is so far demented as to issue, in his recent electioneering letters, a "gross libel against the memory of Washington, by characterizing him as one of the founders of "MEASURES devised by the *friends and advocates of privileged orders*, for the *purpose of perverting the Government* from its pure and legitimate objects, *vesting all power in the hands of the* FEW, and *enabling them to profit at the expense of the* MANY"—as one of those by whose conduct "the FEW *were enabled to enrich themselves by using the money which belonged to the* MANY," and "in CLEAR VIOLATION of the spirit of a constitutional *prohibition*"—as one of the founders of "an extensive interest," "deriving wealth from the use of the people's money," "in PALPABLE VIOLATION *of the spirit of the constitution*"—as one whose gross errors President VAN BUREN was to reform by a measure, by means of which "the management of an important branch of our national concerns, AFTER A DEPARTURE OF NEARLY HALF A CENTURY, will be brought back to the LETTER, as well as to the OBVIOUS spirit and intention, of the constitution." This is the picture of WASHINGTON, as drawn by the hand of VAN BUREN!! Truly the President has, in this instance, gone beyond his pledge to tread in the footsteps of his "illustrious predecessor." That predecessor had, in 1796, contented himself with a species of *negative* insult to WASHINGTON, by refusing to join in a vote in the House of Representatives, on the occasion of his final retirement from public life, expressing its sense of his public services. President VAN BUREN, true to his promise of imitating President JACKSON, attempts to "perfect the work he had so gloriously begun," by telling the American People, in substance, that WASHINGTON was "a deliberate violator of the constitution" which he had solemnly sworn to obey! This act of fatuous effrontery (and injustice) has roused the indignation of the country so strongly, that any direct defence of it has, so far as we have noticed the papers of the day, been *avoided* even by the most reckless advocates of the present administration."—(*See the National Intelligencer of August* 27.)

III. *Mr. Van Buren the author and perfecter of the great spoils system—The direct spoils of office only a branch of that system—A key to the machinery used to bring this whole system to perfection, and concentrate it in the hands of the President, consisting of the Press, the Post Office, the Armed Force, and the Appointing Power—Their several uses and abuses in the hands of a corrupt Executive, in monopolizing the whole money-power, and reducing "the Commonwealth to a spoil."*

It is necessary again to recur back a little beyond the commencement of Mr. Van Buren's career in the United States Senate, in order to begin the review (which runs through this period till he reached the Presidency) of his exploits in the *direct* "spoils of office," according to the definition given in the beginning of the *second* Section of this period of his life, in which, I have also treated of some of the subjects that belong to the other two branches of that "great system of spoils" to which he has subjected all the resources, public and private, of this great republic.

We have seen that Mr. Van Buren, precocious in all the arts of "uniting, harmonizing, and directing" the passions of party, *was*, at a very early period of his political life, (more than twenty years ago,) the author and projector of the New York "regency school" of politics called the "spoils system;" that is to say, in the mitigated form of expression used by his biographer,

† "He avowed the principle that the dominant party should always possess and exercise the official patronage." (See Holland, p. 198.)

I shall now give a few further evidences of his continuance and perfection of that system, in the various protean shapes which his ingenuity and his opportunities enabled him to give it, in transferring it from his State to the Federal Government—AND FOR WHAT OBJECT!

It is a matter of record in the Post Office Department, that, in 1829, when Mr. Van Buren was a candidate for a seat in the United States Senate, to become the colleague of Rufus King, whose election he had procured, he canvassed with great zeal, upon the proscriptive principle of the "spoils system," to secure his election to that body, by the success of his own party in the State Legislature, through the official influence of postmasters of his own selection, to fill the places of those he reported to the Postmaster General for removal. Let the following letter suffice here as evidence of that fact:

"*Van Buren's letter to the Hon. Henry Meigs, requiring the removal of certain officers in order to secure his election to the Senate of the United States.*

"MY DEAR SIR: Our sufferings owing to the rascality of deputy postmasters is intolerable, and cries aloud for relief. We find it absolutely impossible to penetrate the interior with our papers, and unless you attain them by two or three prompt removals, there is no limiting the injurious consequences that may result from it; let me therefore, entreat the Postmaster General to do an act of justice, and render us a partial service, by the removal of Holt, of Herkimer, and the appointment of Jabez Fox, Esq.—also, of Howell, of Bath, and the appointment of an excellent friend, W. B. Rochester, Esq., a young man of the first respectability and worth in the State—and the removal of Smith, at Little falls, and the appointment of Hollister—and the removal of Chamberlain, in Oxford, and the appointment of Lot Clark, Esq. I am in extreme haste, and can therefore add no more. Use the enclosed papers according to your discretion, and if any thing is done, let it be quickly done, and you may rely upon it, much good may result from it. "Yours, affectionately,

"M. VAN BUREN.

"The Hon. HENRY MEIGS.
"APRIL 4, 1819."

Of the subsequent "additional" proscriptive lists furnished in pursuance of the above, and other details on that head, it is not material to inquire. He succeeded in obtaining a seat in the Senate, according to his wishes, by the vote of a small majority of the next Legislature. And I believe, with others of infinitely more profound research than myself, "that Mr. Van Buren came into the General Government with an eye fixed upon the Presidency, and with a determination to reduce to practice in that Government the *ethics* of the New York school, as a *means* of arriving at his OBJECT;" for "he was not long in the Senate before he gave indications of that [the latter] determination as far as was in his power." Early in the session of 1821–'22, a vacancy having occurred in the post office at Albany, and it being understood that Gen Solomon Van Rensselaer, a gallant soldier of the Revolution and of the late war, was likely to be appointed to the situation, Mr. Van Buren interfered to prevent it, and procure a partisan appointment, as will appear by the following extract from his letter to the Postmaster General, in which he "united" the concurrence of one or two friends:

"Knowing, as we do, that the Republicans of the State of New York will regard it as a matter of great importance that the post office at the seat of Government should be in the hands of a gentleman of the same political character with themselves; and anxious that they should fully understand the principle which, in this particular, governs your department, we have felt it to be our duty and our right to present, on this occasion, that question respectfully, but distinctly, to your consideration."

But the Postmaster General, Mr. Meigs, and the President, Mr. Monroe, not being diverted by this covert threat from their determination to give the appointment to Gen. Van Rensselaer, Mr. Van Buren addressed to his friends at Albany a letter of condolence, and pointed to a hope in the future; from which the following is an extract:

"You have now the same means of judging as ourselves how far you may, with propriety, regard the appointment in this case as deciding, that, in the administration of the Post Office Department, political distinctions give no preference. That you will be disappointed and mortified we can readily believe; but we trust that you will not be disheartened. While there are no men in the country more enured to political suffering than the Republicans of New York, there are none who have stronger reasons to be satisfied of the irrepressible energy of the Democratic party, and that no abuses of their confidence can long remain beyond their reach and plenary correction. On this conviction we trust you will repose yourselves, and act accordingly."

Here, then, we have the satisfaction to lay before the great American Democracy the first deliberate attempt to desecrate their magnanimous, popular denomination, to the purposes of pandering to a "spoils faction." The sagacious commentary of the editors of the National Intelligencer, (August 15,) remarks on this movement, that Mr. Van Buren "failing, through the coolness and wariness of the two veteran patriots MONROE and MEIGS, in the attempt to establish his power in the General Government by a *coup de main*, had the prudence to change his TACTICS, and to pursue his OBJECT by *paths less direct* but *more easily practicable*."

After his signal disappointment in the case of the Albany post office, in pursuance of his own advice of patient resignation and hope in the future, we notice little or no evidence of Mr. Van Buren's further action upon the "spoils of office," while in the Senate, until the latter part of Mr. Adams's administration. His own State had, in 1824, pronounced Gen. Jackson incompetent for the Presidency when her electors cast for Mr. Adams 26 votes, for Mr. Crawford 5 votes, for Mr. Clay 4 votes, and for Gen. Jackson only 1 vote. Of course Mr. Van Buren was virtually pledged to the support of Mr. Adams's administration. Moreover, his own Senatorial term would expire before another election of President. This explains the restraint he put upon himself in taking *no open part* in the *earlier* workings of certain conclaves in Congress against Mr. Adams, preparatory to a second canvass for the Presidency, until after his own re-election to the Senate. "It was enough (*says the Mirror, p.* 39) to have it known by his contemp-

lated dupes that he was opposed to the administration, and disposed, under certain undefined contingencies, to support the pretensions of General Jackson." The same author informs us (p. 37) that the "existence and character of these conclaves, by which a powerful party was gradually formed, involving a majority of the Senate, were first developed on the 1st of March, 1827, by the *vote on the choice of printer.*" Previous to this time, we are informed by the same author, that Mr. Van Buren had "carefully avoided *the sessions of the organized cabal*, and had caused cautionary monitions against *premature committal* for any candidate to be circulated throughout his State. Uncommitted himself, he was *any body's*, and, consequently, *every body's man*, and was re-elected to the Senate by a very unanimous vote. The inference was drawn that the vote of New York in the next Presidential election was placed in his hands. New importance was thence given to his position at Washington, and he was emboldened more openly, but with scarce more efficiency, to mingle in the intrigues against the administration, and to appear at the SECRET CABAL, at which the great combination was effected."—(*Mirror, p.* 39.)

This was indeed a tedious suspense of Mr. Van Buren's customary participation in the "spoils of office" for party purposes, during a whole Senatorial term. But the best he could make of the necessity that imposed inertness upon him was, to be *ready* at the instant of a propitious turn of his fortune. Being now re-elected for a second term to the Senate, he lost not a moment in laying aside the mask, and seized the occasion of the vote above mentioned for printer to the Senate on the 1st March, 1827.

The Political Mirror says, (page 37,) "The nature of this vote is not a matter of inference merely. It is explained by the testimony of one [Mr. Van Buren himself] who was a party to it, and avowed it to be a party vote." Mr. Van Buren, who had the greatest power in preparing, and took the most active part in advocating that vote, distinctly avowed the motive. He said:

"He had long been of opinion that the public interest might be promoted, and the condition of the press, as well here as throughout the country, improved, and respect for the Senate, and economy in the publication of the proceedings of the Senate better secured, by a judicious revision of the laws relating to the public printing at large. At a more convenient season he hoped the subject would be revised; and he promised himself the best results from such revision as the nature of the subject was susceptible of."

This avowal of Mr. Van Buren is far less important as it relates to the primary *direct spoils of office* in question, than as it relates to the secondary *indirect spoils of office* then in prospective. Though the immediate result of his policy was, to elect a partisan of the new party combination of the Senate by a mere plurality vote of *one*, and not by a majority of the Senate, after repeated ballotings to supersede the editors of the National Intelligencer, who had advocated the election of Mr. Crawford, the personal and political friend of Mr. Van Buren, and who had supported the administration of Mr. Adams as their second choice, whom Mr. Van Buren's own State had preferred for the presidency—and, what is still more remarkable, though the printers, now superseded by the new party combination, had been elected the term before with the co-operation of Mr. Van Buren, without opposition, and had in the mean time committed no offence but to maintain their own integrity by rejecting party overtures for their seduction from the support of the administration, (all of which sufficiently declare the covert party malignity and inveterate "purpose of the spoils" in the principal actor in this affair,) I say, the secondary *indirect aspect* of the professions with which he urged this vote, was infinitely more portentous of the evil consequences that followed in its train; and it is on that account that I have taken more pains in stating the particulars of it. But the tendency and bearing of the motives avowed on the occasion, I will, *as a specimen of prophecy realized*, leave to be explained by the lucid commentary of the author of the Political Mirror, who speaks of it, pp. 37, 38, thus:

"We have said, that this is a distinct avowal of the sentiments of the speaker; but it is to be observed, that the speaker was Mr. Van Buren, distinguished by his skill in mystification, and his art of giving to his sentences an hermaphrodite character. We draw from the declaration the inference—which, considering Mr. Van Buren as a candidate for the highest office of the country, is as important as it is alarming, showing how unlimited are his ideas of power pertaining to the General Government—the inference, that Mr. Van Buren deems that Congress, by a 'judicious revision,' (a phrase admirably appropriate, from its obscurity and indefiniteness, to the assumption of forbidden powers,) may improve, i. e. direct and control, the press throughout the United States."

That sagacious author goes on to remark, that Mr. Van Buren's text "was fully explained by the practical commentary which was immediately given to it by the dismissal of Gales and Seaton (as supporters of the administration) from the employment of the Senate, and by the subsequent distribution of the *public printing* and *all other official favors* by the administration of General Jackson, *of which Mr. Van Buren is the vital spirit* AS HE WAS THE CREATOR." But I am astonished it should escape the inquiry of our author, what "respect for the Senate" Mr. Van Buren could desire "to secure from the Press," compatible with the freedom of that *palladium* of our liberties.

It cannot but be, now, a matter of curiosity to many, to hear what the elements of this CABAL said on the subject of "Executive patronage," which they proposed to "regulate by law," the session before the above vote, when that combination was only in its forming state, and of which Mr. Van Buren, as we have just seen, was the occult, clandestine, master spirit. An extract of the report (May 4, 1826) of a committee of the Senate composed of Messrs. *Benton*, Macon, *Van Buren*, White, Findlay, *Dickerson*, Holmes, *Hayne*, and *R. M. Johnson*, appointed "to inquire into the expediency of amending the constitution," and further instructed "to inquire into

the expediency of *diminishing* or *regulating* the *patronage* of the Executive of the United States," with leave to report by bill or otherwise, will show that Mr. Van Buren and his associates of the majority of the committee *did affect* to denounce the abuse of Executive patronage or the "spoils system," through a sheer purpose of raising a false alarm against the administration, when such a system actually did not exist, and as yet never had existed in the Federal Government. The said committee reported, on the day mentioned, six bills, viz:

1. "A bill to regulate the publication of the laws of the United States, and of public advertisements."
2. "A bill to secure in office the faithful collectors and disbursers of the revenue, and to displace defaulters"
3. "A bill to regulate the appointment of postmasters."
4. "A bill to regulate the appointment of cadets."
5. "A bill to regulate the appointment of midshipmen."
6. "A bill to prevent military and naval officers from being dismissed the service at the pleasure of the President."

Now, in order to understand the full purport of these bills as nearly as may be, and the barefaced hypocricy of certain members of the committee who framed them, and have since been foremost in sharpening the appetites and letting loose the hell hounds of the whole system of the spoils, take the following *beautiful* extract from the report accompanying said bills:

* * * "The committee must then take things as they are; not being able to lay the axe at the root of the tree, they must go to pruning among the limbs and branches. Not being able to reform the constitution in the election of President, they must go to work upon his powers, and trim down these by statutory enactments, whenever it can be done by law, and with a just regard to the proper efficiency of the Government. For this purpose they have reported the six bills which have been enumerated. They do not pretend to have exhausted the subject, but only to have seized a few of its prominent points. They have only touched in four places, the vast and pervading system of federal executive patronage: the Press—the Post Office—the Armed Force—and the Appointing Power. They are few compared to the whole number of points, vital to the liberties of the country! The Press is put foremost, because it is the moving power of human action. The Post-office is the hand maid of the press. The Armed Force is its executor. And the Appointing Power is the 'directress of the whole!'" * * * "In the country for which the committee acts, the Press, (with some exceptions,) the Post office, the Armed Force, and the Appointing Power, are in the hands of the President, and the President himself is not in the hands of the people."

If the reader will contrast the subsequent conduct of THE PARTY with this delectable exposition of the practicable patronage of the Executive, (practicable in the opinion of the Van Buren majority of the committe, for it had never been used and was not considered, morally, practicable to use it, by the wisest and purest men in the earlier days of the republic,) he will at once have a key, not only to Mr. Van Buren's "hermaphrodite expression" of his sentiments about a judicious "revision" and "improvement of the Press here and throughout the United States; but, taken with their forbearance to press those bills to a final passage into law, he will perceive that they were, with the report, only intended as an electioneering demonstration against the then administration, (which Mr. Van Buren's cabal had resolved, as it was profanely expressed by another prominent member, Richard M. Johnson, now Vice President, that "it should be put down, were it as pure as the angels which stand at the right hand of God."—*Political Mirror, p.* 41.) For, the sequel of their conduct has shown that the whole of those resources of the "spoils system," direct, indirect, and remote, should they ever fall into their own hands, were too highly appreciated to be thus "pruned and lopped off" by legislative enactments at their instance. Taking these engines of the spoils, as afterwards used by the corrupt dynasty which succeeded the administration of Mr. Adams, in the order in which the party chieftains arranged them while acting as legislators, with Mr. Van Buren at their head, as "harmonizer and director," I shall give a specimen of their plan of "revision and improvement of the Press," their uses of the "Post Office Department," and of the "Armed Force;" when, finally, I shall come to the subject of the spoils of office proper, as their fourth object of *practicable* EXECUTIVE PATRONAGE in the "Appointing Power."

The specimen I select in regard to the improvement of the Press, is from a party witness of their own, exposing the agency of one of Mr. Van Buren's most accredited lieutenants, whom he has recently deputized from the Post Office Department, to act as generalissimo of his party organized Press here and throughout the Union. It relates to the party drilling which the editorial corps friendly to the administration were fated to undergo, upon the contemplated removal of the deposites, as upon all other important party measures that are ever contemplated by their chieftain. James G. Bennett, Esq., one of the editors friendly to the administration at the time, feeling himself insulted by the course of dictation practised towards him by the cabal at Washington, made an exposition of this "INFLUENCE BEHIND THE THRONE," in a series of letters to the public shortly after the date of those impertinent instructions which he received direct from Amos Kendall and R. M. Whitney. The editors of the National Intelligencer commenced the republication of Bennett's exposé in their paper of the 7th January, 1834, introducing it to the public, with an editorial article, in the first and concluding paragraphs of which they observe: "Our readers will not need to be informed, that in a series of essays addressed to them on 'the Bank Question' in August and September last, we endeavored to make them acquainted with the character and objects of a cabal, then laboring to effect the removal of the Public Deposites, with the ulterior object of crushing the United States Bank. In those essays we shadowed out, but too faintly, we fear, the consequences which would follow the consummation of their wishes and labors. We did not then know so much as we now do, of the length and the depth of their machinations; nor did we then suppose that the 'Government' of the United States was *so completely under the influence of their counsels*, as subsequent disclosures seem to indicate too clearly to be doubted. * * *

"The Pennsylvanian is the title of the foremost administration paper in the city of Philadelphia, of which, our readers may remember, Mr. James G. Bennett (formerly connected with the Courier and Enquirer) was recently the editor. Having been unceremoniously ousted from that post, for want of sufficient pliability of conscience for its *managers*, he has felt it to be incumbent on him to raise the curtain, and exhibit the machinations of as reckless a band of *confederates* as perhaps ever undertook to turn the affairs of a great Government to their own personal advantage. This he has begun in a series of letters, of which the three first now lie before us. If we were not so pressed by other matters, demanding a place in our columns, we should consider it due to Mr. BENNETT to give them entire. But, to spread the essential part of them before our readers, we are obliged to content ourselves with such extracts as serve to throw light on the present posture of political affairs, and to expose the wickedness and wantonness with which the public interests have been played with by the underlings who have possessed and abused the confidence of the Chief Magistrate. These extracts we subjoin, purposely abstaining from comment, except merely to say, that Mr. B. has, so far as he has gone, fully redeemed his pledge to the public, and vindicated his own honesty of purpose." The editors of the Intelligencer then proceed to give the extracts from Bennett, containing two letters from Amos Kendall and one from R. M. Whitney, with remarks of Mr. Bennett upon each. For want of room I can only copy the Intelligencer's extract of Mr. Bennett's general remarks on the topics involved, leaving out Kendall and Whitney's letters with Mr. Bennett's remarks upon each.

EXTRACTS FROM BENNETT'S LETTERS.—"Andrew Jackson was raised to the highest station which a free people can bestow in 1828-'29. * * * A small band of desperate men, under the excitement and triumph of his first election, having succeeded to worm themselves into the subordinate offices at Washington, have availed themselves of that very popularity and success to create one of the most ferocious tyrannies that ever reared its head in a country calling itself free and intelligent.

"During the last two or three years, this unseen irresponsible body of individuals, consisting principally of subordinate officers of the Executive Government at Washington and elsewhere, have created a confederacy and organized a power, which has for its purpose an entire change in the Government of the United States, as established by the patriots of the revolution, and guarantied by the principles of the existing constitution. * * * This irresponsible cabal, who control and write for the official journal called the Globe, have made, in twelve months, more rapid strides to subvert public liberty—destroy the checks of the constitution—degrade Congress—disgrace the cabinet—subvert the liberty of the press, than a military leader, with fifty thousand bayonets at his back, could have achieved in twenty years, in the face of a brave people, who knew their rights and could defend them. * * *

"By the success of such a scheme, the whole frame of the Government would be reversed at a blow, and henceforth Congress would be reduced to a couple of contemptible recording corporations, ready to sanction the decrees of the temporary dictator, whoever he might be.

"One of the principal elements of this conspiracy, is the *organization of the Government officers and the newspaper press* throughout the country, in the shape of a permanent body of police, empowered to circulate the decrees of the central conspirators, denounce the refractory, destroy the character of the independent, and elevate the power and prerogatives of the Executive, without the slightest regard to the constitution or laws of the country.

"Taking into consideration the state of the public mind—the situation of the country—the personal feelings of the President—the progress of power, there never was so favorable an opportunity since the revolution for the enlargement of the Presidential prerogative—the destruction of the constitution—the degradation of Congress, and the ultimate erection of a dictatorship, or rather a vetoship upon the ruins of all.

"The Washington Globe is the organ of the prime conspirators. Its ostensible editor is F. P. Blair, * * * but the principal editor is Amos Kendall, the 4th Auditor, who, it is believed, also participates in the profits of the establishment. * * * He is the master spirit of the confederacy, and contrives as well as executes the general plans of spoliations, and the individual executioner of the refractory, be he either a cabinet minister, member of Congress, or a newspaper editor. * * * Blair is * * * Whitney is 'a picker up of loose papers,' a gleaner of little things about banks, which Kendall shapes into editorial paragraphs, for the latter is entirely ignorant of the first principles about banking and currency, and scarcely ever attempts to talk on the subject without newspaper authority before him.

☞"When a new editor of any standing or talents begins business, he is immediately written to by the conspirators at Washington, in the name of the President, or of the republican party, and a course is marked out for his especial guidance. The following letters show the beginning of the game which these august personages attempted to play with me, through the last summer, until they discovered I claimed an entire independence in the management of my paper, and chose to think and act for myself. This discovery brought out their whole power against me," &c. &c.

The extent to which "THE POST OFFICE" has been used as an engine of the spoils party in a thousand ways, since their cabal in the Senate affected to cry out against those abuses which they prefigured to the public before they existed, ought to be sufficiently known to relieve me from any details here, save only to say, in general terms, that, in a very short time after these hypocritical reformers came into power, the pecuniary resources of the Department were reduced from the flourishing condition of $202,811 40, surplus on hand, to a deficit of $450,000 indebtedness, in consequence of illegal borrowing from the banks, to meet the profligate waste in paying electioneering agents and party favorites under the pretence of *extras* due to mail contractors, for the most part fraudulently incurred. It may well be supposed that the whole operations of the Department corresponded very much with the corruption of its fiscal branch.—(*See the results of some half dozen reports of committees of investigation of both Houses of Congress since* 1831.) But of its abuses of the franking privilege, to subserve the purposes of a corrupt Executive in manufacturing and dictating opinions for public adoption, by disseminating them in an imposing manner through the channels of the mail, I will give a single instance, to show how truly the committee of the Senate in 1827, under the magic wand of Mr. Van Buren, appreciated the POST OFFICE as "the handmaid" of his REVISED PRESS. It is a copy of an engraved or *lithographed* letter, (except the date and signature,) which may be printed by thousands, (and thousands of other forms suited to other subjects may have been adapted to their desires as well as this,) requiring only the date and signature of the executive officers at the seat of Government,

using and abusing the franking privilege, to flood the country with the edicts of the executive junta, "issued or to be issued." The original is on file at the Madisonian office, whose editor has been favored with it by some one of the persons to whom it had been addressed.

"WASHINGTON CITY, *January* 31, 1838.

"SIR: I enclose you, herewith, a prospectus for the Extra Globe, with the first number as a sample. These papers will explain themselves. The cheap rate at which the Extra Globe will be published will enable every man in the country to become a subscriber. For a single dollar he can obtain a weekly newspaper, published at the seat of the National Government, containing the latest political and foreign news. If a number of persons choose to unite and forward a larger sum, the subscription to each, as you will perceive by the terms of the prospectus, will be less than a dollar. Whilst our political opponents control a majority of the public presses in every State, it is believed, in the Union, and have in their employ a corps of letter-writers stationed in this city and elsewhere, who are daily misrepresenting public men and public measures, it becomes important, to counteract their effect, that a cheap medium through which true information may be conveyed to the people should be patronized. The Globe, it is well-known, is the leading democratic paper; and, because it is so, great efforts have been made by the federal party to impair its just influence on public opinion. They have not succeeded.

"Let me hope that you will take some interest in giving to the Extra Globe an extensive circulation in your neighborhood. "I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, H. L. ELLSWORTH."

The intelligent reader will perceive that the scandalous allegations in the latter part of the above letter are more descriptive of the "hirelings" of the administration than of their opponents, to whom they falsely and maliciously apply them. Other instances, in abundance, of the subserviency of the POST OFFICE to the purposes of the spoilers are familiar to most persons conversant with the history of the times: therefore, I hasten to a brief survey of the next count—the subserviency of the "ARMED FORCE" in the hands of a corrupt Executive. Moreover, the style of this letter declares it to be the composition of the then Postmaster General himself, Amos Kendall, being the counterpart of his secret circular on the same subject.

The reader should perpetually bear in mind the *remark* of the committee of Mr. Van Buren's friends of the Senate, in 1827, that "the PRESS is put foremost, because it is the moving power of human action"—that "the POST OFFICE is the handmaid of the Press"—that "the ARMED FORCE is the executor"—and that "the APPOINTING POWER *is the directress of the whole.*" Let him then turn his eyes to the means resorted to in order to insure that the "ARMED FORCE" shall be "the executor" of "their decrees, issued or to be issued," through the Press, the Post Office, or otherwise, under the direction of the "APPOINTING POWER," the President!

The "ARMED FORCE" of the regular standing army has already been increased nearly double, under the patronage and recommendation of Mr. Van Buren, since he has been *commander-in-chief* of the army! But, in his annual message of the 24th of December last, he has gone the whole figure. Speaking of that part of the report of the Secretary of War, accompanying his message, detailing a plan of an *armed force* of 200,000 *men*, he said to Congress:

"*I cannot recommend too strongly to your consideration the plan submitted by that officer* [the Secretary of War] *for the organization of the militia of the United States.*"

Mr. Van Buren and Mr. Poinsett have both, at the instance of Mr. Ritchie, greatly falsified the origin and object of that "PLAN," in order to extricate themselves from the embarrassment it has thrown them into with the people, who shudder at the idea of an enormous *armed force* in times of peace. I shall not waste time to show the absurdity of those equivocations and falsifications of dates, &c., but proceed to exhibit, briefly, the objects of so immense an *armed force*, to be distributed, in proportion to population, throughout the country.

Having made pretty clean business of destroying the commerce of the country by their financial blunders and quack experiments upon the banking institutions, the revenue from imports, they begin to perceive, is insufficient to defray the current expenses of the Government, and that *direct taxation and excises* will, of necessity, have to be resorted to, whether these consequences formed a part of their original design against the United States Bank or not. Preparatory to the latter measure, the process of assessing the property of every description throughout the United States, by the census-takers, has been ordered, so as to embody the necessary information on which to compute and levy a DIRECT TAX. This project had been progressing with but little agitation of the public mind, until the NEW PLAN of an additional *armed force of* 200,000 *men*, and the demi-official insinuations of Messrs. Rhett and Pickens of South Carolina, and Mr. Jones of New York, induced some of the friends of liberty to apprehend that there was some ground of alarm.

It now appears that the object of the armed force of 200,000 men is in part to enforce the collection of the direct tax, should it meet resistance, as it surely would, in some parts of this yet independent country. I subjoin the testimony in an extract from the "GASPEE TORCH-LIGHT."

"Isaac Hill, now receiver-general for New England, in a political lecture delivered before the Van Buren association of Providence (R. I.) last March, declared 'that the expenses of the General Government should be paid by a direct tax upon property.' He proclaimed this as one of the final measures of the administration party. That there should be no mistake about this matter, we, soon after the delivery of that lecture, and while the declarations of Mr. Hill were fresh in the recollection of all, obtained the following certificate, signed by eight highly respectable gentlemen of this city, who heard the lecture; which certificate was, last April, published in a communication of ours in the Providence Journal. It was not *then*, has not *since*, and cannot *now*, with truth, be denied:

"'PROVIDENCE, *March* 25, 1840.

"'We, the undersigned, freemen of this city, hereby certify that we attended a l cture delivered by Isaac Hill, of New Hampshire, before and at the request of the Democratic Association of said city, in the masonic hall of Providence, on the evening of the sixth instant; and that, in said lecture, said Isaac Hill did state positively and distinctly the following to be among the true principles of genuine Van Buren democracy, viz:

"'1. The abolition, not only of all protective duties, but of all import duties, and the abolition of the whole custom-house system.

"'2. That the expenses of the General Government should be paid by a direct tax upon property, &c.

"'3. That gold and silver was the only currency which the General Government had the constitutional power to provide for the people of this country; and that Congress had no power to create a system of national currency and exchanges by means of a national bank, (such as Washington recommended in 1791, and Madison approved in 1816.)

"'4. That all distribution acts were wrong, and calculated to corrupt the States and the people, though he did not attempt to show why the money should be more corrupting in their hands than in the hands of the General Government.

"'5. That no division of the proceeds of the sales of the public lands among the several States ought therefore to be made or allowed to be made by the General Government.

"'6 He boasted that his Van Buren friends in New Hampshire had attained to that happy state of democratic purity and perfection, that they could now take strong and decided ground in favor of the above principles and measures of the Van Buren party—that they were opposed to a tariff—opposed to a national bank—opposed to any division of the proceeds of the sales of the public lands* among the several States.

"'We understood Mr. Hill to distinctly lay down the above principles and doctrines as the true principles of the present Van Buren democratic party.

BENONI COOKE. JOSEPH SWEET.
T. D. GOODHUE. N. S. DRAPER.
WM. J. HARRIS. MARTIN ROBINSON.
GEO. W. TYLER. JOHN L. NOYES."

But to insure the obedience of the *armed force* thus proposed, and prevent them from co-operating with their fellow-citizens against federal misrule and oppression, they are, according to the plan of the President and Mr. Poinsett, to be subjected to "the regulations of the army." Now, if *this* does not constitute that armed force a part of the standing army, then they are still entitled to be called citizen-militiamen. It then results that, if the President may thus avoid the odium of proposing a standing army of 200,000 men, he must encounter the odium, not less embarrassing, of reviving the "sedition law" among us, to the extent of the application proposed of those regulations of the army, of which the *fifth*, *sixth*, and *ninth* articles are more oppressive to the citizen than the "sedition law," and could only be politic as regulations of an army in time of war, viz:

"Art. 5. Any officer or soldier who shall use contemptuous or disrespectful words against the President of the United States, against the Vice President thereof, against the Congress, or any of the United States in which they may be quartered, if a commissioned officer, shall be cashiered, or punished as a court-martial shall direct; if a non-commissioned officer or soldier, shall suffer such punishment as shall be inflicted on him by the judgment of a court martial.

"Art. 6. Any officer or soldier who shall behave himself with contempt or disrespect towards his commanding officer shall be punished according to the nature of his offence, by the judgment of a court martial."

"Article 9. Any officer or soldier who shall strike his superior officer, or draw or lift up any weapon or offer any violence against him, being in the execution of his office, on any pretence whatever, or shall disobey any lawful command of his superior officer, shall suffer death, or such punishment as shall, according to the nature of his offence, be inflicted upon him by the sentence of a court-martial."

Suffice it to say that similar offences of "contemptuous writing, speaking, or publishing, against the President, the Congress," or other authorities, "with the intention to defame or bring them into disrepute," were punishable by THE SEDITION LAW with "fine not exceeding *two thousand dollars*, and imprisonment not exceeding *two years*." Thus, it is placed beyond the reach of the most daring mendacity to deny, with semblance of truth or credibility, that the President has proposed to organize a standing army of 200,000 men, or to revive the "sedition law" to that extent, but in a more tyrannical form than ever.

Let us now, in the last place, pay our respects to Mr. Van Buren's further agency in bringing his "regency spoils system" to embrace the "APPOINTING POWER" of the Federal Government, that "directress of the whole" system of spoils, by which, after the example of those demagogues who subverted the Greek republics more than 2,000 years ago, *he* has made "politics *a trade*, and the commonwealth *a spoil*." Under the "magic direction" of Mr. Van Buren, (as his biographer terms it,) the same men who contrived those bills and report above quoted, with their party associates in the Senate, took early opportunity to *reserve* the spoils of office, that vacancies and other means afforded, for the disposal of the coming administration of Andrew Jackson; and thus materially aided, by a Senatorial lead, in tempting General Jackson from the broad highway, the long beaten track of Republicanism, which he had pledged himself to follow, in exterminating the monster, "party spirit;" for example:

When the nomination of the honorable John J. Crittenden was made to the Senate, on the 18th December, 1828, to fill a vacancy on the bench of the Supreme Court, it was ordered, by a party vote, to lie on the table; where it did lie, till General Jackson, nearly four months after, had an opportunity to fill the vacancy by the appointment of Judge McLean.

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*"In regard to the disposal of the public lands," says Holland, page 238, "a topic of great interest and great difficulty, the following remarks of Mr. Van Buren were made on a motion to ask for information, in the Senate, May 18, 1826:

"Mr. Van Buren said." * * * "No man could render the country a greater service than he who should devise some plan by which the United States might be relieved from the ownership of this property, by some equitable mode. He would vote for a proposition to vest the lands in the States in which they stood, on some just and equitable terms, as related to the other States in the confederacy. He hoped that, after having full information on the subject, they would be able to effect that great object. He believed that if those lands were disposed of at once to the several States it would be satisfactory to all!"

A more visionary politician, setting at naught all the wisest counsels and acts of our ancestors, never lived. The States, severally, once owned these lands, but to settle and harmonize their possible conflicting interests, nobly surrendered them to the common stock, to the Union; and Mr. Van Buren's proposition would now involve a greater discord than could possibly have arisen out of the former condition of this property. Indeed, it seemeth that nothing is good till it is remodeled by Mr. Van Buren!! THUS IT IS WITH ALL QUACKS!!!

It would seem that the glorious period for which Mr. Van Buren recommended his friends at Albany to live in hope, and not be disheartened, was now beaming on his gladdened vision; and the whole country sadly knows how he regaled himself and his spoils party, when the day of his long desired fortunes was confirmed. Among his first acts, when he became Secretary of State, as a personal reward for his influence in giving the whole electorial vote of New York to General Jackson, or in discharge of a political debt to the State for the same service, was that proscriptive measure of removing, at a sweep, nearly all the clerks of the State Department, among whom were Mr. Fendall, Mr. Slade, Mr. Thruston, Mr. Brown, Mr. Smith, with some three or four others from the Patent Office, and filling their places with party favorites, as did his exemplar, Amos Kendall, in the Fourth Auditor's office.

Shortly after this commencement, Mr. Van Buren showed his alacrity at the work of desolation, by his *influence* in another department, the Post Office, the only other that adopted his excesses. It was scarcely known to a spoils friend of his in Louisiana that he was appointed Secretary of State, when that friend, a Mr. Overton, addressed him a letter dated 21st March, 1829, requesting his influence in procuring the removal of certain officers in that department; to which Mr. Van Buren returned the following answer, *expressed in a breath*, dated April 20, 1829:

"MY DEAR SIR: I have the honor of acknowledging the receipt of yours of the 21st ultimo, and of informing you that the removals and appointments which you recommended were made on the day your letter was received.

"With respect, your friend, &c.

"M. VAN BUREN."

The guillotine never severed the head from the body of its victims in the terrific days of Danton, Marat, and Robespierre, with equal haste, in its greatest thirst for blood.

If these instances did not suffice to show that the whole mania of the spoils system, practised in the name of General Jackson, was of Van Buren origin, as he was of General Jackson's administration "the spirit and the creator," I could at least give ample testimony of his improvement upon it, by his *practice* since he has, *by the foulest means*, succeeded to the Presidency. His wanton removals of faithful and capable officers, and his appointment of party favorites in their places, some of them known to be infamous, his retention of notorious defaulters, and his declaration that it is less objectionable for individuals to use the public money, [by their own assumption,] than that corporate institutions should use it, [by the permission of the Government,] and, finally, his further declaration that "rotation in office was a part of his system," i.e. to make dismissals and appointments at his will and pleasure, on spoils principle, without regard to the good of the public service, would sufficiently establish his hearty adoption, if there were not already exhibited full evidence of his paternity, of the whole system.

Without dwelling, in detail, upon the thousands of examples of this abuse of usurped power, the doctrine of *Executive right* under which they have been practised, taken with its fearless and wanton execution, proves that the MONEY POWER, not only to the full extent of the appropriations for the civil list, but for disbursements of every description whatever, for the current expenses of the Government, is assumed and exercised by the President, by virtue of his control of the tenure of office of those receiving and disbursing the same: and not only this, in its simple amount, but the same *infinitely multiplied*, inasmuch as when the appointments and salaries are once assigned to officers, these being tenants-at-will of the President, he exercises the control of the money power not only to that amount, when first bestowed, but in the compound ratio of its perpetual renewability every instant afterwards, the actual amount of which, in the hands of such a man as Mr. Van Buren, cannot be computed by the greatest adept in arithmetical calculations.

It would not be inappropriate here to ask, whence Mr. Van Buren derives the "REMOVING POWER?" It is not granted to the President by the constitution—and Mr. Van Buren is the advocate of a strict construction of powers, according to the letter: if it be alleged that it has been acted on long enough to give it the weight of an express grant—which is not true—yet the usage of precedent has no authority with him, for he condemns all who have been acting, for a half century, on the principles of construction by which our whole financial system was put in motion. Nor does he hold with the doctrine of any power whatever being inherent in an office; for this doctrine was very ingeniously (if without sense) opposed by him, in the discussion of the famous Foote's resolution, when he denied the inherent right of the presiding officer of the Senate to call to order, however disorderly any member might be on the floor of the Senate. If, then, the *removing power* be not granted to the President by the constitution—if it be not an implied and inherent executive right—if it cannot be sanctioned by mere usage and precedent for a half century—I would ask, again, whence is it derived?

I have said, parenthetically, that the REMOVING POWER was not considered to be a legitimate or constitutional power of the Executive, by most of the wisest and purest statesmen, in the earlier days of the republic. When the subject of the REMOVING POWER was under discussion in the House of Representatives, June 16th and 17th, 1789, (being the 1st session of the 1st Congress,) it was ably argued that it was *co-ordinate* with the APPOINTING POWER, and that the Senate had the same right to participate with the President in the one as in the other. This discussion took place on "*The Bill for establishing an Executive Department, to be denomi-*

nated the Department of Foreign Affairs." The first clause, after stating the title of the officer and his duties, had these words: "*To be removable from office by the President of the United States.*"

It is obvious to every discernment that the insertion of this clause fully declared the absence of a constitutional or *inherent* power in the Executive to make removals, which would render this clause superfluous, or rather a *negation* of that power, when not recognised by law. Many members who denied the existence of the power were averse to granting it in any case, and therefore proposed to strike from the bill this clause granting the power in this case. It was, however, retained as a legislative grant of power over the tenure of this office by a vote of 34 to 20.

"Mr. WHITE, of Virginia, said: The constitution gives the President the POWER OF NOMINATING and, by and with *the advice and consent of the Senate*, APPOINTING TO OFFICE. As 'I conceive the power of *appointing* and *dismissing* to be *united in their natures*, and a principle that never was called in question in any government, I am adverse to that part of the 'clause which subjects the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to be removed at the will of the President.'" * * * * * * * * * * *

* * "Mr. MADISON, of Virginia, said: * * The constitution affirms that the executive power shall be vested in the President. Are there exceptions to this proposition? Yes, 'there are. The constitution says that, in *appointing* to office, the Senate shall be associated 'with the President, unless in the case of inferior offices when the law shall otherwise direct. 'Have we a right to extend this exception? I believe not." * * "The question now resolves itself into this: Is the power of *displacing* an executive power?" [Having already said 'it was a power "*incident* to that department," he went on to say:] "I conceive that if any 'power whatever is *in its nature* executive, it is the power of *appointing*, *overseeing*, and *controlling* those who execute the laws. If the constitution had not qualified the power of the 'President in *appointing* to office, by associating the SENATE with him in that business, would 'it not be clear that he would have the right, *by virtue of his executive power*, to make such '*appointments?*" &c. &c.

Hence, Mr. Madison concluded that, as the constitution did not also expressly qualify the *removing power*, by associating the Senate with the President in that regard, this "inherent power" is self-operative in the Executive: to which Mr. Jackson replied with great force and resistless power of argument; from which the following extract may be deemed as prophetic:

"Mr. JACKSON, of Georgia, said: As a constitutional question, it is of great moment, and 'worthy of full discussion. I am, sir, a friend to the full exercise of all the powers of Government, and deeply impressed with the necessity there exists of having an energetic Executive. 'But, friend as I am to the efficient Government, I value the liberties of my fellow-citizens be'yond every other consideration; and, where I find them endangered, I am willing to forego 'every other blessing to secure them. I hold it as good a maxim as it is an old one, '*of two 'evils to choose the least.*'

"It has been mentioned that in all Governments the executive magistrate had the [inherent] 'power of dismissing officers under him. This may hold good in Europe, where monarchs 'claim their powers *jure divino*, but it never can be admitted in America, under a constitution 'delegating enumerated powers. It requires more than a mere *ipsi dixit* to demonstrate that 'any power is, *in its nature*, EXECUTIVE, and consequently given to the President of the United 'States by the present constitution. But, if this power is *incident to the executive branch of 'the Government*, it does not follow that it vests in the President *alone*, because he alone *does 'not possess* ALL executive powers. The constitution has lodged the power of forming treaties, 'and all executive business, I presume, connected therewith, in the President, but it is qualified '' by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,' provided two-thirds of the Senate agree 'therein. From this, I infer that those arguments *are done away*, which the gentleman from 'Virginia (Mr. Madison) used to prove, that it was contrary to the principles of the constitution that we should blend the executive and legislative powers in the same body." * * *

"It has been observed that the President *ought to have this power to remove a man* when he 'becomes *obnoxious* to the people or *disagreeable* to himself. ARE WE THEN TO HAVE ALL THE 'OFFICERS THE MERE CREATURES OF THE PRESIDENT? *This thirst of power will introduce a 'Treasury bench into the House*, and we shall have ministers obtrude upon us *to govern* and '*direct* the *measures of the legislature*, and to *support* the *influence* of *their master;* and shall 'we establish a different influence between the people and the President? I suppose these circumstances must take place, because they have taken place in other countries. The executive 'power falls to the ground in England, *if it cannot be supported by the Parliament;* therefore, 'a high game of corruption is played, and a majority secured to the ministry *by the introduction 'of placemen and pensioners.*

"The gentlemen have brought forward arguments drawn from possibility. It is said, that 'our secretary of foreign affairs may become unfit for his office *by a fit of lunacy*, and therefore 'a silent remedy should be applied. It is true, such a case may happen, but it may also happen 'where there is no power of removing. Suppose the *President should be taken with a fit of*

'*lunacy*, would it be possible by such arguments to remove him? I apprehend he must remain 'in office during his four years. Suppose *the Senate should be seized with a fit of lunacy*, and 'it was to extend *to the House of Representatives*, what could the people do BUT ENDURE THIS 'MAD CONGRESS TILL THE TERM OF THEIR ELECTIONS EXPIRED! We have seen a King of 'England in an absolute fit of lunacy, which produced an *interregnum* in the Government. 'The same may happen here with respect to our President; and, although it is improbable that 'the majority of both Houses of Congress may be in that situation, yet it is by no means im- 'possible! [Does not the present locofoco majority of the present Congress verify this?] But 'gentlemen have brought forward another argument with respect to the judges. It is said they 'are to hold their offices during good behaviour. I agree that ought to be the case. But is not 'a judge liable to the act of God as well as any other officer of the Government? However 'great his legal knowledge, his judgement, and integrity, it may be taken from him at a stroke, 'and he rendered the most unfit of all men to fill such an important office. But can you re- 'move him? Not for this cause; it is impossible, because madness is no treason, crime, or 'misdemeanor. * * * * * * * * *

"But let me ask gentlemen if it is impossible to place their officers in such a situation as to 'deprive them of their independency and firmness; for, *I apprehend it is not intended to stop 'with the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.* Let it be remembered that the constitution gives the 'President the command of the MILITARY. If (in addition to this) you give him complete power 'over THE MAN WITH THE STRONG BOX, *he will have the liberty of America under his 'thumb.* It is easy to see the evil which may result. If he wants to establish an arbitrary au- 'thority, and finds the SECRETARY OF FINANCE not inclined to second his endeavors, '☞ he has nothing more to do than to *remove him*, and GET ONE APPOINTED OF PRINCIPLES 'MORE CONGENIAL WITH HIS OWN. Then, says he, I have got the army; let me but have the 'money, and I will establish my throne upon the ruins of your *visionary republic!* Let no 'gentleman say I am contemplating imaginary dangers—the mere chimeras of a heated brain. 'Behold the baleful influence of the ROYAL PREROGATIVE! All officers, till lately, held their 'commissions during the *pleasure* of the Crown."

* * * "I agree that this is the hour [the 1st session of the 1st Congress] in which we 'ought to establish our Government; but it is an hour in which we should be wary and cautious, 'especially in what respects the executive magistrate. With him [Washington] every power 'may be safely lodged. Black, indeed, is the heart of that man who even suspects HIM to be 'capable of abusing them. But, alas! he cannot be with us forever; he is liable to the vicissi- 'tudes of life; he is but mortal, and though I contemplate it with great regret, yet I know the pe- 'riod must come which will separate him from his country; and can we know the virtues or *vices* 'of his successor in a very few years? May not a man with a *Pandora's box* in his breast come 'into power, and give us sensible cause to lament our present confidence and want of foresight?"

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"Mr. PAGE, of Virginia, said: I venture to assert that this clause contains in it the SEEDS 'OF ROYAL PREROGATIVE. If gentlemen lay such stress on the energy of Government, 'I beg them to consider how far this doctrine may go. Every thing that has been said in favor 'of energy in the Executive may go to the destruction of FREEDOM, and establish a DESPOT- 'ISM. This very energy so much talked of has led many patriots to the BASTILE, to the 'BLOCK, and to the HALTER. If the Chief Magistrate can take a man away from the head of a 'department, *without assigning any reason*, he may as well be invested with power, on certain 'occasions, TO TAKE AWAY HIS EXISTENCE. But, will you contend that this idea is consonant 'with the principles of a free Government, where no man ought to be condemned unheard, nor 'till after a solemn conviction of guilt on a fair and impartial trial? IT WOULD, IN MY OPINION, 'BE BETTER TO SUFFER FOR A TIME THE MISCHIEF ARISING FROM THE CONDUCT OF A BAD 'OFFICER, THAN ADMIT PRINCIPLES WHICH WOULD LEAD TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DES- 'POTIC PREROGATIVES," &c.

The reader knows full well how truly have *these royal*, these *despotic prerogatives*, been realized, and that to the fullest extent, by the encroachments and usurpations of the Executive, during the last ten or twelve years. Now although these usurpers have professed the doctrine of "strict construction of the constitution," that instrument confers no express power of *removal* so much exercised by them; and although Mr. Madison contended that this power "is incident to the executive office," and essential to the responsibility of the President in seeing that the laws be faithfully executed by inferior executive officers, as he expressed it in the House of Representatives in 1789, and though General Washington, Mr. J. Adams, Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Monroe, and Mr. J. Q. Adams, must have concurred with Mr. Madison as to this "incidental power" to enable the President to insure the *efficacy* of the public service, under his supervision, as each of them made a few removals on that principle, yet none of them abused the power by perverting it to the illegitimate purposes of proscription, favoritism, or any other uses than those purely emanating from the dictates of the public good—a consideration that seems to have had no part in governing the transfer of the spoils system to the General Government under the present dynasty, contrary to their professed principles of literal construction of powers.

But it is proper to say, as a part of the secret history of this transfer of the spoils of office to the General Government, Mr. Van Buren and his coadjutors met with considerable difficulty in the commencement of his plans in 1829, on account of the greater favor of Southern men and Southern principles at the time with General Jackson. None of the other Secretaries had yet done much in the way of proscription except Mr. Van Buren and Mr. Barry; and, on account of those removals that were made, Mr. Ritchie, of the Richmond Enquirer, a supporter of the administration, was continually bearding the President. Among the repeated instances of his setting his countenance against *all removals*, except *for good cause*, and *with explanatory reasons*, it will be sufficient to note, from the columns of the Enquirer, the following:

MAY 5, 1829.—"We are no advocates for the removal of good, faithful, and meritorious 'officers, who have not been warm political partisans, but we are opposed to all corruption. It 'is peculiarly incumbent upon the present administration to supersede all *faithless* officers, to 'look keenly into the departments, remove every complaint, and cleanse the Augean stables of '*abuses*."

MAY 12.—"Mr. Niles objects to members of Congress being appointed to executive offices, 'except of the *highest grade*, in which we have uniformly agreed with him. * * We 'see no occasion to change this opinion. * * The moment he [the President] appoints 'members to ministerial offices, as postmasters, collectors, auditors, &c., *it will be time for the* 'people to speak out."

JUNE 5, '29.—"There have been some more recent removals at Washington. Justice re-'quires that *the reasons* of them should be *understood* before we pass *sentence* upon them," &c.

JUNE 5.—"We have *understood* all the circumstances under which Mr. Campbell received 'the appointment, (of Treasurer,) and it is doing him even less than justice to say, that there 'is nothing in the manner in which he obtained it, at which the slightest exception could be 'taken by the most fastidious opponent."

JUNE 19.—"Mr. Campbell did not *seek to turn Mr. Clarke out* He did not know that 'Mr. Clarke was to be removed—he had not any idea of becoming treasurer. When he was 'told Mr. Clarke is certainly to go out—will you accept the appointment? The most fastidious 'delicacy could not take exception at the proposition. *We know this to be the fact*," &c.

On another occasion, about this time, Mr. Ritchie went so far as to twit the administration over the shoulders of Mr. Berrien and Mr. Van Buren, (fortifying himself at the same time with the assertion of popular discontent in Virginia,) saying, that "Mr. Berrien and Mr. Van Buren could tell the National Journal why Virginians do not wish to turn one another out of office." From this side-blow by Mr. Ritchie, taken in connexion with his other oblique censures of *removals* and *appointments*, it is obvious there must have been some private inter-communications between him and Mr. Van Buren, deprecatory of the spoils system, which, however uncongenial with the spoiler's views, he had to endure in silence, under the terrors of popular wrath in Virginia, and betake himself again to *hope in the future*—regarding, at the same time, with aggravated chagrin, the paramount interest that General Jackson then felt for Mr. Calhoun's pretensions to the succession; for, Mr. Calhoun had withdrawn from the Presidential contest, in 1824, had thrown his interest into the scales of General Jackson, and had continued to advocate his cause till it was successful in 1828: yet hoping to attain the high objects of his own ambition, as the successor of General Jackson, after his enjoyment of one term. "But against this consummation of his wishes (*says the Political Mirror, page* 124) all the powers of the *black art* had combined. The potent magician had woven his effective spell." Accordingly, after hesitating and pondering upon the policy of withdrawing from the Department of State, he archly concluded that, "opposed by the deep-rooted popularity of General Jackson, all hopes of success were vain;" he, therefore, resolved to keep his position, as the most propitious; thence to avail himself both of General Jackson's *affections* and his *resentments*. He immediately set about to court the *former*, by unremitting attentions and assiduities towards the lady of General Jackson's most favored Secretary, the Secretary of War: and to arouse the *latter* passion, "Mr. Van Buren sprung a mine upon Mr. Calhoun, which had been long dug beneath the feet of him who was the only *rival* in the Jackson party who could give Mr. Van Buren uneasiness."

"It was already felt (says the Political Mirror, page 125) that the influence of (humbug) *re-'form* had given to the President a potential, if not a *conclusive*, voice in designating his succes-'sor. His favor was as much to be *sought*, as his enmity was to be *deprecated*. It was, there-'fore, a desirable stroke of policy for a Presidential aspirant *to gain the one*, and to turn the other 'upon *his rival*. Mr. Van Buren succeeded in effecting this by a *coup de mâitre* which has 'rarely been surpassed. In it, he exhibited the consummation of art which conceals art; for 'whilst he accomplished an effective work, scarce the mark of a tool is visible. The work as-'sumes, what it is affirmed to be, the happy ministration of Providence. We will endeavor to 'narrate the particulars of this event, (says the Mirror,) preserving chronological order.

"Mr. James A. Hamilton [afterwards Secretary of State, ('*ad interim*,') and then United 'States attorney for the southern district of New York] was delegated in 1827 to represent 'the New York Tammany Society, at New Orleans, in the celebration of the 8th of January,

'1828, at that place. General Jackson had been invited by the Legislature of Louisiana to at-
'tend the celebration. Mr. Hamilton joined the General at Nashville, whence he proceeded
'with him and his suite. During the voyage, there was much conversation among the Gen-
'eral's friends, in relation to various charges against the General, which the Presidential can-
'vass had originated or revived; and, particularly, as to the unfriendly course Mr. Crawford
'was supposed to have taken towards him in relation to the Seminole war. [The reader
'will observe that Mr. Crawford's views of the General's conduct in that war were known, or
'supposed to be known. The application to be made to him, therefore, could not be for information
'of *his* views and conduct, but of the views and conduct of *others*. If of others, of whom, save
'Mr. Calhoun, Mr. Adams, or Mr. Wirt? Mr. Adams's were fully known—Mr. Wirt's were now
'unimportant. But those of Mr. Calhoun were interesting to the General, and to Mr. Hamilton
'as the *adjective* of Mr. Van Buren. These circumstances raised the violent presumption that
'it was a knowledge of Mr. Calhoun's conduct that was to be sought.] It being understood
'that Mr. Hamilton, on his return, passing through Georgia, would avail himself of the oppor-
'tunity to visit Mr. Crawford, Major Lewis desired him, or Mr. Hamilton offered, to ascertain,
'truly, what occurred in Mr. Monroe's cabinet deliberations, in relation to a proposition suppos-
'ed to have been made to arrest General Jackson for his conduct in that war, and to inform him
'of the result, in order, as Mr. Hamilton understood, that Major Lewis might be prepared to
'defend the General against attack upon this point.

"On his arrival at Sparta, Georgia, Mr. Hamilton, as he declares, ascertaining that Mr.
'Crawford dwelt sixty miles on the left of his route, and might probably be absent from home,
'resolved to push on to Savannah; thereby to take a *detour* of 150 miles to the right, avoiding
'one of 60 to the left, by a road, at that season of the year, much worse than that which he de-
'clined. At Savannah, Mr. Hamilton, under date of 25th January, wrote to Mr. Forsyth, then
'Governor of Georgia, *whom he had seen at Milledgeville, on his way to Sparta*, requesting him
'to procure from Mr. Crawford the desired information. Mr. Forsyth replied, February 8th,
'1828, thus:

"I had a long conversation with Mr. Crawford, and afterwards read him your letter. By his authority, I state, in reply to your inquiry, that, at a meeting of Mr. Monroe's cabinet to discuss the course to be pursued towards Spain, in consequence of General Jackson's proceedings in Florida, during the Seminole war, Mr. Calhoun, the Secretary of the War Department, submitted to, and urged upon, the President, the propriety and necessity of arresting and trying General Jackson. Mr. Monroe was very much annoyed by it; expressed a belief that such a step would not meet the public approbation; that General Jackson had performed too much public service to be treated as a younger or subaltern officer might without shocking public opinion. Mr. Adams spoke with great violence against the proposed arrest, and justified the General throughout, vehemently urging the President to make the cause of the General that of the administration."

* * * [The Mirror, after stating many other facts, part of them respecting a correspondence between Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Calhoun in connexion with this subject, goes on to say, p. 128:]
"Mr. Hamilton was, at this time, 1st March, 1828, in possession of the following facts, most
'important in their nature to a skilful politician. [Mr. Hamilton was then, as now, the polit-
'ical, personal, and interested friend of Mr. Van Buren, and Mr. Van Buren had every need
'which a skilful politician could have for such facts, to be used at an opportune occasion.] Mr.
'Hamilton knew, and we cannot for a moment doubt that Mr. Van Buren also *then knew*, that
'Mr. Crawford avowed that Mr. Calhoun had suggested the *arrest*, a *court of inquiry*, or pro-
'ceeding of *some sort*, against General Jackson for his conduct in the Seminole war; and that
'Mr. Calhoun had *denied* that any measures against the General had been proposed by *any one*
'in the Cabinet." * * "We have one fact yet to mention, which we think may have much
'bearing on the case. Messrs. Van Buren and Cambreleng, in their Southern progress in the
'spring of 1827, had spent several days with Mr. Crawford, whose principal friend Mr. Van
'Buren had been in the election of 1824; and, as Mr. Crawford was in the habit of speaking of
'these cabinet affairs, and of Mr. Calhoun, whom he most cordially hated and vengefully pur-
'sued, it becomes highly probable, *almost certain*, that he communicated to his dearest friends
'[Van Buren and Cambreleng] the inconsistency, as he supposed, of his enemy, in supporting
'for President the man whom he had proposed to *arrest*, and probably to *degrade*." * * *
'Supposing Mr. Van Buren to have been then possessed of the facts, coinciding so well with
his interests, we might, *had he not denied it*, presume him to have been the PROMPTER of Mr.
Hamilton's otherwise very extraordinary course."

"But, if these facts might prostrate Mr. Calhoun, why not use them at the time? The re-
ply is obvious. They could not be used with effect. General Jackson was not President—
he might not be; and to make him so, Mr. Calhoun's interest might be indispensable. Neither
the chief nor Mr. Van Buren would have ventured to quarrel with the Vice President at this
time." * * * "Until the winter of 1829–'30, [these important facts, known to the friends
'of General Jackson, remained unnoticed,] when the same Mr. Hamilton who had so success-
'fully and *accidentally* put the Vice President at issue with Mr. Crawford, called on Mr. For-
'syth, then a member of the Senate, and requested him to give to the President the information
'he had given to him, (Mr. Hamilton.) * * * "Mr. Forsyth [from certain considerations
'was induced] not to give the information, without Mr. Crawford's assent. Mr. Crawford was,
'therefore, applied to in form, and his answer, dated 30th April, 1830, was obtained, confirm-

'ing and enlarging the details given by Mr. Forsyth in his letter to Mr. Hamilton of the 8th of 'February, 1828. THE COPY OF MR. CRAWFORD'S LETTER, DULY CERTIFIED, WAS FURNISHED 'TO GENERAL JACKSON ON THE 12TH MAY, 1830."

The sagacious author of the Political Mirror says: "Supposing Mr. Van Buren to have been in possession of these facts, we might presume him to have been the *prompter* of Mr. Hamilton's otherwise extraordinary course." "But," says the Mirror, p. 132, "It is the privilege of the accused, in all cases, nay, custom makes it almost a duty, to plead 'not guilty' before a *popular* or *judicial* tribunal; but the question still remains, whether the evidence is *sufficient to convict?*" The public have some recollection of the success, in regard to the views of Mr. Van Buren, with which this quarrel was waged between General Jackson and Mr. Calhoun. All the details of this political manœuvre constitute one of the most singular passages in the history of court intrigue. A perusal of the whole statement, from which the above extracts are made, is richly worth the purchase of this precious volume. Shortly after that dexterous achievement, Mr. Van Buren withdrew from the State Department, further to strengthen the advantages he had gained in his triumph over Mr. Calhoun, in regard to his future prospects for the succession to the Presidency. On this subject the Mirror, page 137, says:

"General Jackson's Cabinet was composed of one Van Buren man, [the little magician him-'self,] four Jackson men, and one Calhoun man. Now, had all these men been earnestly dis-'posed to promote the public service, instead of their private ends, there was nothing in their 'predilections which would have interfered with their public duty; and all who were competent 'might have continued in office. But their official stations gave *patronage* and *influence*, which 'might be serviceable to the LEADERS to whom they were respectively devoted; and Mr. Van 'Buren, who, from long experience, well knew the value of these, *resolved to wrest them from 'hands which would employ them adversely to himself;* and to such a purpose [adversely to 'himself] it was supposed Messrs. Ingham, Branch, and Berrien were devoted. He had just 'succeeded in overthrowing a powerful rival, and the dispersion of these enemies seemed, as it 'truly was, a trivial matter. On the 11th April, 1831, Mr. Van Buren took the new and suc-'cessful course of sacrificing his enemies, by an apparent *offering up* of himself; addressing a 'letter to the President, he declared 'he felt it his duty to retire from the office to which the 'President's confidence and partiality had called him.'" [Mr. Eaton had tendered his resigna-tion on the 7th April.]

It appears that these gentlemen, in their letters of resignation, assigned such reasons for so doing as were supposed would be satisfactory to the public, and cover hidden motives and precon-certed arrangements. Gen. Jackson, also, to put the final gloss over the whole affair, assigned his reasons for reorganizing his cabinet. The Mirror says "there is a total want of keeping be-tween the reasons assigned [by Gen. Jackson] and those given by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War." The same author further adds, page 140:

"That the true motive for breaking up the cabinet were not those assigned by the President; 'that it was an act premeditated; and that the resignations of Messrs. Van Buren and Eaton 'were the consequences and not the cause of the determination, we have further evidence in the 'confessions of the President and the wily Secretary, [viz:]

"The President having invited to a private audience one of the secretaries, (Mr. Branch, 'whom he was about to dismiss,) for the purpose of making known to him the new arrangements 'on which he had determined, said, with an air of diplomatic caution and studied precision, 'Sir, 'I submit to you two letters which I have received from the Secretary of State and the Secretary 'of War, resigning their respective offices, and ask for them your serious consideration.' 'Sir,' 'replied the astonished Secretary, 'I am a plain man, and your friend. Our intercourse has been 'of long duration, and you know that diplomacy is no part of my character or of yours. Be so 'good, therefore, as to tell me frankly what you intend, and what you desire of me.' 'Then, 'sir, I will inform you that I mean to reorganize my cabinet.' 'Very well, sir; I hope you will 'profit by the change. I have not been your friend for the sake of office. I wish only to be in-'formed whether my conduct, while in your cabinet, was satisfactory to you.' 'Sir,' said the 'President, 'I have no fault to find with you.' 'With this assurance,' said the Secretary, 'I 'am contented; but allow me to inquire who is to be your Secretary of State?' 'Mr. Living-'ston,' was the reply. 'Who is to take the Treasury Department?' 'Mr. McLane, now 'minister in England.' 'Who will occupy the Navy Department?' 'Mr. Woodbury.' 'And 'pray, sir, who is to replace Mr. McLane in England?' 'MR. VAN BUREN.'"

"Soon after the dissolution of the cabinet, whilst Mr. Van Buren was waiting at New York 'the arrival of Mr. McLane from England, he replied to the inquiry of a partisan friend—that 'he had the offer of the mission to the Court of St. James, but had not yet decided as to the pro-'priety of accepting it. His friends, he said, differed as to the policy of his leaving the country 'at that time, there being some arrangements to make in the republican party, for future opera-'tions—and observed that he was anxious to have an interview with Mr. McLane, before de-'parture, should he determine to go. Being interrogated as to the real cause of the dissolution 'of the cabinet, he answered that Mr. E**** had no agency in the matter; but that it was 'caused more by the conduct of Mr. Calhoun and Mr. Ingham, *who desired the retirement of*

'*General Jackson from office at the expiration of the first four years* of his term of service, and 'who had endeavored to consummate their designs by traducing the character of ————. To 'the remark that he, Mr. Van Buren, had managed well to pass unscathed through the fiery or- 'deal, he laughingly replied, 'Yes, I had seen for some two or three months the approach of 'trouble, and that a dissolution of the cabinet must ensue—the materials being too discordant to 'continue together in harmony—and, to save myself, I thought it better to retire in time, KNOW- 'ING THAT IF I LED THE WAY THE REST MUST FOLLOW.'"

Accordingly Mr. Van Buren, in pursuance of the preconcerted arrangement, by which he reduced the whole cabinet to a spoil, and appropriated a slice of $19,000 to himself, (having also artfully contrived to interweave into his letter of resignation a nomination of himself for the Presidency, as Gen. Jackson's successor, and to obtain the General's sanction of his course,) departed for Europe, in the summer of 1831, to represent the United States at the Court of St. James, where he had but lately *disgraced* his country by his diplomatic instructions to Mr. McLane. To convict Mr. Van Buren of this charge (which was the principal ground of the rejection of his nomination by the Senate at the ensuing session, by the casting vote of Mr. Calhoun, then Vice President) it will be sufficient to contrast his own sentiments, expressed in a *speech* in the Senate in 1827, on the very same subject, with the corresponding passage in his *instructions* to Mr. McLane in 1829. In his speech in the Senate, the 24th February, 1827, upon our negotiations to regain the British colonial trade, he said:

"In a Government like ours, founded on freedom of thought and action, imposing no neces- 'sary restraints, and calling into exercise the highest energies of the mind, occasional differences 'of opinion are not only to be expected but to be desired." "But this conflict of opinion should 'be confined to subjects which concern ourselves. In the collisions which may arise between the 'United States and a foreign Power, it is our duty to present an unbroken front. Domestic dif- 'ferences, if they tend to give encouragement to unjust pretensions, should be extinguished or 'deferred; and the cause of our Government must be considered as the cause of our country. 'The humiliating spectacle of a foreign Government speculating for the advantage which it may 'derive from our dissensions will, I trust, never again be the reproach of the American people!!"

Now mark what came directly afterwards from this political impersonation of the grossest contradictions and inconsistencies, as soon as the fates had put it in his power to act upon this very subject of regaining the colonial trade. In his instructions to our minister, dated July 20, 1829, he said:

"If the omission of this Government to accept the terms proposed, when heretofore offered, be 'urged as an objection to their adoption now, it will be your duty to make the British Govern- 'ment sensible of the injustice and inexpediency of such a course. The opportunities which you 'have derived from a participation in our public councils, as well as other sources of information, 'will enable you to speak with confidence—of the respective parts taken by those to whom the 'administration of the Government is now committed, in relation to the course heretofore pursued 'upon the subject of the 'colonial trade.' Their views upon that point have been submitted to the 'people of the United States; and the counsels by which your conduct is now directed are the re- 'sults of the judgment expressed by the only earthly tribunal to which the late administration was 'amenable for its acts!" "To set up the acts of the late administration as the cause of forfeiture of 'privileges which would otherwise be extended to the people of the United States, would, under 'existing circumstances, be unjust in itself, and could not fail to excite their deepest sensibility." '"The tone of feeling which a course so unwise and untenable is calculated to produce, would 'doubtless be greatly aggravated by the consciousness that Great Britain has, by orders in council, 'opened her colonial ports to Russia and France, notwithstanding a similar omission on their part 'to accept the terms offered by the act of July, 1825."

In the name of all that is just and honorable let me ask, was not the last recited fact sufficient to satisfy Mr. Van Buren's mind that the same privileges and participations in the colonial trade which were extended to Russia and France under *similar* circumstances, would also, upon the customary honorable course of negotiation, be restored to the United States, without disgracing the preceding administration, and humiliating the country at the footstool of our ancient enemy? Not only, then, is Mr. Van Buren condemned, in advance, by his own judgment expressed in 1827, for this anti-patriotic conduct, but manifestly, it was a superfluous excess of party spirit, as wanton as it was uncalled for. But, nevertheless, it was in perfect good keeping with the whole tenor of Mr. Van Buren's *political life*, from which it would have been a singular departure had he not done precisely what he did. The emphatic words of the author of the Political Mirror (p. 166) declare that "The nomination of Mr. Van Buren was rejected in Senate, upon the ground, *distinctly put*, that *he*, 'the Secretary of State for the United States of America, had shown a manifest disposition to establish a distinction between *his country* and *his party*; to place *that party* above *the country*; to make interest at a foreign court, *for that party*, rather than *for the country*; to persuade the English ministry, and the English monarch, that *they* had an interest in *maintaining* in the United States the *ascendency* of *the party to which he belonged*.'" "Other political sins of the ex-Secretary (says the Mirror) were reviewed at this period, and none were more severely reproved than the *quarrel* he had caused between

the President and Vice President, the *dispersion* of the first cabinet, and the introduction of the odious system of *proscription* (for the exercise of the elective franchise) into the Government of the United States—a system drawn from the worst period of the Roman Republic, making the offices, honors, and dignities of the people, *prizes to be won*, *booty to be gained*, at every presidential election—producing contests that would be intolerable, and which must result in inexorable despotism."

This *rejection* by the Senate, however imperiously called for to vindicate the honor of the nation against the stigma cast on it by the official offences of the nominee, nevertheless furnished a new *pivot* on which the wily politician and the abettors of his purpose of *spoliations* might turn their future electioneering operations. Very few persons either in Congress or among the multitude of voters had any knowledge of Mr. Van Buren's previous hypocritical and treacherous political course, by which he had successively wormed himself into high stations—but, regarding him only as the adopted friend of General Jackson, they generally considered the action of the Senate more in the light of an insult offered to the venerated chief, than as a merited rebuke to a *political adventurer;* and therefore they were in a state of mind fully predisposed to second and adopt any electioneering arrangements to revenge the offended President and his discredited minister, by advancing him to the highest official honors in the gift of his country, first by commissioning him to preside over the very body that had recalled him, and, secondly, by commissioning him to preside over the whole Union, whose honor he had degraded as the football of his party, to which he has since given her treasury as a spoil. It is obvious, then, that the whole popular enthusiasm that was immediately and industriously gotten up by the Executive influence, for the first time thrown into the political arena, was virtually and substantially to *vindicate*, through a generous, deceived, and abused people, at the ballot box, a guilty, condemned, and disgraced minister; and this, too, was to be effected by the artifices of Executive and other official electioneering, through an organized party press, emanating from the suggestions of the offender himself. But he succeeded! and the public now know pretty much of the details by which he did succeed; and, in consequence of the abuses he has practised since his election, and the people's present better acquaintance with the dishonorable means by which he has enabled himself thus to abuse their confidence, they are now prepared to confirm the rejection of the Senate, by ejecting him from the Presidency.

It being consonant with my plan, from the beginning of this review, to let Mr. Van Buren pronounce his own sentence of condemnation, as we have seen he has been compelled to do in the public prints in more cases than one of late, he shall have an opportunity to do so, once more, on the theme of the Third Period of his political career, which no doubt will be his last appearance in any political capacity.

THIRD PERIOD.

"I allude, sir, to that COLLISION, which seems *inseparable, from the nature of man*, between the RIGHTS of the *few* and the *many*, to those never-ceasing CONFLICTS between the advocates of the *enlargement* and *concentration* of POWER on the one hand, and ITS *limitation* and *distribution* on the other: CONFLICTS WHICH IN ENGLAND *created the distinction between* WHIGS and TORIES—the LATTER striving by all means within their reach to *increase* the INFLUENCE and DOMINION of the THRONE, at the expense of the common People; and the FORMER to *counteract* the exertions of their adversaries, by *abridging* that DOMINION and INFLUENCE, for the advancement of the *rights* and consequent AMELIORATION of the CONDITION of the PEOPLE."—(*Van Buren's speech on Foote's resolution, session* 1827–'28.)

Mr. Van Buren, while a Senator in 1828, *reprobated the Tory principle of the enlargement and concentration of power, and advocated the Whig principle of the limitation and distribution of power: his practices while President of the United States convict him, under the criteria of his own judgment, as an apostate Whig, a Tory, and a traitor to his country and her constitution.*

Mr. Van Buren having exerted his great experience in political matters, while a Senator, a member of General Jackson's cabinet, and Vice President, in "*uniting*, *harmonizing*, and *directing*, those with whom he acted," to promote executive encroachments on the other departments of the Government, and to concentrate all power in the President—as I have demonstrated in the foregoing sections—it remains now to say a few words on the *uses* and *abuses* he has made of those "concentrated powers" in the brief space since his election to the Presidency.

I have already anticipated most of these details, by recitals and references incident to the First and Second Periods of life just reviewed; and all the themes of this Third Period being made familiar to the public mind by executive messages, secretaries' reports, congressional proceedings, public discussions, and newspapaper notoriety, there is no occasion for me to dwell upon them here, though, in a practical sense, the most important period of the Magician's life. I have

taken a survey of the *serpentine* course by which Mr. Van Buren *wormed* himself successively, stealthily, and upon trust, almost without inquiry, into high stations, till he actually reached the topmost pinnacle of honor—showing how artfully he established redoubts and safe-guards about his imaginary *throne*, even before he had attained the platform on which he purposed to erect it. Preparatory to a summary recapitulation of those fortresses of concentrated and usurped powers, I shall cite one more *remarkable instance of the wily man's fair professions*, to show how Mr. Van Buren, while he was an humble suppliant before the People for small favors, condemned *in advance* his own subsequent acts, and, as a good *Whig*, in a speech, sneered with ineffable scorn upon the whole class of *Tories* who had ever practised the same acts before him.

In a speech in the Senate of the United States in the winter of 1827–'28, on Mr. Foote's motion to invest the Vice President with power to call to order for words spoken in debate, Mr. Van Buren gave a good description of "WHIGS" and "TORIES," showing the hostility of the former against that "*enlargement* and *concentration* of power," which he represents the latter as ever seeking to achieve and grasp in their own hands; taking occasion, at the same time, to eulogize the whig principles of "*limitation* and *distribution* of power." But how entirely he has reversed these professions by his practice, since he has officiated in the executive department, and particularly since he has been President of the United States, is at last in a fair way to become well known to every voter in the country. On the occasion above-mentioned, Mr. Van Buren said:

"It is the *source* from whence the power of calling to order had been claimed for the Vice President, which had excited *his* anxiety. In claiming that power by *implication*, he said, principles had been advanced and earnestly supported, against which *he* felt it to be HIS *duty*, at least, to protest." "In every point of view, said Mr. Van Buren, in which this subject had presented itself to *his* mind, it had produced but one sentiment, and that was UNQUALIFIED OPPOSITION *to the* PREROGATIVE claimed for the chair. Although this claim of power is now for the first time made, the *principle* in which it originates is as OLD as the Government itself. I look upon it, sir, as the legitimate offspring of a school of politics which has, in times past, agitated and greatly disturbed this country; of a school, the leading principle of which may be traced to that great source of political contentions which have pervaded every country where the *rights of man* were in any degree respected. I allude, sir, to that collision, which seems inseparable, from the nature of man, between the *rights* of the FEW and the MANY, to those never-ceasing conflicts between the advocates of the *enlargement* and *concentration* of POWER on the one hand, and its *limitation* and *distribution* on the other; conflicts which, in England, created the distinction between WHIGS and TORIES—the latter striving by all means within their reach to increase the *influence* and *dominion* of the THRONE, at the expense of the common people; and the former to counteract the exertions of their adversaries, by abridging that *dominion* and *influence*, for the advancement of the rights and the consequent amelioration of the condition of the people." Again, "No candid and well-informed man will for a moment pretend, that if the powers now claimed for this Government had been avowed at the time, or even had not been expressly disclaimed, there would have been the slightest chance for the adoption of the constitution by the requisite number of the old thirteen States. *But it was ratified*, (said Mr. Van Buren,) and from the moment of its adoption to the present day, the spirit he had described, had been at work to obtain by construction what *was not included* or *intended to be* included in the grant." "It was then that the *monarchical* and *aristocratical* character of the spirit he had described, was displayed in increasing efforts to wrest from the States the powers that justly belonged to them, to exercise such as had never been conferred, and to CONCENTRATE, *as far as practicable*, ALL AUTHORITY IN THE HANDS OF THE PRESIDENT."—(*See Holland, pages* 285, 291.)

Thus did Mr. Van Buren once solemnly protest against the "implication of power," and declared his "unqualified opposition to the PREROGATIVE it claims;" a prerogative which is incomparably more dangerous in the President of the United States than in the Vice President, the mere presiding officer of the Senate. He also referred this "implication of power," and its consequent "prerogative," to a school of politicians who, he says, are ever seeking to enlarge and concentrate power in their own hands, whom he calls *Tories*, in contradistinction from *Whigs*. And, in his zeal for whig principles, he even embraces the occasion to calumniate many of our revolutionary fathers who framed our system of Government and set it in motion, embracing General Washington, Mr. Jefferson, and Mr. Madison, among the rest, of course, as a part of this school of politicians or Tories, who "advocate the enlargement and concentration of power in the hands of the *few*, in derogation of the rights of the *many*," for they advocated and practised, "implied" or "incident," executive powers that enure to the "responsibility" of the office, for the good of the service. Nay, he even extended this calumny by imputing, necessarily, to those and other eminent patriots, "efforts to wrest from the States the powers justly belonging to them—to exercise powers by the General Government which had never been conferred upon it—and to concentrate all authority in the hands of the President."

Now, after this seemingly ardent manifestation of Whig principles, even unto the extreme of perpetrating an outrageous calumny against many of our best patriots of the Revolution, this simple question arises—What has Mr. Van Buren DONE, since he attained the Presidential chair, to *repair*, to *curtail*, and *restore* this enlargement and concentration of power in the General Government, and especially in the hands of the President? Has he taken a single step towards it? No, not one!

1st. Has he repudiated the incidental or implied executive power of making *removals from office?* Not he; far from it. He has not even confined himself to that wholesome limit prescribed by Mr. Madison, of power "incident to the executive office," to remove FOR CAUSE AFFECTING THE GOOD OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE. On the contrary, he exercises this "implied power" of removal to the odious extent advocated by Tories, (not for cause, for such, generally, being of his own spoils party, he does not remove, but) for the indulgence of the most fiendish

of monarchical prerogatives, TO PUNISH HIS POLITICAL ENEMIES; and that, too, with less regard to the public good than if he were exercising the province of his *personal rights* or his *private property*.

2d. Has he restricted himself exclusively to the consideration of the good of the public service in *making appointments?* He has not. Rather, he has made his appointments exclusively and *avowedly* upon the spoils principle, of conferring rewards on zealous partisans for their party services, otherwise called a "payment of political debts"—palpably substituting his *party* for his *country*—confirming, in a yet more aggravated form, this very charge of the Senate, on which they based his rejection as minister to England; more aggravated, I say, because these very party appointments, as part of the system of reducing the commonwealth to a spoil, are sent to the Senate for their confirmation, and which, as his party vassals, they do confirm.

But this is not all. Regarding the consequences of this latitudinous exercise of the correlative powers of removals and appointments, which are even pretended to be incidental or implied to the Executive office, in the extent to which they are used, there has sprung up, simultaneously with this assumption of power, a system of *peculations*, *frauds*, and *defalcations*, that has jeoparded all the available resources of the Treasury, as the rightful spoils of the official party, to the utmost bounds that they think proper to go; for there appears to be no definite or recognised limit to these depredations, except in the different degrees of hardihood of the individuals practising them.

This system manifests itself, 1st. In the enormous *charges* made against the Government on account of all casual JOBS, from the most trivial to the most important, in every department of the Government, when such opportunities are afforded to the favorites of the Executive. 2d. In extra *allowances*, unknown to law, for services alleged to have been performed over and above the remuneration of the regular salaries, or as being performed out of official hours—whereas, there are no such casualties to authorize an allowance of any sort in those cases, the fixed compensation of law entitling the Government to the entire service of its officers, without further charge, unless Congress chooses to make a donation upon any extraordinary emergency. 3d. This system of depredations manifests itself in the *defalcations* of RECEIVERS and DISBURSERS of public money, to any amount that such officers may abstract, at intervals or by the lump, out of the moneys in their hands; which Mr. Van Buren considers to be "less objectionable in individuals, than for corporations to use the public money" placed on deposite with them by the authority of the Government!

3d. Finally, has Mr. Van Buren *confined* himself to the constitutional injunction that the President "shall from time to time give to Congress *information* of THE STATE OF THE UNION, and recommend to their *consideration* such MEASURES as he shall judge NECESSARY and EXPEDIENT?" He has not. In regard to the sub-Treasury measure, particularly, he has also overleaped the obvious limitation of this clause, and has taken the initiative, if not the entire, power of legislation into his own hands. In the first instance, he recommended the "consideration" of this measure, connected with a statement of the *financial embarrassments* of the whole country, and of the banking institutions of the States, in his message to the called Congress in 1837; but that body did not think proper to adopt the measure. Having thus performed his constitutional duty, here the matter would have ended, had he a sincere regard for the "limitations of power." But, true to the Tory principles of "extending and concentrating power," which he has substituted for the whig principles that he once eulogized of "limiting and distributing power," he has, at every subsequent Congress, insisted upon the *adoption* of the same measure, which he had, in fact, no right to advert to as such, *unconnected with further information of the state of the Union in that regard*, which alone could justify his bringing it forward as a new measure, based upon the *further* and severally communicated [new] information, from time to time, of the state of the Union. But more: without the *new facts* and *information*, the absence of which stamps the several renewed presentations of the same measure as an Executive dictation to Congress, he has taken steps, through his party managers in the House of Representatives, to insure a majority subservient to his ambition, by disfranchising a sovereign State in depriving her of her full representation, by *excluding* five of her six members, legally returned, before the House was organized and in a condition to pass judgment upon the returns of its members in any contested cases—thereby realizing a most daring encroachment upon the "rights of the States," which he once affected to hold in such high veneration!

So far, then, from abandoning the specific enlargements of Executive power, or renouncing the encroachments on the legislative department, he has pressed them to the greatest extremity; and even beyond these, he has on several occasions made vigorous efforts to raise the Executive authority above that of the Judiciary Department; which, however, has been as yet successfully resisted, and that, too, the more to their credit, by a bench constituted of his predecessor's appointments in the proportion of *seven* in *nine*.

All the rest of Mr. Van Buren's Executive acts, which can in any degree be made subservient to party interest, which he holds above the interest of his country, are of a piece with this summary, showing that he is, to all intents and puproses, an apostate Whig, a rank Tory, a traitor to

his country and her constitution, for the sake of the hope to perpetuate his power, *by basely holding up the commonwealth as a spoil to his deluded party!*

☞It must be obvious to the intelligent reader, that these few pages can only be offered, as a systematic outline, or frame-work, to be filled up by future details.

But without these, the reader is now sufficiently initiated into the solecism, which equally sustains the truth that Mr. Van Buren did every thing, and advocated every opinion—and the contrary of every thing and every opinion, that have been charged against him: Hence, his partisans dare deny the truth of those charges, when the fact is, that both allegations of his contradictory actions and opinions are true. He has been for and against *every thing* and *every body*, EVERY OPINION and EVERY PARTY, as it happened to suit the VARYING PHASES OF HIS ERRATIC POLITICAL LIFE. But still it may be said, he has been constant in these, because they have subserved his PRE-EMINENT CONSTANCY IN THE PURSUIT OF THE SPOILS OF OFFICE AND THE CONCENTRATION OF POWER.

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FIRST PERIOD.

"Even at that early age, too, [FOURTEEN, WHEN HE COMMENCED THE STUDY OF LAW,] Mr. Van Buren is represented, by those who knew him, to have had a spirit of observation, with regard to *public events* and the *personal dispositions* and *characters of those around him*, which gave an EARNEST of his future *proficiency* in the SCIENCE OF POLITICS and of the HUMAN HEART."
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III. Mr. Van Buren opposed the adoption of a bill of rights with the New York constitution--he opposed the extension of the elective franchise—and he opposed the amenability of the higher officers of State to the ordeal of popular elections : the inconsistency of his sentiments on the veto power--his advocacy of long terms and re-election to the chief Executive—the inconsistency of his doctrines and practice respecting the "spoils of office ;" a system of which he was the unenvied author.

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[*Holland's Life, &c., page* 208.

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THIRD PERIOD.

"I allude, sir, to the collision, which seems inseparable, from the nature of man, between the rights of the few and the many, to those never-ceasing conflicts between the advocates of the enlargement and concentration of power on the one hand, and its limitation and distribution on the other: conflicts which in England created the distinction between Whigs and Tories—the latter striving by all means within their reach to increase the influence and dominion of the Throne, at the expense of the common people ; and the former to counteract the exertions of their adversaries, by abridging that dominion and influence, for the advancement of the rights and consequent amelioration of the condition of the people."—(*Van Buren's speech on Foote's resolution, session* 1827-'28.)

Mr. Van Buren, while a Senator in 1828, reprobated the Tory principle of the enlargement and concentration of power, and advocated the Whig principle of the limitation and distribution of power : his practices while President of the United States convict him, under the criteria of his own judgment, as an apostate Whig, a Tory, and a traitor to his country and her constitution.

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